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Abstract 
 
Informativeness has been used as an explanatory concept in linguistics and other 
fields. I discuss previous accounts of informativeness, and propose a model for assessing 
a component of it, focusing on the distribution of negated and non-negated English 
adjectival past participles (APPs), like eaten and uneaten. An utterance is informative to 
the extent that it increases the cognitive availability of information not fully available via 
context or category membership, what one knows about an item through knowing its 
category.  
To assess the portion of informativeness related to category membership, or CM-
informativeness, I propose a model that uses categories based on qualia (elements of 
meaning) or linguistic items, which have gradient members whose centrality represents 
cognitive availability. CM-informativeness relates to centrality: an utterance that 
associates a category base with some member of that category is more CM-informative if 
the member is peripheral than if it is central.  
The distribution of APPs is explained via the model as follows: an APP occurs more 
often in non-negated form if its common collocates have categories in which the APP is a 
peripheral member, because the negated form can then be thought of as a central member. 
Since an utterance associating a category base with a peripheral member is more 
informative than one associating it with a central member, and informativeness correlates 
with frequency, phrases with the non-negated APP occur more often here. Contrastingly, 
if an APP’s common collocates are those with categories in which it is a peripheral 
member, the reverse occurs. 
This model may be generalized to a variety of linguistic forms. For some expressions 
the CM-informativeness that it assesses is predictive of frequency. This work enriches the 
conception of informativeness by developing a new characterization and a cognitive 
model of how one aspect of informativeness may be assessed. This is intended to 
elaborate on, rather than replace, previous accounts of informativeness.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The concepts of information and informativeness have been used in many fields for at 
least half a century.1 ‘Information’ generally refers to the content of a proposition, which 
can be transmitted and possessed or known by someone; ‘informativeness,’ on the other 
hand, is typically used to denote a property of a proposition, message, or part of a 
message, and involves (but is not necessarily limited to) how much information it 
contains or supplies. Information and informativeness are often used in the discussion of 
propositions, or statements that have truth values. However, other elements such as 
symbols, numbers, phonemes, words, phrases, and functions are also said to carry 
information and thus have degrees of informativeness (Fogerty & Humes 2010, Wang & 
Inhoff 2010, van Duym 2010, Shannon 1948). The ideas of information and 
informativeness are used in a wide variety of disciplines, including semantics, linguistic 
pragmatics, philosophy, electrical engineering, computer science, and mathematics. 
Within linguistics, informativeness is most commonly used in accounts, such as Grice’s 
(1975), of the differences between what is said and what is communicated. However, it 
has also been used in studies of childhood pragmatic development (e.g., Bagassi et al. 
2009; Davies & Katsos 2010) and narrative analysis (e.g., Murray 2010), among other 
topics, and is shown here to be useful in explaining relative frequency of some phrase 
types. 
Despite their common use, the concepts of information and informativeness often 
remain ill-defined, and when explications of these two closely related concepts are given, 
they frequently appear inconsistent both within and across fields. A number of 
researchers in fields such as speech and hearing sciences, psychology, semantics, and 
cognitive science have treated informativeness as the degree to which something reduces 
the number of possibilities for a value, event outcome, etc.2 For example, given an array 
of three red shapes, comprising a star, a triangle, and a circle, and the information that 
John likes exactly one of the shapes, the proposition John likes the triangle (which 
                                                
1 E.g., Bruner & O'Dowd (1958) and Shannon (1948).  
2 E.g., Fogerty & Humes (2010) on perception, Calhoun (2010) on prosody, Steele & Watkins (2010) on 
word learning, Syrett et al. (2009) on children’s gradable adjective use, Bagassi et al. (2009) on children’s 
use of some, and Nieuwland et al. (2010) on processing of scalar statements.  
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reduces the number of possibilities from three to one) is said to be more informative than 
John likes a shape with points (which leaves two possibilities), and both are more 
informative than John likes a red shape, which is completely uninformative (as it does 
not eliminate any of the original three possibilities).  
This way of measuring informativeness can be thought of as similar to a view, 
espoused by Horn (1972) and many others, of informativeness as having to do with 
entailment; put in its simplest form this view states that if A entails B, but B does not 
entail A, then A is more informative than B. Returning to the propositions above, we can 
say that John likes the triangle entails John likes a shape with points, but not vice versa, 
so again the former statement is viewed as more informative. Other researchers, in fields 
such as computational linguistics and neurolinguistics, have appealed to the amount (by 
various measures), correctness, and intuitive relevance of information in assessing 
informativeness.3 Many rely to varying extents on a Gricean notion of informativeness; 
Grice himself did not define ‘informative,’ and these researchers tend to do the same, but 
like Grice (1975) they utilize the notion of there being an appropriate level of 
informativeness in any given conversation.4 Various other definitions and assessment 
methods for informativeness abound.  
Calhoun (2010), who clearly identifies her use of informativeness as involving both 
contextual newness and the reduction of possibilities, acknowledges the lack of 
consistency in uses of ‘informativeness.’ She notes that “informativeness has been 
conceptualised in quite different ways in different disciplines” and that “how these 
different notions relate to each other, or indeed, if they are reducible to a single 
dimension” is unclear (2010:1101). Such inconsistency is problematic when, as noted by 
Calhoun (2010), different conceptualizations are not obviously connected or compatible. 
Compounding this is the fact that many researchers fail to adequately define exactly what 
they mean by ‘informativeness,’ leaving the reader to guess which of any number of 
                                                
3 E.g., Stark (2010) on aphasic storytelling, Clarke & Lapata (2010) on document compression, and 
Murray (2010) on narrative attributes of patients with depression compared with those of patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease.  
4 E.g., Davies & Katsos (2010) in applied linguistics, Bagassi et al. (2009) in psychology, and Neiuwland 
et al. (2010) in cognitive sciences.  
 3 
possibilities might have been intended.5 Such oversights may be particularly common 
because ‘informativeness’ is a word whose basic sense any competent English speaker 
can deduce; however, like many relatively familiar terms, it requires explication when 
used specifically as a technical term. Though the inconsistency of definitions can present 
problems, it also has the advantage of allowing for characterizations customized to 
particular work. One may, therefore, take advantage of the flexibility of the concept while 
avoiding confusion by presenting a clear characterization of informativeness along with 
discussion of how that characterization relates to previous accounts of informativeness; 
this is what I endeavor to do in this work. 
In my work on adjectival past participles, I found that informativeness was an 
explanatory factor in the relative distribution of negated and non-negated participles in 
attributive position. I thus required a characterization of informativeness, and a way of 
assessing it; finding inspiration but no fully satisfactory accounts in the work of others, I 
developed my own characterization, which I present here. This is intended not to replace 
previous accounts of informativeness, but to elaborate on them in a way that has not 
previously been done in order to generate an account that is useful for purposes beyond 
those to which informativeness has thus far been applied. In particular, I apply 
informativeness to the purpose of explaining the relative frequency of adjectival past 
participles, though I maintain that my characterization of informativeness may be useful 
for other objectives as well. In brief, I propose that a phrase or utterance6 is informative 
to the extent that it increases the cognitive availability of information not already fully 
available via category membership or context, and thereby reduces the number and/or 
likelihood of possibilities for the event, state, or entity to which it refers. I do not require 
an item to be of a propositional form in order to have the property of informativeness, 
though I do require that information be of a propositional form; and I treat cognitive 
availability as the ease with which something may be brought into conscious thought. I 
define context broadly to include one’s cognitive environment, noting that aspects of 
                                                
5 E.g., Wang & Inhoff (2010) in cognitive neuroscience and psychology, and van Leeuwen et al. (2009) in 
neuropsychology.  
6 ‘Utterance’ here and throughout this work is intended to any conversational turn or constituent thereof, 
regardless of modality; an utterance may have propositional or non-propositional form. 
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one’s physical and cultural environment may be part of one’s cognitive environment.  
Although my characterization represents a development in the area of linguistic 
informativeness, the primary contributions of this work lie in its focus on information 
provided by category membership and its application of information and informativeness 
so conceived to the study of the distribution of adjectival past participles. In the simplest 
terms, information provided by category membership is information that one has about an 
item, based on prior knowledge of a category, when one knows the category to which an 
item belongs. The cognitive availability of such information is a function of how closely 
it is associated with the category in question, so that information about attributes 
necessary for category inclusion is fully available. In order to provide a structure for such 
knowledge and a way of assessing how it contributes to informativeness, I propose a 
model in which categories can be based on qualia or linguistic items and have gradient 
(or more- and less-central) members whose centrality represents cognitive availability. 
The portion of informativeness related to category membership, which I call CM-
informativeness, can then be assessed via the centrality of a category member: when an 
utterance associates a linguistic item on which a category is based with some member of 
that category, the utterance is more informative if the member is relatively peripheral 
than if the member is relatively central. This relates to the fact that information that is 
less cognitively available prior to an utterance is that which, by being made fully 
available, has its cognitive availability most increased; one might think of this as the 
information that would be found the most “surprising.” 
The mechanisms described above are used to explain the distribution of negated and 
non-negated adjectival past participles in attributive position. An adjectival past participle 
occurs more often in non-negated form if its most common noun collocates are those with 
categories in which the participle is a peripheral member; this is because, in such a case, 
the negated version of the participle can be thought of as a central member. As stated 
above, an utterance associating a category base with a peripheral member is more 
informative than one associating a category base with a central member, so phrases with 
the non-negated form of the participle in question tend to be more informative than those 
with the negated form. Because, ceteris paribus, more informative utterances are expected 
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to occur more often than their less informative counterparts, in this case phrases with the 
non-negated form occur more often, leading to higher frequency of that form than of the 
negated form. In contrast, if an adjectival past participle’s most common collocates are 
those with categories in which the participle is a peripheral member, the reverse occurs: 
phrases using the negated form of the participle tend to be more informative and occur 
more often than those with the non-negated form, leading to greater frequency of the 
negated form. 
In chapter 2, I give an account of how the concepts of information and 
informativeness have been used in some influential theories. I begin in 2.1 with theories 
not associated with linguistics, recounting the general principles and early development 
of information theory, followed by the views of Dretske (1981) as a representative of the 
philosophical perspective on information and informativeness. Within linguistics, I 
discuss Grice’s (1957-1991) work in some detail in 2.2.1, since it is the foundational 
work on implicature, the most prominent area in linguistics in which the concept of 
informativeness is used. Along with this I outline Horn’s (1972) work on scalar 
implicature. I then briefly review the work of Horn (1984) in 2.2.2 and Levinson (1987; 
2000) in 2.2.3, both of whom propose revisions to Grice’s system. Finally, in 2.2.4 I 
provide a somewhat detailed account of relevance theory as developed by Sperber & 
Wilson (1995), as this theory shares a number of resemblances to my own proposals (not 
coincidentally – it was a major influence on my work). 
Chapter 3 contains, in 3.1, a summary of the study on adjectival past participles that 
led to my formulation of an account of informativeness. As part of that account, I provide 
my initial characterization in 3.1.6. Then, in 3.2, I give a description of other factors that 
affect the relationship between informativeness and relative frequency of phrases of the 
type studied. These include the fact that more informative phrases are likely to be 
applicable less often, the influence of conventionality, and clashes in CM-
informativeness. Following that, I provide a more current revision and expansion of my 
characterization of informativeness in 3.3, revising my stance on propositionality and, in 
particular, propositional form (it is no longer required of an informative item, though is 
required of information), clarifying what is meant by ‘cognitive availability,’ discussing 
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why category membership-related informativeness is considered to be possessed by the 
recipient prior to an utterance, and proposing my view of lexical items as having many 
qualia with a range of applicability.  
Next, in chapter 4, I detail the category-based model described above. First, I discuss 
category attributes in 4.1, noting that categories have graded structure, are individualized, 
and can be common or ad hoc. Then, in 4.2, I show that a category can be based on a 
linguistic item and have qualia as members; for the sake of simplicity I examine only 
telic quale as members, and nominals as bases. A category can also be based on a quale, 
as I show in 4.3, and have linguistic items as members; again I confine my discussion to 
nominals and telic qualia, with the understanding that what is shown can be generalize to 
other types of linguistic items and qualia. For either category type, the CM-
informativeness of a pairing between a category base and a member (or a linguistic item 
derived from base or member) is higher when the member is more peripheral, and lower 
when the member is more central. Next, in 4.4, I discuss interactions between categories 
of similar types. I then provide a generalized account of the types of assessments and 
predictions that the model allows for. Finally, in 4.5, I discuss differences between my 
model and other theories’ treatments of informativeness; the most prominent of these is 
my focus on CM-informativeness, which is what the model assesses. 
I conclude in chapter 5 by first reiterating the motivation for my work: to expand 
upon current characterizations of informativeness by providing an account that serves to 
explain the distribution of adjectival past participles and that has the potential to be useful 
for other purposes. Following that, in 5.2, is a review of what I have proposed and how 
this contributes to the field. In 5.3 I note some limitations of my work, and this leads to a 
discuss of future directions for research in 5.4. I provide concluding remarks in 5.5. 
 
  
 7 
Chapter 2. Background: previous characterizations of informativeness 
2.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss some background on the concepts of information and 
informativeness, particularly in the contexts of information theory and philosophy in 2.1 
and several linguistic theories in 2.2. In the field of linguistics I focus first on Gricean 
implicature, which, as a theory proposed by a philosopher and used heavily in linguistics, 
can be thought of as bridging the gap between philosophy and linguistics. Following that, 
I discuss the principles of Horn (1984) and Levinson (1987; 2000), both of whom based 
their work on that of Grice (1975).7 Finally, I examine relevance theory, which also grew 
partly out of work on implicature but makes use of some concepts from information 
theory as well.  
2.1 Information and informativeness outside of linguistics 
2.1.1 Information theory 
 Information theory (IT) is used primarily in mathematics, computer science, 
electrical engineering, and other fields. It operates under what is generally known as the 
code model, in which communication is viewed as a process of encoding followed by 
decoding. The model consists of the following components shown in (1) below (Ash 
1965; Shannon 1948). 
(1) a. Source: the origin of the message to be communicated.  
 b. Transmitter or encoder: takes the message from its original form to that of the 
code.  
 c. Channel: accepts input (coded message) in the form of a signal from the encoder; 
provides signal output to the decoder; is susceptible to noise, or interference that 
causes output to differ from input.  
 d. Receiver or decoder: takes the coded output from the channel and renders it usable 
to the final recipient of the message.  
 e. Destination: the final recipient of the message.  
These components are illustrated below. 
                                                
7 1975 is the year of publication in a book; the work is based on a speech given in 1957 and transcripts had 
been circulating since then, hence Horn (1972) being able to address topics treated in what is here referred 
to as Grice (1975). 
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Figure 1: The code model of communication 
One can see in figure (1) the path that a message takes from source to destination. IT was 
initially designed to deal only with discrete sources, or those that “generate the message, 
symbol by symbol” and “choose[s] successive symbols according to certain probabilities 
depending, in general, on preceding choices as well as the particular symbols in question” 
(Shannon 1948:5). However, it is no longer limited in this way. It is important to note 
that while the code model has been (and in some cases continues to be) used as a model 
for human linguistic communication, it applies to other types of communication as well. 
The source and encoder could be a speaker in a discourse, and the decoder and 
destination a hearer, but they need not be. This model has frequently been discussed (e.g., 
by Shannon 1948) with respect to radio, telephone, and television signal transmission, the 
types of transmissions for which it was originally developed, as well as transmission of 
other types of messages. While Shannon does address the information content of 
language specifically in his seminal 1948 work, it is with reference to written, rather than 
spoken, language. 
The principal objectives of IT were originally to construct a mathematical version of 
the model described in (1) and shown in figure (1), and thereby to “provide methods for 
studying and discussing [signal distortion and interfering noise]” with the aim of 
maximally reducing these while minimally increasing the quantity of signal transmitted 
(Young 1971:7). Another way this goal is framed is, with a signal of set quantity, to 
maximally reduce distortion and noise while minimally reducing the amount of 
information actually transmitted via the signal; in other words, to send the greatest 
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amount of information possible, as clearly as possible, given the limitations of a signal 
and channel (Ash 1965). It is important to note that this goal is quite different from those 
of subsequent theories to be discussed. One of IT’s important tenets is that there is a 
calculable value, the channel capacity, to which the amount of information transmitted 
per unit of time must be decreased in order to reduce noise and distortion to an arbitrarily 
low value and thus achieve “arbitrarily high reliability” of the transmission (Ash 1965:3). 
Channel capacity is measured in binary digits, or bits, per second. A bit is a unit 
representing the amount of information stored by a device in one of two possible 
positions, or the amount conveyed by eliminating one of two possibilities (Shannon 1948, 
Ash 1965). Here we see the first indication of informativeness having to do with the 
reduction of possibilities, as discussed in 2.0. 
 Maximizing the amount of information transmitted by a minimal signal necessarily 
involves defining and quantifying information, but despite its name, the measurement and 
especially the nature of information are less than central aspects of information theory. 
Sayre identifies a major “difference between [IT] and semantics” as “the difference 
between the study of the conditions for the communication of any message whatsoever 
and the study of the content of particular messages” (qtd in Dretske 1981:47). Dretske 
argues that IT may be “more properly viewed as a theory of signal transmission…. A 
genuine theory of information would be a theory about the content of our messages, not a 
theory about the form in which this content is embodied” (1981:40). On the topic of 
amounts of information, Ash notes that measuring the transmission rate of information is 
critical for the notion of channel capacity, and “...if we could pin down the notion of 
uncertainty, we would be able to measure precisely the transfer of information,” which is 
defined in IT as that which removes uncertainty (1965:4). The amount of information 
associated with an event or state correlates with the reduction in uncertainty caused by 
that event or state, or how many possible outcomes were eliminated by it (Dretske 1981). 
Ash proposes a theorem for uncertainty based on the probabilities of all possible 
outcomes for a situation (Ash 1965: 8)8.  
                                                
8 Note that a very similar explanation and function appear in Shannon (1948:11).  
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Ash notes that uncertainty is independent of an outcome’s possible values and 
“anything else except the probabilities associated with those values” (1965:11). He does 
not offer an assessment of whether this limitation is good or bad, but instead remarks, as 
an example, that the uncertainty of a unbiased coin toss “is not changed by adding the 
condition that the experimenter will be shot if the coin comes up tails” (1965:11). What 
Ash presumably means to convey is that, since in this case the probabilities referred to 
above are the probabilities of a heads or tails toss, something extraneous like the 
experimenter’s well-being is completely irrelevant to the uncertainty of the situation and 
thus to the type or amount of information provided by a particular outcome. Though Ash 
does not, one could allow for some sort of modification to either the uncertainty equation 
or the calculation of probability values to permit the inclusion of experimenter-shooting 
probability, which would, in this scenario, be 1 for tails and 0 for heads, assuming that 
under this condition a coin flip of heads means the experimenter will not be shot. 
However, the same amount of uncertainty (regarding both the outcome of the coin flip 
itself as well as the fate of the experimenter) is removed by both heads and tails 
scenarios. Since information is viewed as removing uncertainty, this is equivalent to 
saying that both outcomes are equally informative.  
Compare, however, a scenario in which an outcome of tails means that the 
experimenter will be shot, while an outcome of heads gives no clue about the 
experimenter’s fate – he or she may or may not be shot. In this case, a crucial difference 
in assessment between IT and other theories discussed later in this chapter rests on the 
context in which uncertainty, information, and relevance are assessed. Following Ash’s 
intimation that a set of probabilities must be for a single random variable, that is heads vs. 
tails, this situation is exactly the same as the one discussed above, in which heads meant 
safety for the experimenter. This is because, within the context of coin outcome only, to 
which probabilities are confined by Ash’s calculations, the amount of uncertainty reduced 
by each outcome, and thus the amount of information provided, is identical to that of 
other outcomes in both scenarios. However, if one allowed for the uncertainty regarding 
the experimenter’s fate to somehow be incorporated into the function as well, expanding 
the context in which outcomes are assessed, the same would not be true. Then, a tails 
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outcome completely removes all uncertainty about both the coin (tails) and the 
experimenter (shot), while a heads outcome removes all uncertainty about only the coin 
(heads) while all uncertainty remains about the experimenter. Within this larger context, 
the tails outcome clearly removes more uncertainty and is thus more informative, but this 
is not the type of context that IT’s calculations are set up for; indeed IT basically ignores 
context, focusing instead on one discrete variable at a time.  
In quantifying information, IT operates under the assumption that “any message 
which has a high probability of occurrence conveys little information,” or in other words, 
removes little uncertainty (Young 1971:4). Thus the least likely messages convey the 
most information, and a message that is certain to occur conveys no information at all. 
The highest level of uncertainty, and thus the maximum information content, occurs 
when all possible symbols, messages, or outcomes have equal probabilities of occurring 
(Young 1971, Ash 1965).  
IT does distinguish between the information content of a message and the amount of 
information actually received, by considering only what might be called ‘new’ 
information or content: “In order to obtain the actual information per symbol received, 
the total amount of the prior information per symbol possessed by the recipient must be 
subtracted from the information per symbol which the recipient would have received if he 
did not already have the prior information” (Young 1971:30). To apply this principle to 
human linguistic communication, one might imagine eliminating the phrase “per symbol” 
above. Thus the total amount of information in a message minus the amount that is prior 
knowledge of the recipient equals the total amount of information received from the 
message. If all the information in a message is also prior knowledge of the recipient, no 
information is received.  
Although in assessing total information received it does take into account information 
that the recipient already has, IT does not place any importance on how the information 
in the message is conveyed. Thus, ceteris paribus, a message is considered equally 
informative whether it is delivered via gesture, Morse code, elaborate circumlocution, a 
simple statement in any language, or any other (ultimately successful) means (Young 
1971). Intuitively, these are not all equally useful or appropriate ways to convey a 
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message under most circumstances, but they are considered informationally identical. On 
a similar point, Dretske argues that what the message recipient knows about the reliability 
of the signal or channel is irrelevant: “as long as the signal is reliable, whether or not it is 
known to be reliable… the amount of information reaching the receiver about the 
source… equals… the amount of information generated at the source” (1981:81).  
 Thus far in this section information has been discussed without reference to whether 
it is propositional or non-propositional, but it was noted earlier that information and 
informativeness are terms often used in discussions of propositions. Information theory is 
somewhat atypical in that the basics of the theory essentially conflate propositionality and 
non-propositionality, noting that information may be supplied by anything that “produces 
a message or sequence of messages to be communicated to the receiving terminal” 
(Shannon 1948: 2). A message was defined as a sequence of symbols (which may or may 
not amount to something propositional), any of various types of functions, or any other 
discrete source (as described with reference to figure 1). In addition to bypassing the 
issue of propositionality, or perhaps because of it, the relationship between information as 
defined by IT and truth remains unclear – must (propositional) information be true, or do 
propositions of unknown or false truth value qualify as information? Certainly a false 
message may be transmitted like any other, and since IT is concerned mainly with 
transmission rates and form over content, one might expect that the theory would allow 
for false information transmitted in a decodable manner. 
 Over time, information theory as a field has broadened significantly, so that what was 
initially quite theoretical and intended to apply to a specific type of communication signal 
is now used for a much greater variety of applications. The evolution of information 
theory was guided in particular by its use in radio, military communications, coding, the 
space program, microprocessing, modems, and digital wireless communication (Aftab et 
al 2001). Today, IT is used by researchers whose work deals with information in a 
number of ways, including processing, storage, transmission, and use, in a variety of 
fields, including electrical and computer engineering, computer science, mathematics, 
biology, theology, cognitive sciences, and many others.  
2.1.2 Philosophy 
 13 
In addition to outlining information theory, Dretske (1981) provides one of the most 
complete and recent accounts of information and its transmission from a philosophical 
viewpoint, so his views will be discussed here as representative of a philosophical 
perspective on information and informativeness. His stated goal is, as one may expect, 
very different from that of IT; it also, he notes, may be “too ambitious” (Dretske 
1981:viii). That goal is to understand “how meaning can evolve, how genuine cognitive 
systems… can develop out of lower-order, purely physical, information-processing 
mechanisms” (Dretske 1981:vii). Dretske draws a distinction between meaning and 
information, proposing that one may consider the latter “as an objective commodity, 
something whose generation, transmission, and reception do not require or in any way 
presuppose interpretive processes” (1981:vii). This definition is quite similar to the 
information theoretical notion of the information content of a message, as distinct from 
the information actually received as the result of a message. Dretske notes that 
information is distinct from value, importance, truth, and knowledge; the fact that 
information is unaffected by the value a recipient may ascribe to it is one way in which 
information differs from meaning (1981:41,72). Despite the distinction between truth and 
information, Dretske writes that a message “may have a meaning but… carries 
information. What information a signal carries is what it is capable of “telling” us, telling 
us truly, about another state of affairs” (1981:44).  
It is clear from the quote above that Dretske views truth as a qualifying characteristic 
of information: “false information and mis-information are not kinds of information” 
(1981:45). He notes that a lie transmits no information, or at least “no information of the 
kind I purport to be giving… you may nonetheless get information, information about me 
(I am lying), from what I say, but you will not get the information corresponding to the 
conventional meaning of what I say” (1981:44). It is interesting to note at this point 
Dretske’s use of the word “conventional;” while he does not elaborate on this 
characterization, it seems to suggest an analysis that focuses away from inferential 
meaning, in sharp contrast with some of the theories to be examined later. Dretske 
defines a causal relationship between information and knowledge; knowledge “that s is 
F” is a “belief that s is F [which] is caused… by the information that s is F” (1981:86). 
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He emphasizes that, by this definition, “for a person’s belief to qualify as knowledge, 
there must not only be evidence to support it, the belief must be based on that evidence” 
(1981:91). Since information is by definition true, and information must be the cause of 
the knowledge belief above, it follows that knowledge must also be true.  
Dretske does not explicitly address whether information under his account is required 
to be propositional. However, his selection of the word ‘telling’ in the quote above on the 
difference between meaning and carried information, along with his repeated use of 
formulations such as “the information that s is F” (e.g., 1981:86), strongly suggests that 
propositionality is in fact a necessary or defining characteristic of information as he sees 
it. This appears to be a requirement that is shared with Dretske’s notion of meaning: 
meaning is defined as being manufactured from information, and if the raw material is 
propositional, the product would most likely be as well (1981). 
 As with information theory, philosophical views of information transmission tend to 
take into account what information the recipient already has. However, there is not as 
clear a distinction between information carried by a message and information gained by a 
recipient of that message. Dennett (1969) notes that received information is difficult to 
quantify because “the information received by people when they are spoken to depends 
on what they already know” (qtd in Dretske 1981:79). Dretske, while agreeing with the 
quoted statement, appears to conflate the information content of a message and 
information received by the addressee, instead drawing a distinction between “the amount 
of information generated by the occurrence of an event and the amount of information a 
signal carries about that event,” which he says can be compared using information 
theoretic formulae (1981:54). The information generated by an event or state of affairs is 
that which “a suitably placed observer” could gain from witnessing the event or state 
(Dretske 1981:45). He argues that the information contained in a signal is precisely 
quantifiable for a particular recipient by examining how much of the signal’s information 
is not in the recipient’s prior knowledge. Further evidence for the conflation of 
information carried and information received can be seen in Dretske’s assertion that the 
relevance of prior knowledge to information transmission has only to do with any effect it 
has on “the amount of information generated at the source by the existence of a specific 
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state of affairs” (1981:81). He also notes, however, that this relativization of information 
is unimportant when all parties involved share the same relevant prior knowledge, and 
argues that this is a common circumstance (1981:80). This aligns with Wilson and 
Sperber’s (2012) suggestion, noted later in this chapter, that a speaker generally knows 
the relevant prior information held by their addressee. 
 Concerning the transmission of information, Dretske recognizes a principle of 
transitivity and a “communication condition” that states that “if a signal carries the 
information that s is F, then it must be the case that… the signal carries as much info 
about s as would be generated by s’s being F,” that it is in fact true that “s is F,” and that 
the signal actually does carry the information “generated by s’s being F” (1981:57, 63-
64). The first part of this condition is something like a principle of conservation of mass, 
but for information quantities instead, while the second reiterates the postulate that 
information must be true. The last part, though seemingly vacuous, prevents even perfect 
correlations from being identified as informational relations: “even if… whatever is F is 
G and vice versa… this does not mean that there is information in s’s being F about s’s 
being G (or vice versa)” (Dretske 1981:73). 
Though this section on informativeness outside of linguistics is by no means 
exhaustive, information theory and the views of Dretske represent two of the most 
important areas firmly outside of linguistics in which informativeness is used. I now 
move on to examining the concept of informativeness in areas more clearly related to 
linguistics. The next section is arranged chronologically, but this has the welcome effect 
of making Grice the next scholar whose work I examine. As a philosopher of language, 
he is an excellent person with whom to make the transition from discussing 
informativeness outside of linguistics to discussing it within linguistics. 
2.2 Information and informativeness within linguistics 
2.2.1 Gricean implicature 
Grice’s theory of conversational implicature is one of the best-known theories within 
linguistics that uses the concept of informativeness. Due to later development by Horn 
(1972), conversational implicature is also an area of linguistics in which informativeness 
has a relatively accepted, precise definition – the entailment-based definition mentioned 
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in 2.0, which is discussed more later. Grice’s work in this area stems from the general 
acceptance among logicians that there is a “divergence in meaning between… some… 
formal devices” of logic, such as ¬, ∧, ∨, and ∃x, and corresponding linguistic 
expressions like not, and, or, and “some (or at least one)” (Grice 1975:41). Grice 
intended to show with his analysis that such a divergence does not actually exist, and that 
“conditions governing conversation” account for the apparent differences in meaning 
(1975:43). In other words, the differences between formal logical devices and their 
corresponding linguistic expressions lie not in meaning, but in possibilities of 
interpretation. In addition, his theories account for the fact that, even outside the use of 
logical operators, “what a speaker intends to communicate is characteristically far richer 
than what she directly expresses; linguistic meaning radically underdetermines the 
message conveyed and understood” (Horn 2004:3). Accounting for this fact is the basic 
motivation behind, and goal of, all the theories discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
It can thus be seen that, based on their goals, the theories discussed throughout this 
chapter form three groups: IT, philosophy, and the remaining more linguistic theories.	  
2.2.1.1 The cooperative principle and conversational implicature  
Grice first introduced what he called “the Cooperative Principle,” “a rough general 
principle” that, under usual circumstances, interlocutors are expected to adhere to.  
(2) The Cooperative Principle 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are 
engaged. 
(Grice 1975:45) 
The purpose of this principle was to capture the fact that a conversation generally does 
not comprise “a succession of disconnected remarks,” and usually involves at least some 
amount of “cooperative effort” with interlocutors agreed, at a minimum, on “a mutually 
accepted direction” (Grice 1975:45). To go along with the cooperative principle, Grice 
proposed four conversational maxims, shown in (3).9 It is important to note that the 
                                                
9 Green (1996) notes that the maxims are explicitly not intended to constitute the cooperative principle, as 
some have mistakenly thought, but to accompany it. 
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maxims are intended not as rules per se, but as “unstated assumptions we have in 
conversations” or “default settings” of which interlocutors are mutually aware (Yule 
1996:37; Horn 2004:8). 
(3) Conversational maxims 
a. Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange). Do not make your contribution more informative than 
is required.  
b. Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true: 
Do not say what you believe to be false. 
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
 c. Relation10: Be relevant. 
d. Manner: Be perspicuous: 
Avoid obscurity of expression. 
Avoid ambiguity. 
Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
Be orderly. 
(Grice 1975:45-6) 
The cooperative principle and the maxims capture the fact that interlocutors generally 
assume that those with whom they are interacting are speaking appropriately11 – namely, 
in a truthful and relevant manner, with the right amount of information, and without 
deliberate obfuscation. When necessary, a speaker may choose to partially or completely 
opt out of a maxim through the use of hedges such as I’m not sure, but maybe… (hedging 
quality) or Oh, by the way,… (hedging relation) (Green 1996; Yule 1996). However, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, a presumption is made that the speaker is 
obeying all maxims,12 and a great deal of information is obtained as a result of this 
presumption, via what Grice calls conversational implicatures.  
                                                
10 Also known as “relevance.” 
11 What is considered appropriate varies cross-culturally; the maxims themselves or how they are obeyed 
may need to be adjusted to fit other communicative cultures (Mey 2001). 
12 Grice (1978) distinguishes this from separate presumptions that the speaker is obeying each maxim 
individually. 
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An implicature, according to Grice, is an inference made by a hearer about what a 
speaker has “implied, suggested, meant, etc.” (Grice 1975:43). Though Grice is less than 
clear on the point, Levinson asserts that Grice means to classify as implicatures only 
those inferences which are “intended to be recognized as having been intended,” thus 
excluding from classification as implicatures those inferences that a hearer may make on 
the basis of errors or unintentional cues by the speaker (1983:101). Information that is 
implicated is distinct from what is actually said. What is said comes from the 
conventional meaning of the words in an utterance, along with the grammatical structure 
of the utterance and additional information like referents, disambiguations of words and 
phrases, speaker, and time and place of utterance (Grice 1975; Horn 2004).13 A 
conventional implicature is what is indicated by the conventional meanings of the words 
(but, again, is not actually said). For example, Grice provides the utterance “He is an 
Englishman; he is, therefore, brave” and notes that the speaker of such an utterance will 
not have “said (in the favored sense) that it follows from his being an Englishman that he 
is brave,” but rather will have “certainly indicated, and so implicated, that this is so” 
(1975:44-45). The distinction here between what is said and what is implicated rests on 
Grice’s (1975) claim that, should it turn out that “he” is in fact an Englishman and brave, 
but that his bravery is not a consequence of his Englishness, the utterance would not be 
false. In later works, Grice makes similar points about the use of but, on the other hand, 
and so (Carston 2002). 
In contrast, a conversational implicature (hereafter referred to as just an 
“implicature,” as conventional implicatures will not be further discussed) is what is 
conveyed not by what is said or what conventional meanings indicate, but by “certain 
general features of discourse,” namely, those in (2) and (3) (Grice 1975:45). Unlike 
conventional implicatures, conversational implicatures can be eliminated or strengthened 
(Yule 1996; Horn 2004); this is discussed in section 2.2.1.4.3. Grice further distinguishes 
between generalized and particularized conversational implicatures, the former “aris[ing] 
in such a broad range of contexts that it will not seem to depend on the details of the 
context too much” while an instance of the latter relies on “special features” of a 
                                                
13 For a more formal treatment of “saying,” see Récanati (1991). 
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particular context and does not normally arise with every use of the linguistic forms that 
accompany it (Geurts 2010:17; Grice 1975:56; Horn 2004). Many scholars (such as 
Neale 1992 and Geurts 2010) treat this distinction as unimportant, and it will not be 
further discussed here. However, many examples given will be what Grice would 
consider particularized. 
An implicature can arise either from the presumption that a maxim is being obeyed, 
or when a maxim seems to have been violated. Violation may result from a “clash” 
between maxims – a situation in which two maxims are in conflict, and in order to obey 
one maxim, another must be violated, and vice versa (Grice 1975:49; Green 1996). 
Violation may also occur either in order to deceive or in order to convey a message other 
than what is strictly said  (in the sense of “said” discussed above). Grice refers to the 
latter type of violation, or “blatantly fail[ing] to fulfill” a maxim, as flouting a maxim 
(1975:49); this is discussed in 2.2.1.3 and in parts of 2.2.1.4. 
2.2.1.2 Implicatures that arise when maxims are obeyed  
Implicatures caused by the presumption that the speaker is obeying a maxim will 
hereafter be referred to as “standard implicatures,” following the terminology of 
Levinson (1983). They routinely arise in a talk exchange in the absence of mitigating 
factors, or “wherever features of the context do not actually block them” (Levinson 
1983:108). A hearer’s assumption of cooperation on the part of a speaker, together with 
an interaction in which the speaker appears to obey the conversational maxims, enables 
the hearer to easily make a number of inferences regarding the truth, relevance, 
informational appropriateness, and clarity of the speaker’s utterance. Due to the maxim of 
quality, the hearer infers that what the speaker says is true, or at least the speaker thinks 
this is the case and has adequate evidence to think so. The maxim of relation allows the 
hearer to assume that what the speaker says is relevant to the point of the discourse. 
Because of the maxim of manner, the hearer accepts that the speaker’s way of speaking is 
as clear, cogent, and appropriate to the hearer’s characteristics as possible. And the 
maxim of quantity leads the hearer to understand that the information the speaker 
provides is enough, but not too much, for the point of the discourse. Such inferences are 
frequently so unremarkable and automatic that they may seem barely worthy of 
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discussion, but it is precisely because they are usually given so little thought that it is 
appropriate to explicitly outline them.  
Some example standard implicatures can be seen to arise from the exchange shown in 
(4). 
(4)  A: What time is it? 
B: It’s ten fifty-one. 
Here B intends to convey, and A is able to assume, based on the maxim of quality, that it 
is actually 10:51, or at least that B thinks it is and has good reason to do so; for example, 
B may have just looked at a clock, not known to be inaccurate, that said 10:51. Unless 
there is any context to suggest otherwise, A can further conclude, by virtue of the maxim 
of relevance, that 10:51 is the time in A’s current location, since this is the most relevant 
time for A to know.14 Standard implicatures resulting from the presumed obeying of the 
quantity and manner maxims are easier to see with the exchange in (5): 
(5)  A1: I was really busy this morning. 
B: What did you do? 
A2: I walked the dog, took a shower, ate breakfast, finished my grant proposal, 
and bought and mailed a birthday present for my sister. 
B is justified in concluding that A meant to convey that he did the things in A2 in the 
order stated, and that, absent any context indicating otherwise, none of the descriptions 
given are euphemisms or obscure phrases used to indicate activities other than those that 
are immediately called to mind (e.g., A does not mean that before his shower he engaged 
in the yo-yo trick known as “walk the dog”). Both of these conclusions are motivated by 
B’s assumption that A is obeying the maxim of manner in A2. Further, on the basis of the 
presumption that A is obeying the maxim of quantity, B may infer that the activities A 
mentioned were the main or most important things that he did that morning. However, 
because the quantity maxim forbids both overinformativeness and underinformativeness, 
                                                
14 Examples of context that might suggest otherwise: B is in another time zone and has mentioned needing 
to get to bed (so B’s local time would be relevant); or A needs to call someone in another location and B 
has warned A not to do it right now because it may awaken them (so the time in the location of the person 
A needs to call would be relevant). 
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B may also surmise that the list of activities is not exhaustive, and that A did other things 
not worth mentioning, such as wake up, breathe, and get dressed. 
As shown in (4) and (5), implicatures can arise without the violation of a maxim, 
simply as a result of a hearer’s supposition that a speaker is being cooperative, and this 
supposition causes standard implicatures of several types. Such implicatures arise as a 
result of the cooperative principle together with the conversational maxims, and are 
foundational for the creation of any further (non-standard) implicatures.  
It is worth noting that standard implicatures rely a great deal on calculations or 
decisions made by the speaker: what constitutes adequate evidence of truth; what the 
point of the discourse is; what the hearer’s characteristics are and what is appropriate to 
someone with these characteristics; what information the speaker already has (and 
therefore does not need, even if it is necessary for the point of the discourse). Any 
difference of opinion between speaker and hearer on any of these points can result in the 
speaker unwittingly violating a maxim and motivating the hearer to make other 
inferences which, being unintentionally triggered by the speaker, would not be classified 
as implicatures.  
2.2.1.3 Implicatures that arise when maxims are violated  
A speaker who has adequate and accurate knowledge of what is appropriate/expected 
can choose to say something conspicuously inappropriate or unexpected in order to create 
an implicature by using the cooperative principle and one or more maxims to send a 
message distinct from the conventional meaning of his/her utterance: “we can make a 
blatant show of breaking one of the maxims… in order to lead the addressee to look for a 
covert, implied meaning” (Leech & Thomas 1988:15-16). A hearer who perceives an 
apparent violation of one or more maxims is presented with a dilemma: a maxim seems 
to have been violated, but the hearer generally maintains a supposition that the speaker is 
following the maxims. Therefore the hearer’s reaction to this situation is to search for a 
way in which the speaker may not actually be violating a maxim. In Grice’s (1975) 
explanation, the hearer may have something like the thought process shown in (6): 
(6)  The speaker’s saying of x seems to violate one or more maxims. 
If the speaker, by saying x, intends me to understand y, then the speaker is not 
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violating a maxim, and my supposition about his cooperativeness may remain. 15 
The speaker may reasonably think y. 
The speaker may also reasonably think that I have the ability to discern that y is 
what he intends me to understand, though he has said x.16 
As a result of this thought process, the hearer will suppose that the speaker did, in fact, 
intend y to be understood, and will thus understand y. Then y is an implicature caused by 
the apparent violation of a maxim, and the speaker has conversationally implicated y. 
This is the basic process by which intentional apparent violation, or flouting, of a maxim 
can cause implicature. As described by Levinson, this process is “based on the 
remarkable robustness of the assumption of co-operation: if someone drastically and 
drastically deviates from maxim-type behavior, then his utterances are still read as 
underlyingly co-operative if this is at all possible;” the speaker’s apparent violation of a 
maxim thus “force[s] the hearer to do extensive inferencing to some set of propositions, 
such that if the speaker can be assumed to be conveying these then at least the over-
arching co-operative principle would be sustained” (1983:109). 
Examples of implicatures caused by flouting can be seen with reference to the 
exchanges shown in (7), (8), and (9). In (7), the maxim of quality is flouted by B. 
(7) A and B live 1000 miles apart. B has many obligations at home, but is coming to 
visit A in June, and they are discussing the duration of the trip. 
A: I wish you could stay longer! You know the weather here will be much better 
than the weather there in late summer, so you could just not even go home until 
October. 
B: Oh okay, sure, I’ll just tell everyone here that they’ll have to live without me 
for five months! 
In this exchange, A has expressed a suggestion that is plainly infeasible and unrealistic: 
that B visit for five months. B’s response is sarcastic and untrue – B does not intend to 
                                                
15 It is arguable that a speaker who says x in order to convey y is necessarily violating the maxim of 
manner; one may consider this a clash between the manner maxim and the reason that the speaker has for 
choosing flouting, where the speaker has opted to prioritize the reason for flouting over obeying the manner 
maxim.  
16 In later work, Grice uses the term “M-intend” to capture intent by a speaker to produce an effect in a 
hearer “by means of [the hearer’s] recognition of that intention” (1991:68). 
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tell those at home to do without her for five months – and this is intentionally made clear 
to A. In this case, B’s intended implicature, and the message that A receives, is that B 
thinks A was silly to even propose a five-month visit. 
 In (8), A flouts the maxim of manner. 
(8) B has lots of experience with young children, and A knows this. B has come to 
A’s house to babysit A’s child, who is currently very cranky. 
A: Somebody definitely needs to take an N-A-P [pronouncing the names of the 
letters]. 
By her utterance, A is engaging in ambiguity (“somebody”) and obscurity of expression 
(by spelling rather than saying the word “nap”). Because A has blatantly violated the 
maxim of manner in these ways, B is able to infer that the child should not be made 
aware of A’s assessment. A relies on B’s experience with children to enable her to figure 
out that this is because, as is common with young, tired children, the child is irritable and 
is denying being tired, so hearing someone say that he should take a nap would only 
make him crankier. 
 In (9), the maxim of relation is flouted in order to more efficiently send a message 
that could have been conventionally said. 
(9) A and B are running errands, with B driving. They had planned to stop at the 
hardware store to replace a faucet fitting. Approaching the road that the hardware 
store is on, B has not activated a turn signal. 
 A: Aren’t you going to turn? 
 B: I forgot the fitting. 
Here B has flouted the maxim of relation by saying something that, by its conventional 
meaning alone, does not constitute an answer to A’s question. However, A is able to infer 
that B is not going to turn. This is based on the fact that A presumes B intends to answer 
the question, and knows the reason for turning is to go to the hardware store, the reason 
for going to the hardware store is to replace the fitting, and in order to be sure that the 
correct fitting is purchased, they must have the old one with them. Thus flouting the 
maxim of relation allows B to provide a very concise but adequate answer to A’s 
question. 
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2.2.1.4 Quantity implicature 
While both types of implicature – standard and flouting – can be discussed with 
reference to each of the maxims and submaxims in (3), the focus here is on the maxim of 
quantity, which, in enjoining speakers to provide neither too little nor too much 
information, necessarily engages the issue of the measurement of informativeness. 
Interestingly, Grice neglected to define informativeness or a way of measuring it when he 
proposed his maxims of conversation; while informativeness is often measured in terms 
of entailment, this was not explicitly discussed with reference to implicature until Horn’s 
(1972) dissertation, which is discussed later in this chapter. Regarding the amount of 
information an interlocutor provides, Grice wrote simply that a cooperative speaker 
should “make [his or her] contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange);” this was intended to classify as uncooperative both over- and 
under-informative contributions (1975:45). It is unclear whether, in Grice’s view, 
something must be propositional in order to be informative; however, some of his 
discussion with respect to the quantity maxim suggests that propositionality is not 
necessary for informativeness. For example, Grice (1989) notes that using an expression 
of the form an X can be considered less informative than using a similar expression in 
which the owner of X is identified, e.g. my X. This would seem to indicate that non-
propositional items can be informative, but it could also mean simply that a proposition 
using an X is less informative than one using a form such as my X. Further, Grice later 
states that “false information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is not 
information” (1989:371); this seems to indicate not only that information must be true, 
but that it must be propositional – since truth is a property of propositions. Then, 
assuming that to be informative something must contain information, informativeness 
would in fact be a property limited to propositions. 
Grice is even less explicit on the subject of whether an addressee’s previous 
knowledge should be considered when determining the informativeness of an utterance. 
However, he says nothing to suggest that previous knowledge should not be considered, 
and it seems reasonable to interpret the phrase “for the current purposes of the exchange” 
from the maxim of quantity as including consideration of one’s partner in the exchange 
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and information he or she might already have (Grice 1975:45). While informativeness 
itself is not noted to be affected by other attributes of a message, such as how it is 
conveyed or how it relates to other information, some of these are clearly addressed by 
other maxims, particularly those of manner and relation. 
Whether or not an utterance has the appropriate or expected level of informativeness 
for the discourse, implicatures may arise as a result of the level of informativeness. These 
can be classified into two categories: those relating to overinformativeness, and those 
relating to underinformativeness. Implicatures related to overinformativeness are the 
standard implicatures that arise from the presumption that a speaker is not being 
overinformative, as well as the implicatures that arise from a speaker flouting the quantity 
maxim by being intentionally apparently overinformative. Correspondingly, the 
implicatures related to underinformativeness are the standard ones that result from the 
hearer presuming that the speaker is not being underinformative, and the implicatures 
created when a speaker flouts the quantity maxim by being intentionally apparently 
underinformative. 
2.2.1.4.1 Overinformativeness 
 As noted above, standard implicatures arise when a hearer presumes that a speaker is 
not being overinformative, or is not giving more information than is needed or 
appropriate. In particular, the hearer infers that all of the information being given is 
necessary and/or appropriate for the discourse. For example, if A asks B how to prepare a 
particular food, and B gives directions that consist of five steps, A will infer that B meant 
it is necessary to complete all five steps. Even when a speaker appears to be 
overinformative, the hearer will try to maintain his/her conception of the speaker as 
cooperative; this fact enables the speaker to be intentionally overinformative in order to 
trigger one or more non-standard implicatures. 
Intentional apparent overinformativeness, or flouting of the quantity maxim, can be 
used to trigger implicatures with several different message types, shown below: 
(10) a. The speaker wants the hearer to know the full extent of his/her knowledge. 
b. The speaker thinks that the hearer should have more information than the 
hearer wants or expects. 
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c. The speaker wants to make the hearer think that the topic is more difficult or 
complicated than it actually is, by portraying that all the information given is 
necessary. 
Most of these will be seen to directly contrast with implicature types caused by 
intentional apparent underinformativeness, given later in (23). 
(10a) is a type of implicature that may arise in a situation in which the speaker is 
trying to impress the hearer, or perhaps dispel any notions the hearer may have about the 
speaker’s ignorance. (11) shows an example of what would most likely be considered the 
former motivation: 
(11) A is a teacher speaking to his class; B is a student in the class. 
A: What do we call the structure that bees live in? 
B: Bees live in a hive, which is made of beeswax and has lots of cells, each with 
six sides. Each hive has a queen, who grows up in a special cell of the hive. 
Here the student (B) has given the information A asked for, plus quite a bit more related 
information. Assuming that B is aware that this is more information than was necessary 
or expected, A and B’s classmates are likely to infer that B wants them to be impressed 
with his knowledge of beehives and for this reason has chosen to share more of it than 
was necessary.  
In the type of implicature in (10b), B again gives A more information than B knows is 
desired or expected, but this time it is because B thinks A should have this information – 
perhaps A needs the information but does not realize it, or A should (in B’s opinion) want 
the information. An example in which this type of implicature might arise is below: 
(12) A is going to housesit for B, and B hands A a set of keys.  
A: Which key is for the front door?  
B: The red one, which you also have to use in order to lock the door. When you’re 
locking or unlocking it, you need to pull the door towards you in order for the key 
to turn easily. 
In this situation, B has given more information than A explicitly asked for or was likely 
expecting, but it is clear that B thinks this information is necessary for A, and wants A to 
realize that; knowing which key to use to unlock the door is not particularly useful if one 
 27 
does not know the trick to get the key to actually work, or how to lock the door 
afterwards. A thus gets the implicature that this other information is also important, 
realizing that he needed it even though he did not know enough about the situation 
beforehand to explicitly expect it. 
The type of implicature in (10c) contrasts with that in (10b) in that, in (10c), B gives 
extra information not because she thinks it is necessary, but because she wants A to think 
that it is necessary. A’s intent here is thus quite similar to B’s intent in (12), but with 
different motivation: in (12) B wanted A to think the information was necessary because 
it was, in fact, necessary, while in (13) A wants B to think the information is necessary 
despite the fact that it is not. Causing A to think that more information is necessary is a 
way to give him the impression that the topic under discussion is more difficult or 
complicated than he thinks it is (and than it actually is). B may desire to cause this 
impression in order to intimidate A or to dissuade him/her from some course of action, as 
in (13).  
(13) A is an amateur violinist who asks a luthier friend, B, for advice on repairing a 
bow.  
B thinks that A is overestimating his precision woodworking abilities, and that the 
repair should be done by someone more qualified and with better equipment, but 
does not want to offend A by saying so directly.  
A: So, my bow has a crack in the tip. It’s a pretty small crack, and it was a cheap 
bow to begin with, so I thought I’d try to repair it myself and see how that goes. 
I’ve read a bit, but can you tell me the basic process you’d use? 
B replies to A’s request for advice with an extremely long and detailed set of 
instructions on how to repair the bow, with lots of description of warnings to be 
extremely careful.  
B has almost certainly given A more information than he was expecting; B’s hope in 
doing so is that A will get the implicature that B thinks the repair is beyond A’s 
capabilities, and that A will allow B or someone else more trained in luthiery to do it. 
 In this section I have shown that implicatures arise from the assumption that speakers 
are not overinformative in usual circumstances. Implicatures also arise when a speaker 
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appears to be intentionally overinformative, as a result of the hearer inferring the reason 
for the speaker’s apparent overinformativeness. In the next section, I discuss the same 
processes with respect to underinformativeness.  
2.2.1.4.2 Underinformativeness 
As with overinformativeness, standard implicatures result from a hearer’s 
presumption that a speaker is not being underinformative, or is not providing less 
information than is needed or appropriate. One such type of standard implicature is that 
any information that was not provided was either not appropriate or was unnecessary. 
The second type of standard implicature caused by assuming a non-underinformative 
speaker is known as a scalar implicature, and involves the hearer’s presumption that the 
information provided is as informative as is possible given the other maxims. 
For example, if A tells B I have two dogs, B is able to infer that A means to say that 
she has exactly two dogs, and in fact does have exactly two – no more, and no fewer. 
This is based on two maxims. The maxim of quality enables B to assume that A is not 
lying,17 and as such, she must have at least two dogs, since her statement would be false 
if she had only one or zero dogs. The maxim of quantity provides the motivation for B’s 
assumption that A has at most two dogs, since, if she did have more than two dogs, A 
would be withholding information that it is appropriate to supply in this conversation (the 
information that she has one or more additional dogs).18 Taken together, then, the quality-
based assumption of at least two and the quantity-based assumption of at most two yield 
a combined assumption of exactly two. 
The implicature that B makes in assuming that A has at most two dogs is an example 
of a scalar implicature; this type of implicature is one of the primary and most well-
known areas of linguistics in which informativeness and its relative quantification are 
used. Scalar implicatures were first written about extensively by Horn (1972), who 
introduced the notion of scales on which linguistic items are ordered such that an item 
                                                
17 Note that all other implicatures are basically dependent on the assumption that the quality maxim is being 
obeyed; many, including Grice himself, have taken this position and thus given the quality maxim status as 
the most important of the maxims (Grice 1975; Levinson 1983; Horn 1984, 2004). 
18 If A happened to have five dogs, she has not actually lied: having five dogs, she also necessarily has four 
dogs, three dogs, two dogs, and one dog. The strength of the quantity implicature, however, is such that this 
type of information withholding is frequently perceived by the hearer as a lie, when in fact one may 
differentiate between lying and deception, and classify this withholding as the latter.  
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entails all items to its left but does not entail any of the items to its right.19 The ordered 
linguistic items are, of course, not randomly selected: “scalemates” are taken to be 
relevant in some shared context (Geurts 2010). It is then said that the rightmost item that 
accurately describes a situation is the most informative in that situation, with 
informativeness effectively defined as the number of entailments regarding the relevant 
scale. According to Horn (1972), the use of each item on the scale implicates that none of 
the items to its right could accurately be used. Therefore asserting any item on the scale 
implicates the negation of all items to its right (Yule 1996). This effect arises because of 
Grice's injunction to “be as informative as is required” (Grice 1975:45). 
A very simple scale of this type can be seen with the cardinal numbers; as noted in 
footnote 17, that there is (or that one has, etc.) a number n of items entails that there is 
also every number from one to n of that item, but it entails nothing regarding the 
possibility of there being more than n items. As Horn (1972:41) says, sentences 
containing numbers “assert lower-boundedness – at least n – and… may, depending on 
the context, implicate upper-boundedness – at most n – so that the number may be 
interpreted as denoting an exact quantity.” Thus a “Horn scale” for the cardinal numbers 
is as follows, where << indicates one-way entailment and can be read ‘is entailed by.’ 
(14) 1 << 2 << 3 << 4 << 5 << 6… 
Returning to A and her dogs, one can see again how B reached the conclusion that A has 
exactly two dogs: it is implicated by the quantity maxim that A is using the most 
informative quantity possible to describe her dog-owning situation, meaning that none of 
the numbers to the right of two on the scale must be available for use (i.e., to use them 
would not be truthful, so A must have no more than two dogs). Further, since no number 
below two entails two, A has asserted that she has at least two dogs, so in B’s view she 
must have no fewer than two, since B assumes she is obeying the maxim of quality. Once 
again, the conclusion is reached that A has exactly two dogs, using the “general fact” that 
“scalar predicates [and quantifiers] are lower-bounded by assertion and upper-bounded 
by implicature” (Horn 1972:42). However, as shown above, this conclusion is relatively 
                                                
19 Some have proposed scales based on relationships other than entailment (e.g., Hirschberg 1985). 
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easy to reach without directly referencing a scale such as that in (14). It is with less 
obvious entailment situations that Horn scales become more useful. 
One of the first scales proposed by Horn was for quantifiers, and is shown below: 
(15) one << some / a few << several << many << half << most / a majority << all / every 
           Horn 1972:61 
This indicates that several, for instance, entails both some and one, and implicates some 
amount less than many, half, most, or all (Horn 1972). Thus, according to Horn's (1972) 
analysis, in a situation where (16a) is not true but (16b) is, (16c) is also true but less 
informative than (16b), and (16d) is even less informative than (16c), though still true. 
(16) a. There are many trees in the yard.  
  b. There are several trees in the yard.  
c. There are some trees in the yard.  
d. There is one tree in the yard. 
If one construes some as less than several, as Horn does, then certainly (16c) is true if 
(16b) is, though (16c) fails to fully describe the extent to which there are trees in the yard. 
Likewise, certainly there is one tree in the yard if there are several, but it would be 
pragmatically uncooperative to use (16d) when either (16b) or (16c) was true. Thus a 
hearer of (16d) will, under most circumstances, conclude that the yard in question 
probably does not contain enough trees for (16a), (16b), or (16c) to be accurate, i.e., there 
is exactly one tree in the yard.  
Horn (1972) provides a number of other examples of items that operate on a scale 
with respect to implicature; in most of these cases, the scale is like those in (14) and (15), 
with one-way leftward entailment. Among predicates, scales can be seen for certain 
adjectives. One such example is the coolness scale below: 
(17)  lukewarm << cool << cold          (Horn 1972:38,48) 
Several things must be noted about this scale. First, it may seem counterintuitive to think 
of each item on the scale as entailing the items to its left; this difficulty, however, can be 
surmounted by thinking of these entailments in terms of the scale itself, rather than in 
absolute terms. That is, while one may find (18a) objectionable, (18b) seems to be 
acceptable because it references the scale in question. 
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(18) a. Cold entails lukewarm; if the water is cold, it must also be lukewarm. 
b. Cold entails at least as cool as lukewarm; if the water is cold, it must also be at 
least as cool as the temperature designated by lukewarm. 
Second, one may wonder why there is a coolness scale (and, though not yet mentioned, a 
corresponding warmness scale) instead of a single temperature scale as in (19a) or (19b).  
(19)  a. * cold << cool << lukewarm << warm << hot 
  b. * hot << warm << lukewarm << cool << cold  
Such a scale cannot exist because of problems with the directionality of entailment. 
Essentially, the right half of each scale above is correct: cold entails at least (as cool as) 
cool, and hot entails at least (as warm as) warm, but none of the statements in (20), all of 
which result from interpretation of the scales in (19), are acceptable. 
(20) a. Cool entails at least as warm as cold. 
  b. Cool entails at least as cool as cold. 
  c. Warm entails at least as warm as hot. 
  d. Warm entails at least as cool as hot.  
(20a) and (20b) are derived from the scale in (19a), and vary depending on whether one 
construes said scale as one of warmness or coolness. (20c) and (20d) are similarly 
derived from the scale in (19b). (20a), while not obviously false, is anomalous or 
underinformative at best. If one accepts the somewhat problematic notion of talking 
about the relative warmth of cool and cold, cool could in fact be said to entail “warmer 
than cold.” (20d) is comparable; while it is questionable to talk about the relative 
coolness of warm and hot in the first place, if this is accepted one can say that warm 
actually entails “cooler than hot.” (20b) and (20c) are simply false: cool is in fact less 
cool than cold, while warm is less warm than hot. From this it can be seen that neither of 
the scales in (19) are possible. Further proof of this can be found by examining 
implicatures, which can be felicitously contradicted, and assertions, which cannot. If 
(19a) were correct, cool should implicate not warm, just as some implicates not all. 
However, cool in fact asserts not warm, as can be seen by the fact that not warm cannot 
be contradicted: 
(21)  *It’s cool; in fact it’s warm.          (Horn 1972:39) 
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Similar results are found with implicatures predicted by the scale in (19b); hot does not 
implicate not cool, but rather asserts it. Thus there is ample evidence for separate scales 
of coolness and warmness.20 
Scales based on other adjectives also have corresponding opposite scales. This 
existence of corresponding “positive” and “negative” scales, as Horn calls them, is 
extremely common among scalar predicates, and interacts interestingly with the 
markedness of questions and answers: a neutral question (i.e., one that gives no 
information about the expected answer) that requests information on a scale “will employ 
a relatively weak element on the positive scale” (Horn 1972:72). In contrast, if the answer 
is “expected to fall on the negative scale,” the question is most likely to use a somewhat 
weak item from the negative scale. A question using a strong item from the negative scale 
likewise indicates expectation of a negative scale answer, but here the answer is expected 
to be a strong negative item, rather than simply any item from the negative scale. 
Similarly, a question that uses a strong positive item suggests that the asker expects an 
answer on the positive scale, and perhaps a strong positive. Consider again the scales of 
warmness and coolness; here the “positive” scale is that of warmness and the “negative” 
scale that of coolness. The following questions illustrate the effects Horn noted: 
(22) a. How warm is it? It’s a bit cold, pretty cool, very warm, extremely hot 
  b. How cool is it?  It’s a bit cold, pretty cool, # very warm, # extremely hot 
  c. How cold is it?  It’s a bit cold, (#) pretty cool, # very warm, # extremely hot 
  d. How hot is it?  It’s extremely hot, (#) very warm, # pretty cool, # a bit cold 
Any item on the warmness or coolness scale is an acceptable answer to (22a); a sample of 
these is shown. With (22b), however, only answers on the coolness scale seem highly 
appropriate, while those on the warmness scale are somewhat anomalous. For (22c), the 
given answers go in order from best to worst, or least to most anomalous, indicating that 
a strong negative answer is the most expected. The same effect is shown in (22d); note 
that the answers, again given from best to worst, are in exactly the opposite of the order 
in (22c). 
                                                
20 A final note is in order to remark that lukewarm can appear on both scales (leftmost in both cases), 
depending upon speaker and context. 
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Of course, standard implicatures, such as scalar implicatures, are not the only ones 
related to underinformativeness. A speaker who flouts the maxim of quantity by 
intentionally giving what seems to be too little information is likely to trigger one (or 
more) of a few basic types of implicatures, shown in (23). 
(23) a. The speaker has no further (truthful, well-evidenced) information to give. 
  b. The speaker thinks that the hearer should not have any further information. 
c. The speaker wants to make the hearer think that the topic is easier or simpler 
than it actually is, by portraying that the information given is all that is necessary. 
d. The speaker wants the hearer to feel that the hearer’s prior contribution(s) to 
the discourse was inappropriate. 
(23a), (23b), and (23c) correspond (and contrast) roughly to (10a), (10b), and (10c), 
respectively: both (a) items concern the amount of the speaker’s knowledge, (b)s involve 
the speaker’s opinion about what information the hearer should have, and in both (c) 
items the speaker is attempting to deceive the hearer with regard to the simplicity or 
complexity of the topic of discussion. While one could imagine a (10d) that contrasts 
with (23d), such an implicature type is not used commonly enough to be discussed here. 
(23a) represents a type of implicature likely to arise when a vague answer is given to 
a question that requires a more specific answer, as in (24): 
(24) A is supposed to drive B to a doctor’s appointment, and on the morning of the 
appointment: 
A: What time is your appointment? 
B: Some time between ten and noon. 
Clearly A needs more information in order to get B to the appointment on time, and there 
is no reason (given the relatively limited context described here) to suppose that B is 
purposely being uncooperative, so A is likely to get the implicature that B intends to 
convey that he does not currently recall the exact time of the appointment. Further, A 
may expect that B will, at some point relatively soon, find out the exact time and provide 
that information.  
The type of implicature in (23b) contrasts with that in (23a) in that it involves the 
speaker having further information, but simply not wanting to share it. This may occur if 
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the speaker views the information in question as private (at least with respect to the 
hearer), or if the information is necessary for the hearer to accomplish something that the 
speaker wants to thwart for some reason. The former is probably the more common 
situation, and is illustrated below: 
(25) Strangers are making small talk while waiting for a bus.  
A: So, do you have any kids?  
B: Yes. 
While B has technically fully answered A’s question, by not elaborating (how many, 
what sexes and ages) B has not given the amount of information generally expected in 
response to such a question. As a result, A is likely to get the implicature that B means 
that she is not comfortable sharing such information with a stranger, without B having to 
say so directly. 
While the next type of implicature, shown in (23c), is perhaps not as common as its 
opposite, discussed previously in (10c), it is still a possible type. Here the speaker seeks 
to deceive the hearer into underestimating the difficulty or complexity of the topic of 
conversation by acting as if the information given, which is actually too little, is 
sufficient. This may be done to encourage the hearer to attempt something that may 
otherwise sound too daunting, or to make the hearer feel inadequate when the supposedly 
easy endeavor turns out to be difficult, or perhaps for other reasons as well. An example 
of the first reason is given below: 
(26)21 A cookbook is being compiled, and one of the recipes requires the cook to sauté 
onions on low heat until they are thoroughly browned.  
The author writes: This may take 15-20 minutes.  
The editor removes this sentence, and writes in a note to the author: Your average 
reader will be intimidated by 15-20 minutes of stirring onions, but once they start 
cooking the onions, will continue until they are browned. Remove this time 
estimate so that it does not keep people from wanting to try this recipe. 
Here the cookbook reader ends up simply being told to sauté the onions until they are 
browned, without any estimate of time. The implicature drawn by the reader is likely to 
                                                
21 This example is based on a real-life anecdote regarding cookbook editing. 
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be that the author thinks the time required must not be very significant, or it would have 
been mentioned. It turns out, however, that this is not true, and the implicature was used 
deliberately to deceive the reader (and ultimately, to sell more cookbooks by making the 
recipes look easier).  
The last basic type of implicature that may result from giving too little information is 
that in (23d), which does not involve deceit but is somewhat negative in that it seeks to 
chastise the hearer and/or cause feelings of remorse or inadequacy. This is the situation 
type in which the speaker uses underinformativeness to signal to the hearer that the hearer 
has said something the speaker finds inappropriate.22 “Inappropriate” here is very broadly 
defined to include basically anything of which the speaker disapproves, whether because 
it truly is outside the bounds of decorum, it asks for more information than the speaker 
wants to give (in this way it overlaps with 23b), it is simply highly uninteresting, or for 
any other reason. Similar to (23b), this type of implicature involves the speaker sending 
the hearer the message, “I do not want to talk about this,” as in (27). 
(27) Coworkers are chatting during their break.  
A1: So, do you have any pets? 
B talks for several minutes about her current pets and their characteristics, past 
pets, and pets she hopes to have in the future. 
A2: I have a pet. 
Here both B (first) and A (second, in A2) have apparently violated the maxim regarding 
informativeness: B has given far too much information, and A far too little. The primary 
violation of concern here is A’s provision of too little information, though it is clear that 
this is in response to B’s violation. Leaving aside the possible reasons for B’s lengthy 
answer, it seems that A’s very short answer in A2 is intended to send B the message that 
A thinks her response was inappropriate (because it provided too much information). The 
implicature, from A’s point of view, might be formulated as something like, “I was 
interested in talking about pets (as evidenced by the fact that I was the one who asked in 
the first place), but now you’ve totally overwhelmed me and I don’t even want to talk 
                                                
22 It is worth noting here that flouting of the quality maxim, i.e., sarcasm, is also often used to achieve this 
aim. 
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about them anymore,” or, “I wanted to talk to you, but then I realized that you apparently 
have a problem with oversharing, so I no longer want to have this conversation.” 
 As I have shown in this section, both standard and flouting-related implicatures can 
arise with respect to underinformativeness (or assumed lack thereof). Next, I discuss 
some properties that hold of all implicatures. 
2.2.1.4.3 Eliminating or strengthening an implicature  
A hallmark of an implicature is that it can be eliminated without denying the truth of 
the assertion from which it arose – in Grice’s terminology, without denying what was 
actually “said” – or can be strengthened by asserting what was implicated. This is true of 
both standard implicatures and those that arise from flouting; while it is unlikely that a 
speaker would create an implicature through flouting and then choose to eliminate or 
assert it, the important point is that this could be done. Thus the ability to eliminate or 
strengthen something serves as a test for whether it is in fact an implicature. 
Elimination of a standard quantity implicature can be accomplished by either 
contradicting or suspending it. Suspension of an upper-bound implicature involves 
leaving open, but not asserting, “the possibility of something ‘stronger’ holding;” in the 
case of scalar implicature, this means that something farther on the right may hold (Horn 
1972:45). Thus a suspension of the upper-bound implicature in (16c), i.e., that (16a) and 
(16b) do not hold, can be accomplished by constructions such as those in (28).  
(28) a. There are some trees in the yard, if not several/many. 
  b. There are some trees in the yard, or even several/many. 
  c. There are at least some trees in the yard, and possibly even several/many. 
                (adapted from Horn 1972:40) 
All three examples in (28) allow for the possibility that there are several or many trees in 
the yard, thus suspending the implicature that some is the strongest (or right-most on the 
scale) term that holds in the situation. Possible ways of contradicting an upper-bound 
implicature are shown in (29).  
(29) a. There are not just some trees in the yard, but several/many as well. 
b. There are some trees in the yard, and moreover / in fact / what’s more, there are 
several/many. 
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              (adapted from Horn 1972:40) 
In these cases, the implicature that there are not several or many trees is completely 
eliminated by the assertion that there actually are several or many, showing that some 
was clearly not the strongest term that held in the situation. 
While it is perhaps intuitively obvious, it is worth noting that the lower bound 
asserted by quantifiers and scalar predicates is never suspendable, much less 
contradictable, because it is an assertion rather than an implicature. Thus an utterance 
such as that in (30a) can only be interpreted as meaning that the speaker has changed his 
mind about the yard’s contents midway through speaking or has realized he is unsure 
about the contents of the yard, while the remaining utterances in (30) are not acceptable 
at all. 
(30) a. There are some trees in the yard, or only one. 
  b. *There are some trees in the yard, if not only one. 
  c. *There are not just some trees in the yard, but only one. 
(30a), while arguably acceptable, seems to admit to some degree of unreliability of the 
speaker. The remaining examples are simply unacceptable by virtue of the fact that they 
involve near-simultaneous assertion and denial of what was asserted.  
 Non-scalar standard implicatures can also be suspended or contradicted. For example, 
as noted previously, a hearer who assumes that the speaker is being neither 
overinformative nor underinformative will infer that the speaker intends to convey that all 
of the information he gives is necessary, and that any information not given is 
unnecessary for the discourse. Adding a statement such as that in (31a) to the end of an 
utterance can serve to the suspend the former implicature, while (31b) suspends the latter. 
(31) a. …but actually, that might be more than you need to know. 
  b. …and there may also be other things you need to know. 
(31a) leaves open the possibility that the speaker has in fact given more information than 
is necessary, while (31b) admits the possibility of too little information having been 
given. Note also that (31a) and (31b) could be used simultaneously to suspend both 
standard implicatures. Similarly, the standard implicatures can be eliminated completely 
by statements such as those in (32). 
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(32) a. …but you don’t really need to know all that. 
  b. …and that’s some of what you need to know. 
(32a) eliminates the implicature that all information given was necessary, while (32b) 
eliminates the implicature that all necessary information was given. As with the examples 
in (31), these could be used simultaneously to eliminate both implicatures. 
A speaker may also suspend or eliminate an implicature caused by flouting, though as 
noted above, this is not likely to happen in actual usage. As an example, consider (13), in 
which A, a violinist, asks B, a luthier, for advice on repairing his bow. B replies with long 
and detailed instructions and warnings, and by his apparent overinformativeness creates 
the implicature that the repair process is very difficult and beyond the capabilities of A. 
However, B could then add something like one of the statements in (33), to either 
suspend or eliminate this implicature. 
(33) a. …but it might not be that hard, and maybe you could do it, so you could give it 
a try. 
  b. …but it won’t be that hard; I’m sure you can do it, so you should give it a try. 
(33a) serves to suspend the implicature that B’s overinformativeness caused, by leaving 
open the question of whether the task is beyond A’s abilities. (33b), on the other hand, 
eliminates the implicature by asserting its opposite. Implicatures caused by being 
deliberately apparently underinformative can of course also be suspended or eliminated, 
with elimination often being accomplished by the speaker providing some reason for his 
or her underinformativeness other than that which was implicated. Consider (25), in 
which one stranger (A) asks another (B) whether she has children, and B replies simply 
with Yes, creating the implicature that she does not think it appropriate to share any 
further information about her children. By following her reply with one of the utterances 
in (34), B could have suspended or eliminated that implicature. 
(34) a. …but since I don’t know you, I don’t know if you’d want to hear about them. 
b. …and normally I’d tell you all about them, but I have a sore throat today so I’m 
trying to avoid speaking very much.  
(34a) somewhat suspends the implicature by making it clear that B simply is not sure 
about the appropriateness of sharing further information. (34b) eliminates the implicature 
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by providing an alternate reason for B’s failure to provide further information about her 
children. 
In contrast to suspension and contradiction, assertion of an implicature can be seen as 
a type of strengthening from assumption to fact; rather than having to assume that 
something is true, the hearer is told explicitly that this is the case. An implicature can also 
be strengthened by strongly suggesting, rather than asserting, that what was implicated is 
true, but this will not be discussed in detail here. Both scalar and non-scalar standard 
implicatures, as well as implicatures created by flouting, can be strengthened. 
Examples of asserting the upper-bound scalar implicature in (16c) are shown below: 
(35) a. There are some trees in the yard, but not several. 
  b. There are just/only some trees in the yard. 
In (35a), the implicature is explicitly stated as an assertion. The same purpose is served 
by just or only in (35b); these words can be thought of as shorthand for something like 
and no more or and no stronger quantifier holds. Standard non-scalar quantity 
implicatures can be strengthened by the addition of assertions such as those in (36). 
(36) a. Remember everything I’ve told you, because it’s all important. 
  b. You don’t need to know anything else. 
(36a) strengthens the implicature that all the given information is necessary by asserting 
that this is the case. (36b) similarly asserts the previously implicated message that any 
information not provided is not necessary for the discourse. 
 Like standard implicatures, implicatures caused by flouting may be strengthened. 
Returning to the violinist and luthier discussed with reference to suspending or 
eliminating an implicature, one can see how the implicature created by the luthier could 
also be strengthened by an utterance such as that in (37). 
(37) …so it’s very difficult, and I don’t think you should try to do it yourself. 
Here the luthier has asserted what was implicated by his apparent overinformativeness. 
Similarly, an implicature created by deliberate apparent underinformativeness can be 
strengthened. Returning to the strangers at the bus stop and B’s curtness, B could say 
something like the assertion in (38) to strengthen the implicature she created. 
(38) …but I’m really not comfortable saying anything about them to a stranger. 
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As in (37), what was previously implicated has been asserted, thus strengthening the 
implicature. It has been shown, therefore, that scalar and non-scalar standard 
implicatures, as well as implicatures created by flouting, can be suspended, eliminated, or 
strengthened. 
 Grice’s (1975) account, together with Horn’s (1972) work on scalar implicatures, is 
arguably able to account for the gap between conventional meaning and what is actually 
conveyed. Since the publications of Grice (1975) and Horn (1972), there has been 
substantial further work on the topics of implicature and reducing and refining the 
maxims of conversation. This is not surprising, given the impact of Grice’s work from the 
beginning and the fact that his work was intended to be only “a general sketch of a 
potentially operative model, rather than an exhaustive account” (Lakoff 2009:107). Next 
I discuss three of the more well-known theories built at least in part on Grice’s account: 
Horn’s (1984) Q and R principles, Levinson’s (1987; 2000) Q-, I-, and M-principles, and 
Sperber & Wilson’s (1986; 1995) relevance theory. 
2.2.2 Horn’s principles and scalar implicature 
 Horn (1984) presents a “partial reductionist program” in which Grice’s (1975) four 
implicatures are reduced to principles influenced by the work of Zipf (1949). The two 
principles are shown in (39).  
(39)  Q and R principles 
   a. The Q principle  
  Make your contribution sufficient.  
Say as much as you can (given R). 
b. The R principle  
  Make your contribution necessary.  
Say no more than you must (given Q).   (Horn 1984:13) 
Unlike Grice’s (1975) maxims (which were nonetheless acknowledged to interact), 
Horn’s principles explicitly reference each other, making it obvious that they interact. 
The Q principle is intended to capture the first part of the quantity maxim (an injunction 
to provide enough information) and the first two parts of the manner maxim (injunctions 
against obscurity and ambiguity) (Horn 2004). The R principle covers the rest of the 
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maxims, with the exception of quality: relation, the second part of the quantity maxim 
(regarding not saying too much), and the last two parts of the manner maxim (regarding 
briefness and orderliness). The quality maxim, while not formulated into a named 
principle, is retained with its special status as the most important maxim (mentioned in 
footnote 17). Horn (1984) argues that the Q and R principles, along with the quality 
maxim, comprise a reduced theoretical apparatus that covers at least as wide a range of 
pragmatic and linguistic phenomena as Grice’s (1975) work. 
 Like Grice, Horn (1972; 1984) fails to explicitly address several questions about his 
view of informativeness. For example, it is again unclear whether only propositions may 
be informative, or other items may be as well. Horn’s (1972) characterization of 
implicature in terms of entailment suggests a requirement of propositionality, since only a 
proposition can entail or be entailed, but the issue is not addressed in Horn’s (1984) 
introduction to the Q and R principles. Also unaddressed in that work is the question of 
whether an addressee’s previous knowledge is considered with relation to 
informativeness; as with Grice’s (1975) quantity maxim, Horn’s (1984) Q principle 
certainly seems to leave open the possibility that the addressee’s knowledge is taken into 
account. Further, Horn’s (1972) account of presupposition suggests that Horn does in fact 
place some importance in general on an addressee’s cognitive state prior to an utterance. 
Other than the fact that his work is based on that of Grice, there is no indication that Horn 
views truth as a necessary characteristic of information (though it is retained as a 
principle of conversation), but there is likewise no indication that he does not. Regarding 
the independence of informativeness and other utterance attributes, Horn’s (1984) 
account resembles that of Grice (1975) in that utterance attributes such as clarity and 
conciseness are not considered directly as a part of informativeness but are addressed by 
parts of his Q and R principles. Thus in his treatment of informativeness, Horn (1972; 
1984) differs little from Grice (1975). 
2.2.3 Levinson’s Q-, I-, and M- principles 
 Levinson (1987) examines the work of Zipf, Horn, Grice, and others in some depth, 
and builds on the work of Atlas and Levinson (1981). He focuses specifically on 
generalized conversational implicatures, and proposes the Q- and I-principles, each 
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containing a “speaker’s maxim,” outlining what the speaker should and/or should not do, 
and a “recipient’s corollary,” explaining what the principle “licenses the addressee to 
think” (Levinson 1987:67). He does not explicate the M-principle, but acknowledges its 
probable necessity and distinguishes between Q-implicatures and Q/M-implicatures. The 
M-principle is formally proposed in Levinson (2000). Slightly condensed versions of all 
three principles are shown in (40). 
(40) Q-, I-, and M-principles  
a. The Q-principle 
Speaker’s maxim: Make your contribution as informative as is required for the 
current purposes of the exchange. Specifically: don’t provide a statement that is 
informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless 
providing a stronger statement would contravene the I-principle. 
Recipient’s corollary: Take it that the speaker made the strongest statement 
consistent with what he knows, and therefore that: 
(i) If the speaker asserted A(W), and <S, W> form a Horn scale, then one 
can infer that the speaker knows that the stronger statement A(S) would be 
false. 
(ii) If the speaker asserted A(W) and A(W) fails to entail an embedded 
proposition q, which a stronger statement A(S) would entail, and S and W 
are ‘about’ the same semantic relations, then one can infer that the speaker 
doesn’t know that q obtains. 
  b. The I-principle 
Speaker’s maxim: The maxim of minimization  
Say as little as necessary to achieve your communicational ends, bearing Q in 
mind. 
  Recipient’s corollary: Enrichment rule 
Amplify the informational content of the speaker’s utterance, by finding a more 
specific interpretation, up to what you judge to be the speaker’s m-intended23 
point. Specifically: 
                                                
23 “M-intended” is used here as defined in footnote 16. 
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(i) Assume that stereotypical relations obtain between referents or events, 
unless this is inconsistent with what is taken for granted or the speaker has 
broken the maxim of minimization. 
(ii) Assume the existence or actuality of what a sentence is ‘about,’ if that 
is consistent with what is taken for granted. 
(iii) Avoid referential interpretations that multiply entities in the domain of 
reference. 
  c. The M-principle 
Speaker’s maxim: Indicate an abnormal, nonstereotypical situation by using 
marked expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe the 
corresponding normal, stereotypical situation. 
Recipient’s corollary: What is said in an abnormal way indicates an abnormal 
situation, or marked messages indicate marked situations, specifically: 
(i) Where S has said something containing a marked expression, and there 
is an unmarked alternate expression U with the same denotation D which 
the speaker might have employed instead, then where U would have 
implicated the stereotypical subset d of D, the marked expression 
implicates the complement of d. 
(Levinson 1987:67-8; 2000:136-7) 
The Q-principle covers the first part of Grice’s (1975) quantity maxim (an injunction 
to provide enough information), while the I-principle captures the second part (regarding 
not saying too much). As with Horn’s Q and R principles, these two refer to each other. 
The M-principle, according to Levinson (2000), covers two or perhaps three parts of the 
manner maxim; he questions whether orderliness should have maxim status, and claims 
that avoiding ambiguity is partially covered by the Q-principle. This leaves, of course, the 
maxims of relation and quality; relation is set aside as applicable to particularized 
conversational implicatures only, while quality “plays only a background role in the 
generation of” generalized conversational implicatures, and is thus excluded from the 
three principles (Levinson 2000:74). Levinson (2000) also notes that his principles can be 
compared to Horn’s (1984) Q and R principles, with Levinson’s Q- and M-principles 
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together corresponding to Horn’s Q principle, and Levinson’s I-principle being roughly 
equivalent to Horn’s R principle. Equivalencies notwithstanding, Levinson (1987; 2000) 
motivates his account through examinations of and establishment of connections between 
Gricean inference, conversation analysis, syntax, and the semantics-pragmatics 
distinction. 
In describing the properties of information and informativeness according to his 
account, Levinson (2000) is not much more explicit than Horn (1972; 1984) or Grice 
(1975). Like Horn (1972), Levinson (2000) characterizes informativeness in terms of 
entailment, indicating that propositionality is at least implicitly required for 
informativeness. As with Grice’s (1975) quantity maxim and Horn’s (1984) Q principle, 
Levinson’s (1987) Q- and I-principles seem to show that an addressee’s prior knowledge 
should be taken into consideration. Most specifically, in order to “say as little as 
necessary to achieve your communicational ends,” a speaker would have to know what 
prior information the addressee has in order to avoid saying something that was not 
strictly necessary. Levinson offers no clues about his view of whether information must, 
by definition, be true. Finally, as with the accounts of Grice (1975) and Horn (1984), it is 
clear from Levinson’s (2000) M-principle that other utterance attributes are considered 
important but are not part of informativeness. In this way, Levinson’s view is also similar 
to relevance theory, the next (and last) theory to be discussed. 
2.2.4 Relevance theory 
Sperber and Wilson’s (1986; 1995) relevance theory can be seen as the most extreme 
example of the reductionist trend shown by Horn and Levinson: while Horn (1984) 
reduces Grice’s four maxims to two principles, and Levinson (1987; 2000) to three, 
Sperber and Wilson (1986) initially propose just one principle: that of relevance (they 
later revise this to two principles). In relevance theory (RT), speaker intention and 
audience recognition of that intention are important. RT is based in part on the premise 
that neither the code model (as in information theory) nor the inferential model (as in 
Gricean implicature) is sufficient to explain human verbal communication, but the two 
may be combined to form a satisfactory account.  
Another premise of RT is that humans manage their cognitive processes in such a 
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way as to maximize effects, and particularly positive cognitive effects, while minimizing 
effort; this basic idea is common to those building on the work of Zipf (1949) (Sperber & 
Wilson 1995). Positive cognitive effects are defined as the modification of a cognitive 
context, or cognitive environment, in a way that “improves” it, by interaction between old 
and new information, strengthening of assumptions, or contradictions that result in the 
removal of assumptions (Sperber & Wilson 1995). One’s cognitive environment, or the 
set of facts that are manifest to him, “can be modified by adding a single piece of new 
information, but it can equally well be modified by a diffuse increase in the saliency or 
plausibility of a whole range of assumptions, yielding what will be subjectively 
experienced as an impression” (Sperber & Wilson 1995; Wilson & Sperber 2012:87). In 
attempting to create positive cognitive effects in an addressee, therefore, a speaker must 
take into account what information the addressee may already have, in order to know 
what new information may improve the addressee’s cognitive context. Wilson and 
Sperber argue that a speaker “can often predict… which background information from 
[the addressee’s] memory is likely to be retrieved and used in processing [the speaker’s] 
stimulus” (2012:272). 
Cognitive effort is seen to be proportional to the amount of conceptual material in the 
stimulus to be processed; in this way RT takes into account attributes of an utterance such 
as clarity and conciseness, and they factor into relevance but not informativeness 
(Sperber & Wilson 1995). Processing implications also requires cognitive effort, but 
Sperber and Wilson argue that this effort is immaterial to the calculation of relevance 
because it “is always in proportion to the effects it implements” (1995:126).  
The minimization of effort and maximization of effect proposed in RT is done by 
providing the most attention to “what seems... to be the most relevant information 
available,” where ‘relevant’ is not yet defined but is presumably used in its general, non-
technical sense (Sperber & Wilson 1995:vii). Because human verbal communication 
places demands on attention, “to communicate is to imply that the information 
communicated is relevant” (Sperber & Wilson 1995:vii). From this premise is extracted 
the original principle of relevance, shown in (41). 
(41)  Principle of relevance 
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Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance.         (Sperber & Wilson 1995:158) 
In their (1995) postface, Sperber and Wilson refer to the principle in (43) as “the second 
principle of relevance,” and designate the principle in (42) as the first. 
(42) The first principle of relevance 
  Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance. 
Relevance itself is defined as the degree to which an assumption in a context has 
contextual effects that are large combined with the degree to which it requires a small 
amount of processing effort; “…an utterance is relevant when the hearer, given his 
cognitive dispositions and the context, is likely to derive some genuine knowledge from 
it” (Sperber & Wilson 1995:125, Wilson & Sperber 2012:60). Sperber and Wilson use 
‘assumption’ to refer to any thought, whether represented as true or not: they contrast 
their view of information with that of some others, noting that RT does not limit 
information to that which is true; instead, they “use the terms [information and inform] 
more broadly, treating as information not only facts, but also dubious and false 
assumptions presented as factual” (1995:2). In later work, however, they appear to revise 
this stance; in their 1995 postface, they note that a theory that takes no account of 
“objective truth or falsity” is “incomplete,” but claim that it is “good enough… for most 
of our purposes” (Sperber & Wilson 1995:263); in 2012, they state their agreement with 
Grice’s statement that “false information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is 
not information” (1989:371), and follow with the conclusion that something that is 
relevant is “therefore true” (Wilson & Sperber 2012:83).  
In terms of measurement, relevance is treated comparatively rather than 
quantitatively; Sperber and Wilson claim that relevance could be defined quantitatively, 
but state, “since we are interested in relevance as a psychological property, we have no 
reason to aim for a quantitative definition of relevance” (1995:132). They define an 
“informative intention” as the intention of a speaker “to make manifest or more manifest 
to the audience a set of assumptions I” (1995:58). Something is considered manifest 
relative to a particular individual and time; an assumption is “manifest to an individual… 
if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as 
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true or probably true” (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 39). Increasing manifestness is one way 
of achieving the positive cognitive effects associated with relevance. With the definitions 
given here for positive cognitive effects and manifestness, it should be clear that, from a 
relevance theoretic standpoint, a recipient’s knowledge or beliefs about the reliability of a 
source are important: a recipient who is less confident in the reliability of a message, 
regardless of the message’s actual reliability, will likely have her cognitive environment 
less affected by that message because she has less confidence in the reliability of the 
information produced. The net effect is that, ceteris paribus, under RT a message will be 
less informative when received by someone with less confidence in the source from 
which the message originated.  
Given that an informative intention involves an intention to increase manifestness, the 
informativeness of a message is a function of the degree to which it increases the 
manifestness of some set of assumptions. Note that this means that if one is already 
absolutely certain about a set, then having it further confirmed achieves no positive 
cognitive effects and is completely uninformative, much like a message containing only 
information already possessed by the recipient is considered uninformative in IT and, it 
would seem, in most other theories (Sperber & Wilson 1995).  
In Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) discussion of informativeness, there seems to be an 
implicit assumption that the messages that may be informative are propositional. 
However, they note that, although pragmatists have generally confined their treatments of 
“meaning” to propositional communication, “much of what is communicated does not fit 
the propositional mould” (Sperber & Wilson 1995:57). Regarding non-propositional 
items of a variety of types, including non-linguistic ones, Sperber and Wilson “see it as a 
major challenge for any account of human communication to give a precise description 
and explanation of its vaguer effects” and assert that “once this step is taken… the 
framework we propose, unlike the others we have discussed, can rise to this challenge” 
(1995:57-58). However, as noted previously, they did later express the view that 
information must be true; it seems, therefore, that either relevance is not limited to 
propositions, but informativeness is (a rather strange claim, I think), or Wilson and 
Sperber (2012) revised their opinions on propositionality. Thus relevance theory 
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originated based on a propositional model, and may or may not remain confined to 
propositions. Thus far, it has typically been used in the examination and assessment of 
propositional items, so its non-propositional capabilities, if any, remain largely 
unexplored.  
Their two principles of relevance, Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue, are sufficient to 
provide an account of communication that is more robust than either the Gricean 
inferential model or an information-theoretic code model alone, and that can explain 
implicatures based on all of Grice’s (1975) maxims. However, some disagree, claiming 
that an adequate theory requires reference to more than just one of Grice’s original 
maxims and that Sperber and Wilson have taken reductionism too far (e.g., Levinson 
1987; Gundel & Mulkern 1998; Lakoff 2009). 
2.3 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have intended to provide a reasonably complete, if somewhat brief, 
account of how information and informativeness have been used in some of the major 
theories both within and outside of linguistics. Within linguistics, I have focused on 
conversational implicature in order to illustrate one of the main areas of linguistics in 
which the concept of informativeness is used. First proposed by Grice (1975) in terms of 
the cooperative principle and conversational maxims, the notion of implicature has seen 
much work by later scholars such as Horn (1972; 1984; 2004), Levinson (1987; 2000), 
and Sperber & Wilson (1995; 2012). Implicatures arise whether maxims (or, in later 
work, principles) are obeyed or violated. Further, they arise whether violation is 
intentional or not, though the character of the implicature varies based on the perceived 
intentionality of the violation. I have characterized implicatures arising from obeyed 
maxims as “standard” implicatures, following Levinson (1983), and have used the 
conventional term “flouting” to refer to the process by which implicatures are created 
through intentional violation of a maxim. Both types of implicatures can be suspended, 
eliminated, or strengthened, and this serves as a test to distinguish what is implicated 
from what is asserted. 
 In the theories associated with implicature, informativeness has most often been 
characterized in terms of entailment: if x entails y, but y does not entail x, then x is more 
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informative than y. It is thus a relative measure rather than an absolute, quantitative one; 
this is fairly standard among measurements of informativeness in linguistics, as is the 
appeal to entailment. However, some who have written about implicature, such as Grice 
(1975), have omitted any explicit definition of informativeness, while others, such as 
Hirschberg (1985), have proposed types of quantity implicature that do not involve 
entailment. Overall, then, the topic of implicature is somewhat representative of the field 
of linguistics as a whole when it comes to informativeness: explicit definitions of 
informativeness are often left out; when it is defined, informativeness is frequently 
characterized in terms of entailment; and some dispute this definition or use very 
different ones without comment on the entailment characterization. In the next chapter, I 
give an account of a study I did that led to the need for an account of informativeness, 
and then describe the characterization I formulated. 
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Chapter 3. Informativeness: motivation and characterization 
3.0 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the initial motivation for the idea of a category 
membership-related measure of informativeness was the distribution of English adjectival 
past participles (APPs) in attributive position. In this chapter I recount the APP study in 
order to partially illustrate the motivation for the present work. The study outlined here 
also serves as an example of another area in which the concept of informativeness is 
useful; however, here it is used not with the goal of explaining the mismatch between 
what is said and what is communicated, but with the goal of explaining why some 
expressions are more used than others. 
3.1 APP study 
In van Duym (2010) I examined the distribution of two particular forms of the 
English adjectival past participle: the regular (non-negated) form, e.g. flown, and the form 
negated with the prefix un-, e.g. unflown. These were compared in prenominal attributive 
position within noun phrases, e.g. the unflown plane.  
Many APPs that are able to function attributively can take the negative prefix un-. 
This prefix can have either of two distinct meanings, the first indicating a reversal, and 
the second indicating the absence of a state or property. The former meaning of un- is 
relatively rare in the data used here, and almost always coexists ambiguously with the 
latter meaning.24 Because instances of the prefix indicating a reversal are so rare in the 
data and do not seem to be relevant, the distinction between these two senses of un- will 
not be further discussed. 
Examination of relative frequencies showed that there were at least two, and perhaps 
three, distinct patterns of distribution between non-negated and negated forms: some 
APPs occur primarily without negation, a few appear equally often with and without the 
negating un-, and a final group is found most often with un-.25 To explain why these 
                                                
24 For example, unrolled in The unrolled rug took up more room than they had expected can also be 
interpreted as meaning that the rug had never been rolled , or that the rug had been rolled, and then the 
process was reversed. 
25 For other studies that address adjectival past participles requiring some kind of additional modifying 
element to be acceptable, see Ackerman & Goldberg (1996), Grimshaw & Vikner (1993), Wasow (1977) 
and Lakoff (1970). 
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distribution patterns exist, I examined factors related to semantic fields, situation aspect, 
incremental theme, historical origins, and informativeness. I concluded that the most 
significant factor was informativeness, and while none of the examined factors was solely 
able to explain the distribution patterns of negated and non-negated APPs, all at least 
potentially contribute to a multifaceted explanation that likely also involves aspects that 
remained unidentified. 
3.1.1 Methodology and data 
Having established that APPs in general occur in noun phrases both with and without 
the un- prefix, I compared the distribution of the prefixed and unprefixed forms for a 
wide variety of APPs. The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) was used 
as the data source and was searched for each form within a phrase containing a, an, or the 
followed by the APP and then any noun.26 For each query, the total number of 
occurrences for the first 1000 tokens was recorded; in most cases this was equivalent to 
the total occurrences overall, as very few searches yielded more than 1000 tokens.27 For 
each APP, the proportion r of total non-negated to negated forms was calculated by 
dividing the total number of occurrences of non-negated forms p by that of negated forms 
n, i.e., r = p/n.28 Thus APPs that occurred more often in negated than non-negated form 
had r < 1, and APPs that occurred more often in non-negated form had r > 1. An r value 
of 1 indicated that an APP occurred equally often in negated and non-negated forms. 
204 APPs were tested, each in both non-negated and negated form, for a total of 408 
search queries. Initially APPs were chosen somewhat randomly as they came to mind or 
were encountered in various contexts not directly related to this research. However, once 
a pattern of distribution became apparent, I began to seek out the more elusive APPs that 
                                                                                                                                            
 
26 The requirement of one of these three determiners before each APP served several purposes: first, it 
somewhat restricted an extremely large data pool (which might, of course, be viewed as good or bad 
depending on one’s perspective); second, it helped to ensure that the phrases retrieved were, in fact, noun 
phrases; finally, it reduced (though did not eliminate) the number of retrieved phrases containing plural 
nouns, which can be problematic for situation aspect (discussed in 3.1.3). 
27 As used here, a token means a specific phrase in which an APP was found; an occurrence is a specific 
instance of a token being found in the corpus. So, for example, for the APP unbroken there are 128 tokens, 
including an unbroken string, the unbroken chain, and the unbroken record (plus 125 others). For the token 
an unbroken string, there are 6 occurrences, meaning that the phrase is found 6 times in COCA. 
28 All r values were rounded to one decimal place. 
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occur predominantly with the un- prefix, selecting verbs to test that I thought (generally 
through my own native speaker intuition) might fulfill this criterion. The number of APPs 
with r < 1, indicating that they occurred more often in negated than non-negated form, 
was 29, or 14% of those tested. Henceforth these will be referred to as ‘negative APPs’. 
This data can be seen in the first column of Table (1) below, and confirms my initial 
intuition that such forms are a minority, especially considering that this was not a random 
sampling but one in which these types of APPs were actively sought. Another 26 APPs, 
in the second data column of Table (1), had r in the 1.0-2.2 range, indicating that their 
non-negated forms did not strongly predominate over the negated ones. It was unclear 
whether these were best grouped with the lower or higher r-value APPs, or whether they 
constituted a distinct distributional group on their own, and this has not been further 
explored. 2.2 was chosen as the upper bound for this group because it reflected a natural 
break in the r values of the data. Finally, the vast majority of APPs had r values greater 
than or equal to 2.6, indicating strong predominance of the non-negated form over the 
negated form; or r values that could not be calculated due to an n of 0, indicating that the 
negated form was not found at all in the relevant context in the corpus. Henceforth these 
APPs with r ≥ 2.6 or undefined will be referred to as ‘positive APPs.’ The data is 
summarized in Table 1.29 
 
Table 1: APP distributional data 
Given this data, an obvious question arose: what characteristics of this minority, the 
negative APPs, caused them to occur predominantly with the negative prefix un-, as 
shown in the first column of data? Several factors, beginning below with semantic fields, 
were examined in an attempt to answer this question. 
3.1.2 Semantic fields 
The first factor examined was semantic, as it became apparent very early on in the 
                                                
29 Percentages here, and throughout this paper, are rounded to the nearest whole percentage point. 
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research that many of the negative APPs seemed to share a small number of semantic 
fields or conceptual categories. Specifically, words having to do with mental processes, 
such as unknown, undoubted, and unforeseen, appeared to be overrepresented in the 
negative APP category. Other categories represented by several negative APPs included 
speech-related activities (unsung, unspoken) and acts involving physical movement 
(unzipped, unshaven). However, members of these three fields were also found among 
the positive APPs (though in lesser proportions). The fact that these categories were 
represented in both sets of APPs strongly suggested that these semantic distinctions alone 
were not sufficient to explain the differences in distribution. However, it is also true that 
the identified semantic fields were represented to a much greater degree among the 
negative APPs than the positive ones. This indicated that the identified categories may 
play a small part in explaining the distributional pattern, if indirectly. 
3.1.3 Situation aspect 
The next potentially explanatory factor examined was situation aspect; I based my 
analysis of this primarily on Smith (1997). Though it showed some promise, the viewing 
of this data through a situation aspect lens was problematic. The main reason for this was 
that situation aspect, as discussed by Verkuyl (1972), Smith (1997) and others, has to do 
most prominently with a verb; indeed it has been treated in the past as relating solely to 
the verb (Smith 1997). As noted earlier, the past participles examined here were 
functioning not as verbs but as adjectives. Thus aspect could only be discussed with 
reference to the verbs from which these APPs were derived, rather than the APPs 
themselves (Grimshaw & Vikner 1993). In addition, many linguists now accept that 
aspect cannot be determined based solely on a verb, but rather requires what Smith refers 
to as a “verb constellation,” which includes not only the verb itself but its arguments 
(Smith 1997:5,17; Verkuyl 1972). As adjectives, APPs did not have the types of 
arguments found in a verb constellation, nor was there always one clear (generic) set of 
arguments that the verb from which an APP was derived would have. These factors made 
talking about situation aspect in relation to APPs messy at best, but they did not render 
the concept useless. 
In order to assess the type of situation aspect that might be associated with each APP, 
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I considered the verb from which it was derived together with the arguments suggested 
by the noun phrases in which the APP occurred; generally, this meant a subject and a 
singular object. I avoided using plural objects because they can cause atelicity where it 
would not otherwise be found, due to an unspecified number in the object preventing a 
natural endpoint from arising (cf. eat an apple vs. eat apples) (Smith 1997:55). Using this 
method, I attempted to assess whether the verb that each APP was derived from was 
static – comprising a single, undifferentiated period – or dynamic with successive stages; 
instantaneous (conceptually, at least), or durative; and telic – having a change of state 
which constitutes the outcome or goal of the event – or atelic (Smith 1997:19). 
Very few of the positive or negative APPs were derived from static verbs, with most 
coming from dynamic verbs instead: only four of the negative APPs and eight of the 
positive APPs had associated verbs that were conclusively identified as static. A large 
portion (48%) of the negative APPs came from exclusively durative verbs, as opposed to 
28% from exclusively instantaneous verbs.30 In contrast, a smaller portion of the positive 
APPs (40%) were derived from verbs of exclusively durative classification, and this was 
matched by 40% derived from verbs of exclusively instantaneous classification. When 
looking only at verbs whose n=0 (a group included in the positive APPs), the percentage 
derived from durative verbs is an even lower 26%, compared to a much higher 
instantaneous verb percentage of 64%. 
The telicity of some APPs’ associated verbs could not be definitively determined; 
among the APPs classified, all groups had more telic than atelic associated verbs. Among 
positive APPs, 47% were associated with telic verbs and 27% with atelic verbs; among 
negative APPs, 62% were associated with telic verbs and 31% with atelic verbs. Due to 
the fact that significantly more positive than negative APPs were unclassifiable (26% 
versus 7%), it is difficult to say whether my expectation that negative APPs’ associated 
verbs would have a higher rate of telicity was in fact confirmed. A more robust method of 
determining situation aspect characteristics of verbs from which APPs were derived 
would likely have been needed in order to assess whether telicity played an explanatory 
                                                
30 Many APPs, both positive and negative, appeared in multiple senses (whose durativity varied) in the data 
and as such could not be classified as exclusively durative or instantaneous. 
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role in the distribution of APPs. This was not pursued at the time of the study, and 
remains a potential direction for further research on APPs.  
In summary, positive APPs were most likely to be derived from verbs that were 
dynamic and telic; assuming that these characteristics occurred together, these were verbs 
that, by Smith’s (1997) classification, would be considered either accomplishments or 
achievements. In slight contrast, negative APPs were most likely to be derived from 
verbs that were dynamic, durative, and telic; Smith (1997) would classify a verb having 
all these characteristics as an accomplishment. In fact, achievement proved to be the most 
common classification of APPs’ associated verbs overall. 
Taken as a whole, this data suggested that situation aspect alone was not highly 
explanatory of the distribution of positive and negative APPs. What this data did show 
was that APPs that could be used in the position studied here, both positive and negative, 
were often derived from verbs of the accomplishment or achievement type. This was 
significant largely because the accomplishment type has previously been identified as 
contributing to modification requirements such as that satisfied by the use of un- 
(Grimshaw & Vikner 1993). According to Grimshaw and Vikner, all accomplishment 
verbs have a two-part event structure consisting of a process and a resultant state 
(1993:144-145). An “obligatory adjunct,” a term which they use rather broadly to also 
include negating prefixes, serves to “identify” one of the sub-events that would otherwise 
go unidentified (1993:144). They show that this is required whenever the 
accomplishment verb is one involving creation, or what they call “constructive 
accomplishments,” because in other types of accomplishments, there is not an 
unidentified subevent (Grimshaw & Vikner 1993:146-147).31 Grimshaw and Vikner 
would predict that I should have found no constructive verbs in the positive APP 
category, given that the noun phrase context in which I searched the corpus eliminated 
obligatory adjuncts of other types. However, this was not what I found; this strongly 
suggested that something was going on beyond what Grimshaw and Vikner identified, 
and motivated me to continue looking at other factors. 
                                                
31 Constructive accomplishments are defined as ones in which “the Theme did not exist in its present form 
before the event occurred,” though this is intended to exclude situations in which the new “form” of the 
theme is the result of a destructive process (Grimshaw & Vikner 1993:146). 
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3.1.4 Incremental theme 
The notion of incremental theme, first proposed by Krifka (1987, 1989), Dowty 
(1987) and Hinrichs (1985), was the next factor examined. An incremental theme is a 
theme whose parts are mapped onto parts of an event by a telic predicate. This allows for 
a further distinction in the situation aspect realm than those made by the criteria discussed 
with reference to Smith (1997) above (Dowty 1991:567). Both positive and negative 
APPs had associated verbs that occurred with incremental themes, but both also had 
verbs with non-incremental themes. However, there seemed to be a possible trend that 
was consistent with my expectations: the verbs from which positive APPs were derived 
had a slightly lower proportion of incremental themes among them than did the verbs 
from which negative APPs were derived. More precise and comprehensive identification 
of incremental themes was still needed to say with certainty whether they play a role in 
the distribution of positive and negative APPs; this was done later and is further 
discussed in 3.2.4. 
3.1.5 Word origins 
Another element of a rather different type examined in this study was historical 
provenance. Because the negative prefix being used, un-, is of Germanic origin, it was 
reasonable to consider whether the negative APPs, which take the prefix much more 
commonly than the positive ones, also more commonly share a historical background 
with the prefix. The reasoning behind this was, in part at least, that sharing a common 
origin with the prefix meant a word had existed in the same language as the prefix for a 
longer time than a word with unrelated origins. This could correlate with the prefix being 
more productive with that word, and with other negative prefixes being therefore less 
likely to be affixed to the word. It was not clear that historical factors could explain the 
lack of positive instances for some forms; origin was offered solely as a possible reason 
for the abundance or scarcity of un- prefixed negative forms relative to the total number 
of negative forms produced in any way. 
Historical information was sought in The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) for the 
verbs from which all studied APPs were derived, and was available for the vast majority 
of them. My prediction that a higher percentage of the verbs from which negative APPs 
 57 
were derived would be Germanic than Latin/French, and that the reverse would be true 
for verbs from which positive APPs were derived, was initially strongly supported by a 
smaller data set. With the final data set, however, this was supported only very weakly. 
Though by no means conclusive or sufficient to solely explain the patterns of distribution, 
historical information suggested that word origin could be yet another factor that played a 
meaningful role in the use of un- on APPs. 
3.1.6 Informativeness 
The last factor examined was borne of the observation that many of the forms found 
infrequently or not at all seemed, to some degree, semantically or pragmatically 
anomalous. Under usual circumstances,32 why would one refer to a man as the identified 
man, rather than just the man, when being identified is part of the default or assumed 
state of a man? Why would one say the unbent wire when the equivalent phrase the 
straight wire is available? I grouped the answers to these and similar questions under the 
umbrella of informativeness. 
It is generally recognized by Griceans and neo-Griceans alike that, under most 
definitions of informativeness, speakers typically prefer the more informative of two 
otherwise similar utterances of comparable length. Likewise, given two utterances of 
similar informativeness, the more concise one is usually preferred. These preferences can 
be seen in Atlas and Levinson’s statement that, “given that there is available an 
expression of roughly equal length that is…more informative, the failure to employ [it] 
conveys that the speaker is not in a position to employ it” (1981:38). They are also 
reflected in Grice’s (1975:45-6) maxims of manner and quantity (specifically: “be brief;” 
“make your contribution as informative as is required”), Horn’s (1984:13) Q and R 
principles (specifically: “say as much as you can; say no more than you must”), and 
Levinson’s (1987:67-8) Q- and I-principles (specifically: “don’t provide a statement that 
is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows;” “say as little as 
necessary to achieve your communicational ends”). Given language users’ preferences 
for conciseness and informativeness, one should expect that a phrase of the type studied 
                                                
32 Henceforth, I use the phrases ‘usual circumstances’ and ‘neutral circumstances’ to refer to situations not 
greatly affected by contextual or confounding factors aside from any currently being discussed. 
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here was rarely or never found if it was no more informative than the corresponding 
simple [Determiner + Noun] phrase without the APP, since then the phrase without the 
APP should occur instead. So if an APP was primarily or always found in negated form, 
it was predicted that the negated form typically contributed to the informativeness of the 
phrase in which it occurred, while the non-negated one did not (or did so less). Likewise, 
if an APP was primarily or always found in non-negated form, it was expected that that 
form typically contributed to informativeness, while the negated form did not (or did so 
less). 
Informativeness (as well as information) has been defined in various ways, as 
discussed in chapter 2. Though it necessitates explicit defining of information and 
informativeness by researchers, can make consistencies difficult to identify, and can 
discourage cross-theoretical comparison and knowledge transfer, the flexibility with 
which the concepts are used is convenient in that it allows each researcher some freedom 
to customize characterizations that best work with the research at hand. Thus I now turn 
to explicitly showing how I used ‘information’ and, in particular, ‘informativeness’ in 
this context.  
Recall that a recurring theme in characterizations of informativeness is the 
elimination of possibilities. Continuing this theme in the context of theories of 
categorization, Giora states, “to say that a category member is informative in a given set 
is to say that it has more features (information) than necessary for category inclusion” 
(1988:550). E.g., for distinguishing members within the set or category of apples, the 
phrase an apple smaller than a house is not very informative, because it describes a 
characteristic of all apples33 that might thus be assumed of anything that is included in the 
apple category.34 In contrast, a green apple is much more informative because it 
describes a feature beyond what is necessary to be considered an apple; certainly not all 
                                                
33 Note that category members are limited to actual referents of the category name, and exclude 
representations thereof. E.g., there are water towers whose tanks are made to look like apples, and some of 
these are larger than houses, but they do not fall within the apple category. For more on this, see chapter 4, 
footnote 2. 
34 Should someone happen to develop an actual apple larger than a house, this assumption might be 
weakened slightly but would remain; the fact that we may recognize something otherwise apple-like but 
larger than a house as an apple suggests that smallness is not, in fact, a strict requirement for inclusion in 
the category of apples. 
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members of the apple category are green, so knowing that an item is an apple does not 
constitute knowing that it is green. Thus if one knows that an item belongs to the 
category of apples, one also knows that it is smaller than a house, but not whether it is 
green. Giora’s (1988) characterization is not unlike Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) 
treatment of positive cognitive effects, as discussed in 2.2.4 – Giora’s informativeness 
involves providing information about a category member that one does not already have 
by virtue of knowing its category membership, while positive cognitive effects can be 
achieved by providing information that one does not already have but that is related in 
some way to information that one does already have. Thus informativeness within a 
category can be viewed as a specific type of situation in which positive cognitive effects 
are generated. For the APP study I developed a characterization of informativeness 
influenced by the work of Giora (1988) and Sperber & Wilson (1995): a phrase or 
utterance is informative to the extent that it increases the cognitive availability of 
information not already fully available via category membership or context, and thereby 
reduces the number and/or likelihood of possibilities for the event, state, or entity to 
which it refers.  
Of course, some elaboration on this characterization was necessary. I initially 
sidestepped the issue of propositionality via a proposed conversion of noun phrases into 
propositions, so for the purposes of the APP study I, like Dretske (1981) and others, 
confined informativeness to propositional items. Unlike Dretske (1981), Grice (1989), 
and Wilson & Sperber (2012), I did not require that information be true; merely being 
“presented as factual” and capable of being represented as “true or probably true,” as 
Sperber and Wilson included in their early definitions of information and manifestness, 
was sufficient (1995:2,39).  
In characterizing exactly which propositions were considered informative, I relied in 
part on the familiar theme of reduction of uncertainty. I also employed the notion of 
positive cognitive effects; recall from chapter 2 that these are defined as effects on the 
cognitive environment resulting from interaction between old and new information, the 
strengthening of assumptions, or the processing of contradictions that result in the 
removal of assumptions (Sperber & Wilson 1995). Note that it may be possible to have a 
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positive cognitive effect without having a reduction of uncertainty; if a new piece of 
information causes a contradiction and the result is that both the new piece of information 
and the previous assumption with which it contradicted are cancelled (or at least less 
trusted, and thus made less manifest, in the language of Sperber & Wilson 1995), then a 
positive cognitive effect has occurred but there has been no reduction (and possibly even 
an increase) in uncertainty. It is for this reason that I included both concepts in my 
characterization of informativeness, but with an emphasis on positive cognitive effects, 
so that in a situation where positive cognitive effects occurred but there was an increase 
in uncertainty, informativeness was still achieved. As suggested by the reference above to 
manifestness, I also included this as a way that a proposition may be informative: by 
increasing the manifestness of some set of assumptions.  
Finally, as most theories do, I excluded from the informativeness assessment any 
information already possessed by the message recipient; this accounts for the “not already 
present via category membership or context” portion of the characterization above. I did 
not heavily restrict context, as is done in information theory. I treated context in a way 
similar to Sperber and Wilson (1995), so that context comprised the entire cognitive 
environment, and thus included an individual’s knowledge deriving from cognitive, 
physical, cultural, and discourse-related sources.35 This was done with the understanding 
that language users have the capacity to determine what aspects of context are relevant in 
a given situation. That is, a language user need not consciously consider everything she 
knows, can sense, and has experienced every time she creates or interprets an utterance. 
With this definition, prior information from context encompasses all of what was referred 
to as from “category membership or context” above, and all prior information the 
recipient might possess can be said to come from context, so that “not already present via 
category membership or context” can be reduced to “not already present via context”. I 
chose not to word my account of informativeness this way initially in order to highlight 
the information that comes from category membership, as this was a major focus of the 
original study; it has since become an even more prominent aspect of my work, so the 
                                                
35 It is important to note that some aspects one’s physical environment, for example, are not part of one’s 
cognitive environment, because one is simply not aware of them; the reliance on cognitive environment is 
meant to exclude consideration of anything of which one is completely unaware. 
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foregrounding of it remains useful. I conformed with relevance theory in suggesting that 
informativeness be measured comparatively rather than quantitatively. Unlike Sperber 
and Wilson (1995), however, I do think that a quantitative measure could be quite useful 
under certain circumstances, and efforts to develop such a method appropriate to one’s 
research are not wasted. 
 Assessing exactly what prior information a language user has is important to the 
calculation of informativeness as defined here. Because a unique facet of my 
characterization of informativeness was its explicit reference to information provided by 
category membership, as part of the APP study I proposed the beginnings of a method for 
assessing that information, outlined below. It is the further development of that method in 
general, rather than with reference to APPs specifically, that is the focus of most of the 
rest of this dissertation.  
For the assessment of what information can be said to be provided by category 
membership, I first considered that information about any characteristic known to be 
necessary for category inclusion would be fully cognitively available as a result of 
knowing an item’s category membership; as Smith and Medin note, categories “allow us 
to go beyond the information given” and “infer…attributes” (1981:1). In other words, if I 
know that an item is a member of the apple category, and I also know that, in order to be 
a member of that category, an item must be a fruit, then the information that the item in 
question is a fruit is fully cognitively available to me. In accounting for other information 
provided by category membership, I utilized Pustejovsky’s notion of qualia structure: 
“the structured representation which gives the relational force of a lexical item” and 
constitutes “modes of explanation for a word” that “permit a much richer description of 
meaning” than a purely decompositional or relational view would provide (1998:76). The 
qualia that Pustejovsky proposes for a nominal are shown below: 
(1) Pustejovskian qualia  
a. Constitutive: the relation between an object and its constituent parts  
 Material; weight; parts and component elements 
b. Formal: that which distinguishes it within a larger domain  
 Orientation; magnitude; shape; dimensionality; color; position 
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c. Telic: its purpose and function 
Purpose that an agent has in performing an act; built-in function or aim that 
specifies certain activities forming an act 
d. Agentive: factors involved in its origin or bringing it about 
 Creator; artifact; natural kind; causal chain 
(Pustejovsky 1991:426-7; 1998:76)  
Pustejovsky notes that “not all lexical items carry a value for each qualia role,” and a 
lexical item may have more than one quale of any given type (1998:76; 1991). Further, 
he argues that qualia values must be treated as “expressions with well-defined types and 
relational structures” (1998:78). While it could be argued that this would have been 
useful for my purposes as well, for the sake of simplicity I chose to omit this information; 
one may assume that it is implicitly included, and to do so explicitly would not 
substantially affect anything proposed here or in the next chapter. Thus the qualia for the 
lexical item novel can be supplied as in (2). 
(2) Qualia for novel36 
 a. Constitutive: NARRATIVE 
 b. Formal: BOOK, DISK 
 c. Telic: READ 
 d. Agentive: ARTIFACT, WRITE     Pustejovsky (1991:427) 
I argued as part of the APP study that the content of qualia such as these comprises a 
substantial portion of the information provided by category membership. However, in 
order to distinguish between informativeness as I defined it and the specific portion of 
informativeness associated with category membership, I shall henceforth refer to the 
latter as “CM-informativeness.”  
To summarize, for my research on APPs, I defined information as any proposition 
that was presented as factual and which the recipient could believe was at least probably 
true. However, not all information was informative, and whether a particular proposition 
was informative depended to some degree on the recipient. Informativeness could be 
achieved by any combination of a message reducing uncertainty, causing positive 
                                                
36 Qualia are indicated by SMALL CAPS, while linguistic items are indicated by italics. 
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cognitive effects, and increasing the manifestness of a set of assumptions. Information 
provided by a message was not counted towards informativeness if it was already 
possessed by the recipient, who could get it from a number of sources. Finally, 
informativeness did not seem to be reasonably quantifiable in the context of this study, so 
it was measured comparatively, as will be seen in the application of a further developed 
version of this account in the next chapter. 
The connection between informativeness and relative frequency was addressed in the 
second paragraph of this section; it was noted that more informative phrases should occur 
more frequently than their less informative counterparts. This connection was used as a 
way of testing informativeness assessments, but in viewing the results of such tests, it is 
important to remember that what was being assessed when using qualia was CM-
informativeness, not total informativeness. Because of this and other factors discussed 
shortly, the relationship to relative frequency was not as strong as one might expect. 
However, it could still be seen. As an example of the connection between CM-
informativeness and relative frequency, consider the lexical item novel. Pustejovsky 
(1991) gives READ as its telic quale; thus it was expected that the read novel was not 
much more CM-informative than the novel, and certainly less CM-informative than the 
unread novel. The phrase the read novel was thus expected to occur rarely if at all. In 
fact, usage suggested that for this particular case (and generally for nouns with a telic 
quale of READ), this assessment was correct: a corpus query for a/an/the read N returned 
mostly phrases in which read was not an APP (e.g., the read option, a football play in 
which read is a noun), while a query for a/an/the unread N returned mostly phrases 
containing nouns with a telic quale of READ, e.g., report, newspaper, essays.  
Because informativeness here was being assessed based on a relationship between the 
verb associated with an APP and the noun that occurred in the phrase with the APP, it 
was not possible to directly and in isolation classify APPs or their associated verbs 
regarding informativeness. What could be directly assessed, however, were the types of 
nouns that typically occurred in phrases with each APP. What proportion of them had 
qualia that would mean the negated form of the APP was more informative, and what 
proportion had qualia that would mean the non-negated form was more informative? It 
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was expected that APPs classified as positive typically occurred with nouns whose qualia 
were such that the negated form of the APP was relatively uninformative. Likewise, 
negative APPs would typically occur with nouns whose qualia meant that the non-
negated form of the APP was relatively uninformative. In fact, this was generally the 
case. In 74% of the APPs examined, the top two noun collocates had qualia like those 
described above (COCA). In other words, positive APPs’ collocates had qualia that 
allowed those APPs to be more informative when non-negated than when negated; that is, 
the non-negated APP denoted a property not supplied by category membership. Negative 
APPs were the opposite: the negated APP denoted a property not supplied by category 
membership. 
Results thus suggested that informativeness assessed via noun qualia was a highly 
explanatory factor in the distribution of positive and negative APPs. In addition, the 
significance of informativeness for APPs has been recognized elsewhere. Ackerman and 
Goldberg make a claim very similar to the one here via their “non-redundancy 
constraint,” which states: “If the referent of the head noun, N, implies a property P as part 
of its frame-semantic or encyclopedic knowledge, then an APP is not allowed to simply 
designate P; it must be further qualified” (1996:21). This is essentially another way of 
stating that APPs of the type identified by Ackerman and Goldberg’s constraint are not 
informative, and uninformative expressions are generally less used than more informative 
ones. 
Having defined what was meant here by informativeness and how it was assessed, I 
present three other factors in the APP study that I grouped with informativeness. The first 
of these was redundancy with resulting lexical blocking (Householder 1971; Blutner 
2004). For some of the APPs tested, the negative form was essentially (at least in some 
senses) completely synonymous with some other unrelated form, as in the example 
previously given with unbent and straight.37 In any case such as this, the synonymous 
forms ought to be, according to the criteria set out above, assessed as equally informative. 
The fact that in these cases the non-APP form was invariably more common, with the 
                                                
37 Note that unbent (in its adjectival function) and straight are alike in failing to distinguish between the 
meanings “never having been bent” and “having been bent, followed by a reversal of the bending.” For 
unbent, this is because un- in this case can have either of the two meanings discussed earlier. 
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APP form often not found at all, was explained by lexical blocking. Lexical blocking, as 
discussed by Blutner, is a process in which “the appropriate use of a given expression 
formed by a relatively productive process [here, APP formation] is restricted by the 
existence of a more ‘lexicalized’ alternative to this expression” (2004:501). Aronoff 
(1976) and Kiparsky (1982) have shown that this process applies not only to 
“expressions” but also to inflectional and derivational processes such as those involved in 
the transformation of the simple form of a verb into an APP. As suggested by Blutner, I 
concluded that this blocking was the result of pragmatic factors; specifically, the use of 
the anomalous or less lexicalized alternative provides information by suggesting that 
there is a specific reason for the choice of that alternative over the commonly used item.38 
Speakers wanting to avoid this suggestion must therefore avoid the alternative; the 
majority of the time, this was in fact what happened. 
Statistical preemption was a related factor that could either co-exist with lexical 
blocking or provide an alternative explanation for it. Statistical preemption, according to 
Boyd and Goldberg, “is an implicit inference speakers make from repeatedly hearing a 
formulation, B, in a context where one might have expected to hear a semantically and 
pragmatically related alternative formulation, A. The result is that speakers implicitly 
recognize that B is the appropriate formulation in such a context, and that A is not 
appropriate” (Boyd & Goldberg 2009:5). This could serve to further explain lexical 
blocking, in that speakers use the statistical rates at which they hear certain expressions to 
realize that one expression is, in fact, more lexicalized, and therefore use of the other 
would be pragmatically marked. Used as a different explanation independent of lexical 
blocking, statistical preemption could function as a model of how the disuse of APP 
forms and preference for equivalent non-APP forms is perpetuated. 
Another factor related to informativeness was that of conceptual impossibility (or 
extreme unlikelihood): in most cases, a phrase that represents something impossible in 
the world, and therefore very difficult or impossible to even imagine, was not used.39 It 
                                                
38 Levinson’s (1987) M-principle, discussed in 2.2.3, also addresses this. 
39 One may perceive as an exception to this a phrase, such as the unbuilt building, that represents something 
that is physically impossible in the world but not conceptually impossible, and thus useful to be able to talk 
about. 
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was for this reason that, for example, that the APPs unchewed or unalerted were never 
found with the reversal meaning; it is impossible to unchew something or to unalert 
someone. Similarly, the APP gathered was used in the examined data only to refer to 
groups of things or people (e.g., crowd, assembly); a group not gathered is arguably not a 
group, making the idea of an ungathered group highly unlikely if not impossible, and in 
fact the APP ungathered was not found in my data. APPs describing conceptual 
impossibilities were, as a group, absent from the data, as would be expected. 
3.2 Factors that affect predictions based on informativeness 
From the varied aspects examined above, it was clear that there was no single factor 
responsible for the differences in distribution between negative and positive adjectival 
past participles in attributive function, but informativeness was a factor with great 
explanatory potential: in general, the form (negated or non-negated) of an APP that was 
predicted to be more informative was the form I found occurring most often in my data. 
This portion of my analysis was also strengthened by its general agreement with that of 
Ackerman and Goldberg (1996). However, as mentioned above, informativeness is 
highly sensitive to context, and as such there are a number of contextual and similar 
factors that can alter the distributions that one would otherwise expect to find. I present 
these here as more recent developments to the APP study.  
3.2.1 Generalization of an individual-based property 
 Informativeness, being relative to an individual’s knowledge, is necessarily relative to 
an individual: what is highly informative to one person might be only somewhat 
informative to another, and completely uninformative to yet another. This individualized 
nature of informativeness is further discussed in 4.1.2. Further, since an individual’s 
knowledge is constantly changing, what is informative to someone at one time may have 
a different level of informativeness at another time. However, since there is not a separate 
corpus of each person’s language use, and multiple uses of a linguistic form necessarily 
take place over time, looking at relative frequency unavoidably involves looking at use 
across many individuals over some span of time, usually at least a few years.40 This 
means that, even when forms’ relative frequencies are highly correlated with 
                                                
40 At the time of the APP study, COCA contained data from 1990 to 2010. 
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informativeness, what is seen in a corpus can be thought of as distribution based on an 
“average” of informativeness levels across language users, time, and, as discussed in the 
next section, situations. Thus the informativeness levels of phrases as determined for a 
single individual may not obviously correlate with relative frequencies of those phrases in 
a corpus, especially if one or more of the phrases have significantly different 
informativeness levels to the individual in question than to most people or an “average 
language user” (assuming such a thing exists). 
3.2.2 Applicability of phrases 
 It should be obvious that one does not select a phrase to utter based on its length and 
informativeness alone; it must also be applicable to one’s current situation and linguistic 
needs. Since not all situations and needs occur with equal frequency, not all phrases are 
applicable an equal amount of the time. Thus even if all phrases were of equal 
informativeness, they should not all be expected to occur with the same frequency. In 
fact, since CM-informativeness can be linked to unexpectedness, in the sense that 
something expected is more likely to be necessary for category membership or linked 
with a quale, it is reasonable to think that more CM-informative phrases are, by 
definition, applicable less often than their less CM-informative counterparts. There are, 
therefore, competing forces: more CM-informative phrases seem to be chosen for use in a 
higher proportion of the situations in which they are applicable, but less CM-informative 
phrases are applicable in a greater number of situations.41 Ideally, then, one would 
examine relative frequency as a function of the percentage of applicable situations in 
which a phrase was chosen for use, but with a corpus this was simply not possible. 
3.2.3 Conventionality 
 Another factor to be discussed is that of relative conventionality, or the degree to 
which particular phrases are set in ordinary usage. Idioms, perhaps the most thoroughly 
set phrases, are outside the scope of this discussion due to their noncompositional 
meaning. However, many non-idiomatic phrases display varying degrees of 
conventionality, and this correlates with not only the frequency with which they appear, 
but also the occurrence of similar, competing phrases. It is necessary, of course, to note 
                                                
41 This is also addressed in 4.4.2, specifically in the discussion of (6c). 
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that conventionality may be either the cause or the result (or perhaps even some of both) 
of a high frequency of occurrence – a phrase may become set in ordinary usage due to 
frequent use; it may come to be frequently used because, as a set phrase, it is particularly 
convenient or cognitively available; or both of these processes may factor in to the 
conventionality and frequency of a given phrase. 
 As an example of a conventional phrase, consider done deal. It is frequently non-
idiomatic and typically occurs in the form a done deal, but is also found as the done deal. 
These two variants make up a significant percentage of phrases of the form a/the done N: 
95% of occurrences of this form have deal as the N (COCA). This means that, if a/the 
done deal were not a conventional phrase, done would occur attributively in simple noun 
phrases much less frequently, changing the ratio of occurrences of done to undone in 
attributive position. In addition, other phrases with similar meaning, such as a/the 
finished deal, a/the completed deal, and a/the finalized deal would likely occur more 
often than they do.42 Because of the conventionality of the phrase with done, these other 
phrases are rarely found: a/the finished deal does not occur at all in COCA, while a/the 
completed deal appears only once and a/the finalized deal is found twice, compared to 
a/the done deal’s 303 occurrences. Thus without the influence of the conventional phrase, 
words like finished, completed, and finalized would likely occur attributively in simple 
noun phrases more frequently than they now do, also changing the ratio of non-negated to 
negated forms for these words. 
 A similar situation can be seen with the phrase a/the guided tour, the 230 appearances 
of which make up 52% of occurrences of phrases of the form a/the guided N (COCA). 
Due to the conventionality of this phrase, alternatives occur much less frequently, if at 
all: an/the escorted tour is found only 5 times, while a/the directed tour and a/the led 
tour do not appear at all. In this case the conventional phrase seems to remove the 
possibility of synonymous alternatives while not making up a significant majority of the 
phrases using its adjective. A more dramatic case is that of a less-used but highly 
                                                
42 See the discussion on statistical pre-emption in 3.1.6. 
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conventional phrase, a/the risen lord43: its 51 occurrences make up 65% of all instances 
of phrases of the form a/the risen N, and no synonymous alternatives of the form a/an/the 
Adj N were found in COCA. 
3.2.4 Use of other modifiers, such as half-, and incremental theme 
 As mentioned earlier, incremental theme was considered in the previous study, but 
did not seem to be highly explanatory. However, upon revisiting this notion, it becomes 
apparent that whether a verb takes an incremental theme or not has an effect on what 
types of modifiers may be used and when; this is relevant to the distribution of APPs with 
and without the negating prefix un-. Like telicity and other components of situation 
aspect, the notion of incremental theme applies to verbs and their arguments rather than 
to adjectives, and thus must be related to the verb from which an APP is derived and the 
themes of that verb when describing the event in question.   
 If an event described with a verb using an incremental theme has started, the theme in 
its entirety cannot reasonably be called a/an/the unAPP [theme], where the APP is 
derived from the verb used to describe the event. For instance, once an event of mowing 
the lawn has commenced, the unmowed lawn44 cannot be used to refer to the whole lawn, 
but rather only to the portion that has not yet been affected by the event. It is only when 
the event has not begun that the whole theme may accurately be called a/an/the unAPP 
[theme], since once the verb’s action starts taking place, at least part of the incremental 
theme is considered to have been “verbed.” Thus it is only before an event of mowing has 
begun that the whole lawn can be described as the unmowed lawn. Similarly, most 
incremental themes in their entirety cannot be called a/an/the APP [theme] during the 
event. For example, during a mowing event, the mowed lawn cannot be used to refer to 
the whole lawn, but only to the portion of the lawn that has been mowed. However, while 
the event is in progress, one may typically use non-negating modifiers to the APP such as 
half, partially, and mostly in referring to the incremental theme, as shown in (3) below. 
(3) Phrases describing incremental themes during event 
a. the half-eaten sandwich 
                                                
43 The word lord varied in capitalization in the corpus, but corpus searches were not sensitive to this; this 
phrase occurs in contexts such as faith in the risen lord (COCA). 
44 This and some other examples in this section are adapted from themes mentioned in Dowty (1991). 
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  b. a partially mowed lawn 
  c. the mostly swept floor 
A phrase such as that in (3a), with half-, is likely to be used when the corresponding 
event is roughly halfway completed; i.e., this phrase would not likely be used of a 
sandwich with just one bite out of it, or just one bite left of it. The modifier partially, as 
in (3b), is a bit more flexible, being applicable for a larger portion of the event than half-. 
The phrase in (3c), with mostly, is similar to that in (3a) in being more restricted; in this 
case, the modifier is used only when the even is relatively near completion. Of course, 
once the event is complete, the theme is described mainly as a/an/the APP [theme], e.g., 
the mowed lawn, with the possibility of the occasional modifier such as fully or 
completely. 
 When an event involves a non-incremental theme, descriptions before and after the 
event are the same as those outlined above. However, during an event described by the 
verb from which an APP is derived, some non-incremental themes can be described with 
the APP under consideration as a/an/the unAPP [theme]or a/an/the APP [theme], as 
shown below.  
(4) Phrases describing non-incremental themes during event 
  a. an unlicensed driver 
  b. a driven car 
Note that both types of description (negated and non-negated) are generally not available 
for the same theme: a licensed driver cannot be used to describe the driver during an 
event of licensing, and an undriven car cannot be used to describe the car during an event 
of driving. In addition, there are some non-incremental themes that cannot be described 
by either phrase type during the event, such as (arguably) the cart during an event of 
pushing it. Finally, modifiers such as those shown in (3) cannot be used to describe a 
non-incremental theme mid-event, as shown in (5). 
(5)   a. *a half-licensed driver   
  b. *a partially driven car 
  c. *the mostly pushed cart 
The unacceptability of these phrases should come as no surprise, since they describe 
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themes as being incrementally affected by events that are not conceived as incrementally 
affecting their themes. 
It is clear from these patterns that the availability of different forms of APP phrases 
(i.e., unmodified, modified but non-negated, and negated) across time varies between 
events associated with incremental and non-incremental themes. Table (2) below 
illustrates these differences. 
Type of theme 
associated  
with event  
 
Before event 
 
During event 
 
After event 
Incremental  negated modified45 unmodified; modified 
Non-incremental negated (negated; unmodified) unmodified; modified 
Table 2: Availability of forms of APP phrases over time 
As can be seen above, phrases of the type a/an/the unAPP [theme] are available for a 
larger proportion of time when describing non-incremental themes – both before and 
sometimes during the event, as opposed to only before the event for incremental themes. 
In contrast, phrases of the type a/an/the [modifier] APP [theme] are more available for 
incremental themes. Thus the type of theme typically associated with the verb from 
which an APP is derived is clearly a factor that has at least the potential to affect the 
relative frequency of negated and non-negated forms of an APP. 
3.2.5 Clashes among information provided by category membership  
 Another contextual factor that may affect distribution of negated and non-negated 
APPs is the presence of clashing expectations, both established by information associated 
with category membership, about whether a mentioned item has or has not been, or will 
or will not be, the object of an action denoted by a verb from which an APP is derived. 
One such type of expectation arises when the item is not considered to be a member of its 
category once it has undergone some action that it is not particularly atypical for it to 
undergo. Such a situation arises with some verbs of consumption or destruction, and can 
be described by the statement an APPed x is no longer an x, as in (6). 
(6)  Clash with verbs of consumption or destruction 
  a. an eaten sandwich is no longer a sandwich 
                                                
45 ‘Modified’ is used here to refer to modification as shown in (3), and does not include negation. 
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  b. a shredded page is no longer a page 
The statements shown above indicate that the item mentioned was once a member of the 
category in question but has been changed in such a way as to remove it from the 
category. The statement in (6a) reflects that something that qualifies as a member of the 
sandwich category must be uneaten, or only partially eaten, even though eating is 
something commonly done to sandwiches; (6b) shows that a member of the page 
category must be unshredded, or perhaps partially but not fully shredded, even though 
fully shredding pages is certainly not uncommonly done. The effect of these requirements 
is that phrases such as an/the uneaten sandwich and an/the unshredded page are 
relatively uninformative under neutral circumstances, despite the fact that they indicate 
the absence of an action frequently done to the noun in question, a function that would 
normally cause them to be relatively informative. Their low informativeness is caused by 
the fact that, in each case, the extra information provided by the APP can be thought of as 
more or less necessary for membership in the category named by the noun, and thus 
qualifies as information provided by category membership. Such phrases are thus 
expected to occur relatively rarely. In addition, phrases such as an/the eaten sandwich 
and an/the shredded page may, more often than would otherwise be expected, be used to 
refer to something that has only partially been affected by the relevant process, e.g., that 
which could also be called a/the partially eaten sandwich. This is because the alternative 
– that they would refer to the fully affected item – would require them to refer to a former 
category member as though it were a current member, e.g., calling something a sandwich 
that is no longer a member of the sandwich category. It should be noted, however, that 
referring to a former category member as though it were a current member is sometimes 
done in cases where former category membership is particularly is particularly salient 
and/or adds relevant information, as with melted ice, paid debt, and corrected error. 
With some verbs of creation,46 a situation that contrasts with the above can hold, 
resulting in another type of clash. This type of situation and the previously discussed one 
both relate to the issue of conceptual impossibility raised at the end of 3.1.6. The 
                                                
46 I use the term ‘verbs of creation’ here perhaps somewhat loosely to include any verb denoting a process 
that creates in an item what could be considered a defining characteristic of that item, e.g., the coiling of a 
spring. 
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particular scenario can be described by the statement an unAPPed x is not yet an x, as in 
(7). 
(7) Phrases with verbs of creation 
  a. an unbuilt building is not yet a building 
  b. an uncoiled spring is not yet a spring 
  c. an ungathered crowd is not yet a crowd 
These phrases reflect expectations that any member of the building category has been (at 
least partially) built, any member of the spring category is coiled, and any member of the 
crowd category is gathered. That is, the actions referenced are required to have been done 
to an item in order for that item to be a member of the relevant category. The effect of 
these expectations is twofold: first, phrases such as a/the built building, a/the coiled 
spring, and a/the gathered crowd are relatively uninformative under neutral 
circumstances, since they provide already assumed information, and are thus rare. In the 
second effect is where one finds a clash of expectations: phrases such as a/the unbuilt 
building, a/the uncoiled spring, and a/the ungathered crowd are expected to be quite 
informative, since they indicate the absence of actions that are generally assumed to have 
occurred, and should thus occur relatively frequently. However, if one accepts that those 
actions, as noted above, are required for category membership (i.e., if we accept the truth 
of the statements in 6), these phrases refer to things that do not exist and should thus have 
quite limited use. This issue, though, has less to do with whether the item in question 
actually exists prior to the relevant action and more to do with whether it can be 
conceived as existing. For example, judging by frequency on Google, a building not yet 
built seems to be somewhat frequently and easily conceived as a building, perhaps 
because planning before the building of a structure is necessary and time-consuming, and 
involves the creation or procurement of related products (architectural plans, models, 
permits, etc.); in contrast, a crowd not yet gathered is very rarely mentioned. In sum, it 
can be said that phrases with negated APPs derived from verbs of creation may, in some 
cases, be expected to occur less frequently than informativeness assessment would 
indicate; the cases most affected would be those in which it is the most difficult to 
conceive of the item in question as existing as a category member prior to the action of 
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creation. 
 Another type of clash, quite similar to the first type discussed, may arise when an 
APP describes an item that is typically disposed of upon becoming describable by that 
APP, as with the used tissue / paper towel / toilet paper. These items are generally used, 
which would lead to the expectation that referring to them as used is not particularly 
informative under usual circumstances. However, they are also typically disposed of 
immediately after use, so that used versions tend not to exist in a noticeable way. 
Therefore, while use is expected, it is also expected that actual encountered instances of 
these items will most often be unused, and so identifying them as used when that is the 
case is, in fact, quite informative. Thus the predicted occurrence of such phrases as those 
above is higher than it otherwise would be. Other items with a similar effect are those 
that, when they can be described by a certain APP, are much less useful in life and/or in 
conversation, as with the unreturned questionnaire/survey and a number of nouns 
described by APPs such as unneeded, unimagined, and unobserved. While phrases with 
these negated APPs would often be otherwise expected to be relatively informative, they 
occur less than might be predicted due to the fact that they describe things that, for most 
people, there is simply not much need to describe.47 
3.2.6 Distinction within a group 
Ackerman and Goldberg note something else that I found to be true of my data in the 
original APP study, namely that “contrastive contexts are able to rescue APPs from 
unacceptability” (1996:23). In other words, a phrase that would be relatively CM-
uninformative under most circumstances, and thus not likely to be used, may be much 
more informative, and thus useful, in a situation where it helps to distinguish some subset 
of a group. For example, since most grass is green, the green grass is typically not 
appreciably more informative than the grass. Even if most grass were not green, the 
former phrase would be relatively uninformative in a situation in which interlocutors can 
see that the grass in question is green. However, the green grass phrase is much more 
informative in a situation in which interlocutors can see that some grass is brown and 
                                                
47 Note, however, that some of this effect may be a result of the type of usage and users that get catalogued 
in a corpus; researchers may be more likely than research subjects to encounter or talk about unreturned 
surveys/questionnaires, but they may also be more likely to find their usage in a corpus or archive. 
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some is green, because it now serves to eliminate the brown grass as the object of 
mention. Similarly, most novels are read, so the read novel is relatively CM-
uninformative under usual conditions, but may be highly informative if there is a 
restricted group of novels to which it may refer, and only one of them has been read 
(perhaps by some particular person). The existence of this distinctive function means that 
a phrase may occur more frequently than would be expected, and if the need to 
distinguish within a group arises often, a phrase that is relatively CM-uninformative 
under neutral circumstances may actually occur quite frequently. 
 In the same manner, a phrase that is only somewhat CM-informative under neutral 
circumstances will have increased informativeness when it distinguishes from a group a 
smaller percentage of the group than it normally would, or in other words, when it 
eliminates a larger subset of possibilities. When picking from all apples in the world, a 
green apple eliminates all but some subset that is probably between 25% and 75% of the 
group. However, if the user of this phrase has only to pick among eight red apples and 
two green ones, a green apple is more informative than in the previous situation: it 
eliminates all but 20% of the relevant group. If one of those green apples is subsequently 
removed from consideration, the phrase becomes even more informative, selecting only 
one apple from the group. As with the similar situation type discussed above, this may 
cause a phrase to occur more than would otherwise be expected, leading to an APP with 
higher relative frequency than predicted. 
3.2.7 Creating a quantity implicature 
 As discussed in chapter 2, the use of an utterance with a seemingly inappropriate 
level of informativeness typically gives rise to some sort of implicature, or conveyance of 
information beyond what is strictly said. When more information than was expected is 
given, a frequent implicature is that all the information given is in fact necessary. When 
less information than was expected is given, frequent implicatures are that the speaker 
either does not have any more information or has the information but does not want to 
share it with the hearer.  
Since these implicatures, as well as others, are triggered by the use of utterances that 
are more or less informative than what seems to be called for, they may account for some 
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variation between actual distributions and distributions that are expected based on 
informativeness. It is worth noting, however, that the adjustments in informativeness that 
are made for the purpose of creating implicatures do not typically involve APPs, though 
of course they may. For this reason, the use of quantity implicatures is best thought of as 
a factor that may somewhat influence distribution of linguistic items in general, but is not 
expected to have much of an effect on APPs in particular. For example, if A asks B how 
to repot his houseplant, and B knows that A is notorious for killing plants, and does not 
want him dealing with the houseplant, B may reply with far more information than A 
wants or needs, including using phrases that considerations of expected informativeness 
alone would suggest to be inappropriate. By providing this extra information, B creates 
the implicature that repotting the houseplant is a very precise, painstaking, and perhaps 
difficult process, thereby overwhelming and/or scaring off A so that the plant stays safe. 
As mentioned above and discussed in chapter 2, implicatures can also be triggered by 
providing what seems like too little information; this may cause relatively uninformative 
utterances to be used more frequently than would otherwise be expected. For example, if 
A and B are in school and just had a test returned to them, A might ask B what he got on 
the test. If B replies with a grade, this is clearly a less informative answer than is 
appropriate in the situation and is likely to create the implicature that B does not want A 
to know what grade he received. B obviously has the information but does not want to 
share it for some reason; perhaps he is ashamed of his grade, or knows it is better than 
A’s and does not want to make A feel unintelligent. Regardless of the exact reason, 
however, a phrase is used that seems to be too uninformative for the situation. 
3.2.8 Attributive position 
Up to this point, my discussion of factors affecting the accuracy of informativeness-
based predictions has focused mainly on phrases of the type originally studied, that is, 
nominals with APPs in attributive position. The factors identified are, for the most part, 
generalizable to a variety of constructions. One factor that is form-specific, however, is 
the focus of this section: the relative frequencies of phrases involving APPs in attributive 
position seem to be more sensitive to CM-informativeness than those of phrases 
involving the same forms in predicative position. For example, many non-negated 
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adjectival participles that are rarely or never found in attributive position occur quite 
freely in predicative position: an/the eaten N and an/the attended N are rare, with 4 and 1 
occurrences in COCA respectively, while a/an/the N is/was eaten and a/an/the N is/was 
attended are relatively less so, with 35 and 37 occurrences in COCA respectively. It 
should be noted that in predicative position these forms are typically verbal rather than 
adjectival, and this likely affects the degree to which they are governed by 
informativeness or CM-informativeness.  
The exact reasons for the difference in CM-informativeness sensitivity between 
adjectival/attributive and verbal/predicative forms remain an area for further research. 
However, preliminary examination has suggested that the distinction between assertion 
and presupposition, and something akin to the attributive/referential distinction proposed 
by Donnellan (1966), may be relevant, though both can most easily be seen to apply to 
definite phrases, while CM-informativeness sensitivity differences are present in 
indefinite phrases as well. First, use of a definite nominal with an adjectival participle in 
prenominal position can be said to presuppose the existence of a referent of the noun with 
the attribute described by the adjective. In other words, using the phrase the thrown apple 
presupposes that there is an apple that has been thrown. In contrast, a predicative, verbal 
use of a past participle with a definite noun again presupposes the existence of a referent 
of the noun but now asserts, rather than presupposes, that the noun has undergone the 
action denoted by the participle. For example, the apple was thrown still presupposes the 
existence of an apple, but now asserts that it was thrown.  
One might expect that presupposed information would face a less stringent 
informativeness requirement than asserted information, but this does not appear to be the 
case. A possible contributing factor to this has to do with a distinction similar to that 
which Donnellan (1966) makes with respect to attributive and referential uses of definite 
descriptions. Donnellan describes the attributive use as “stat[ing] something about 
whoever or whatever” is described and the referential use as “enabl[ing] [one’s] audience 
to pick out whom or what he is talking about and stat[ing] something about that person or 
thing” (1966:285). Similarly, one can distinguish between the fact that the prenominal 
use of a participle often allows an addressee to “pick out” the appropriate referent from 
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among the relevant possibilities, a sort of referential use, while the predicative, verbal use 
of a participle more often allows one to “state something” about the referent of the 
relevant noun, a more attributive48 type of use. Since information that allows one to pick 
out a particular member of a category over other members is closely related to what is 
measured by CM-informativeness, it follows that participles that are more often used 
attributively (by Donnellan’s classification) would face higher CM-informativeness 
requirements. However, the analysis provided here is in its infancy, and as noted above, 
this area remains one with great potential for future research. 
3.3 Informativeness revisited 
Having presented some more recently identified factors in the APP study, and in the 
connection between CM-informativeness and relative frequency specifically, I now return 
to my original characterization of informativeness to offer an updated discussion of that 
as well. In this section I address several issues, some of which represent changes to the 
original conception, and some of which simply provide necessary elucidation. 
3.3.1 Propositionality 
First, I return to the topic of propositionality. At the time of the original study, the 
proposed characterization of informativeness was intended mainly to work with only a 
small subset of linguistic forms – namely APP phrases of the type studied – which could 
simply be converted into propositions. However, in working with informativeness in an 
expanded context, it has become apparent that an account that neither requires nor 
assumes propositional form as a requirement for informativeness is useful. In order to 
accomplish this with the current characterization of informativeness, I rely on the idea 
that a phrase, whether or not it has propositional form, can be said to ‘associate’ one item, 
action, attribute, etc. with another. I use this as a general cover term for both relationships 
indicated by both propositional and non-propositional forms; for example, both the 
constructions in (8) associate the property of having been cooked with the item denoted 
by the apple. 
(8) Association 
                                                
48 By ‘attributive’ here I mean to relate this use to Donnellan’s (1966) classification of attributive definite 
descriptions; it is an unfortunate coincidence that participles in attributive position correspond to his 
referential use, while participles in predicative position correspond to his attributive use. 
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a. the cooked apple 
  b. We cooked the apple 
It is clear that these two constructions are not identical in either form or meaning, but in 
both cases there is a specific apple that can be understood to have been cooked, so both 
items can, in some sense, be said to have some propositional content, if not (in the case of 
8a) propositional form. Indeed, it is the case that any association can be viewed as 
propositional in content, if not in form. The move from phrase conversion to the use of 
the concept of association thus represents a minor evolution that allows for a simpler 
theory by eliminating the conversion step and thereby avoiding any potential pragmatic 
issues resulting from the change in form. Items with non-propositional form can, 
therefore, be informative, and thus arises the second point on which my clarification of 
the propositionality requirement rests: a distinction between information and items that 
can be informative. Information itself can still be required to be propositional, as both 
constructions supply information that can be formulated as “the apple was cooked,” but 
the items that can be said to have the property of informativeness need not themselves be 
propositional. 
I also argue that both constructions above, to the extent that one can tell given the 
lack of context, are presented as factual, which I required in my original characterization 
of informativeness in lieu of truth. I classify as a factual presentation any presentation 
that does not give the addressee evidence that he should question the truth or accuracy of 
the associations presented. Such evidence might range from the very explicit, e.g. It is not 
true that we cooked the apple, to the subtle, such as a questioning tone of voice. Clearly, 
no such evidence can be detected in (8). Thus the two constructions above can be treated 
identically in terms of assessing the CM-informativeness of the word cooked in 
connection with the apple category; such assessment is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
3.3.2 Cognitive availability 
The next task is to clarify what I mean by ‘cognitive availability,’ a phrase used in my 
characterization of informativeness but as yet undefined. To recap, my account of 
informativeness reads, in part, “a phrase or utterance is informative to the extent that it 
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increases the cognitive availability of information not already fully available.” By 
‘cognitive availability of information,’ I simply mean the ease with which that 
information is called to mind, or brought into conscious thought, at a particular time. This 
is not dissimilar to others’ use of ‘cognitive availability’ or simply ‘availability’ as 
related to information’s “activation in [one’s] mind” (Linderholm et al. 2004:166), the 
amount of time it takes to produce a response involving a particular piece of information 
(Henley & Abueg 2003), or the speed with which a particular word can be retrieved 
(Mercer 1976). Similarly, ‘lexical availability’ is used, e.g. by Hernández-Muñoz et al., 
to describe “the ease with which a word can be generated as a member of a given 
category” as measured by the percentage of subjects who produce the word as a category 
member and the ordinal position in which it is produced (2006:730).  
As should perhaps be expected, cognitive availability is not a binary, all-or-nothing 
property, but rather a graded one: it is not the case that one simply can or cannot call to 
mind a piece of information, but rather that, when one can call it to mind, the ease with 
which this may be done can vary. This variance depends on a number of factors, 
including the extent to which one has been previously exposed to the information and 
how relevant the information is to one’s current cognitive, physical, and discourse 
environment. Thus information that is not already fully cognitively available can be made 
more available, or brought more to the forefront of one’s mind, by stimulus to which it is 
relevant, and that stimulus can then be said to be informative according to my account. 
Having clarified this point, it is now possible to compare my account of informativeness 
to entailment-based definitions such as that used by Horn (1972). It should be clear that 
my characterization is much broader, in the sense that it allows a wider variety of things 
to be informative: one item need not entail more than another in order to be more 
informative, and indeed need not entail anything at all. 
3.3.3 ‘Already available’: the timing of information from category membership 
 The use of the phrase ‘already fully available via category membership or context’ in 
my characterization of informativeness suggests a temporal ordering of information 
sources; namely, that information from the category membership of entities in an 
utterance is received and/or processed before information provided by the associations 
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that an utterance makes. While I have no hard evidence for or against such a temporal 
ordering of processing, the wording I use in my characterization of informativeness is 
intended to capture the fact that information provided by category membership is 
temporally distinct from new information provided by an utterance in terms of 
acquisition, if not activation. The former can be considered ‘prior’ information in the 
sense that the information itself is in fact already possessed by the recipient of an 
utterance; the utterance simply serves to activate the information by calling to mind a 
particular category. In other words, the recipient already has information associated with 
a myriad of categories, and can create new categories with associated information as 
needed (see 4.1.2 for more on this), so all an utterance has to do is convey to the recipient 
which category (or categories) he or she should call to mind; the already-present 
information associated with this category then achieves varying degrees of cognitive 
availability, as discussed in detail in chapter 4.  
3.3.4 Qualia and CM-informativeness 
As detailed above in 3.1.6, I use Pustejovsky’s notion of qualia to define the sorts of 
information provided by category membership. I showed in (2) that Pustejovsky allows 
for more than one quale of each type to be assigned to a lexical item; I agree with him 
that restricting qualia to one per type is unwarranted, but beyond that, I depart from his 
theories on the issue of how qualia are assigned. 
In Pustejovsky’s (1991) view, qualia that fully apply to the lexical item in question 
should be included in said item’s semantics, and other qualia are not considered in 
relation to the item. In my view, every quale can be considered in relation to every item, 
though I do not propose that language users actively engage in such exhaustive 
consideration. Of course, given any single lexical item, most qualia will not apply at all, 
but there will also be a class of qualia that apply more or less well. I consider all of these 
qualia to be important in relation to the lexical item under consideration, and discuss how 
they can be managed and structured with respect to their applicability to an item in the 
next chapter. Thus, in my view, a lexical item can have far more qualia than Pustejovsky 
would likely ever propose, because I allow for graded assignment in which some qualia 
apply better to an item than others. 
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  In addition, I claimed in 3.1.6 that “the content of qualia… comprises a substantial 
portion of the information provided by category membership,” stopping short of an 
assertion that qualia make up all of the information provided by category membership. I 
wish to now somewhat strengthen that claim, to say that the information provided by 
category membership is entirely of the sort given by qualia, though not necessarily 
limited to exclusively the specific types of information listed in (1). That is, all 
information provided by category membership can be classified as constitutive, formal, 
telic, or agentive, but each of those classifications may contain information types beyond 
those listed in (1). I make this point not so much because it is critical to my notion of 
information that is provided by category membership, but because it allows me to 
conceive of the model discussed in chapter 4 as being comprehensive while having 
categories based on qualia, and categories whose members are qualia. 
3.4 Conclusions 
 In this chapter I have recounted the study that motivated my characterization of 
informativeness and defined the concept. I also proposed a framework within which to 
view the portion of informativeness associated with knowledge about category 
membership, dubbed ‘CM-informativeness.’ I then discussed factors that mitigate the 
correspondence between relative frequency and CM-informativeness. First, CM-
informativeness is related to an individual’s knowledge, and as such varies somewhat 
from person to person, while relative frequency is a measure of use by a (usually large) 
population, and thus cannot be expected to reflect an individual’s perceived level of CM-
informativeness of an item. Second, some linguistic items are simply applicable in a 
greater number of situations than others, and as such occur more frequently; these tend to 
be those that have lower levels of CM-informativeness. In addition, conventionality also 
affects relative frequency. Whether a verb takes an incremental or non-incremental theme 
affects which modifiers can be used on its associated APP at which times, so this too can 
influence the proportions in which negation and other modifications are found. In some 
cases there are clashes between considerations of CM-informativeness, making the 
relationship between it and relative frequency more complex. In addition, a phrase with 
low CM-informativeness can have higher informativeness when used to distinguish 
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something within a known group. Finally, language users may choose to employ 
language of unexpected informativeness levels in order to create quantity implicatures. 
 After discussing the factors above, I then expanded and clarified some points related 
to my account of informativeness. First, I revised my notion of informativeness so that 
non-propositional items may be considered informative. Next I clarified that ‘cognitive 
availability’ refers to the ease with which one can access information at a particular point 
in time. I then discussed how information provided by category membership can be 
thought of as information that the recipient of an utterance possessed prior to the 
utterance. Finally, I introduced a view of qualia in which a large number of qualia may be 
seen as being applicable, to varying degrees, to a single lexical item. 
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Chapter 4. A model for assessing CM-informativeness 
4.0. Introduction 
Having defined informativeness, and showed how qualia may be used to predict what 
information can be said to be provided by category membership, I now introduce a model 
that uses qualia to allow for predictions to be made regarding information provided by 
category membership. The model I have developed utilizes two main types of categories: 
nominal-based categories that contain qualia, and quale-based categories that contain 
nominals. Though Pustejovsky (1995, 1998) provides for qualia structure of other 
linguistic categories as well, I concentrate specifically on nominals for the sake of 
simplicity and because what is shown with nominal-based categories and with nominals 
as category members can relatively easily be generalized to other linguistic forms. For 
similar reasons, the only qualia I discuss here are telic, but again, a generalization to 
include other types of qualia (constitutive, formal, and agentive) is quite straightforward. 
The motivation for a category-based model comes from arguments for the importance 
of categories in cognition, particularly those made by Smith and Medin (1981), Mervis 
and Rosch (1981), and Lakoff (1987). Smith and Medin use the word ‘concepts’ to refer 
to the mental constructs behind the ability to categorize, or “determine that a specific 
instance is a member of a concept” (1981:7). They note that “without concepts, we would 
be overwhelmed by the sheer diversity of what we experience and unable to remember 
more than a minute fraction of what we encounter” (1981:1). Concepts allow us to “draw 
inferences about…entities,” and such inferences are “activated by gaining access to [a] 
concept via the word that denotes it” (Smith & Medin 1981:8-9). Mervis and Rosch 
classify a category as something that “exists whenever two or more distinguishable 
objects or events are treated equivalently” (1981:89). They note that “categorization may 
be considered one of the most basic functions of living creatures,” and without it, “an 
organism could not interact profitably with the infinitely distinguishable objects and 
events it experiences” (1981:89,94). Lakoff, following the work of Rosch (1978; 1981), 
supports a view of categories as prototype-based and “defined by cognitive models,” 
which “structure thought and are used… in reasoning” (1987:9,13). He claims that “there 
is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action, and speech,” 
 85 
and that without this ability, “we could not function at all, either in the physical world or 
in our social and intellectual lives” (Lakoff 1987:5,6). 
The researchers discussed above are also among those who have provided motivation 
for the particular nature of the categories I propose. In the next section I establish that 
categories in the proposed model have graded structure, vary among individuals, and can 
be common or ad hoc. In the following section I discuss categories based on nominals 
and what these can tell us about information provided by category membership. After 
that, in section 3, I do the same for categories based on qualia. In section 4, I discuss the 
relationships and interactions between categories, and synthesize the information in 
sections 2 and 3 to discuss the model as a whole and further outline what it can and 
cannot do. Section 5 delves into the differences between how the model treats 
informativeness and how others (particularly those subscribing to an entailment-based 
view) have treated it, and I conclude in section 6. 
4.1 Category attributes 
4.1.1 Graded structure 
 Both the nominal-based and quale-based categories I propose here have graded 
structure, which comprises three attributes: central and non-central members, fuzzy 
boundaries, and variation in similarity to the category among non-members (Barsalou 
1983). The first two of these attributes are more important to the model than the third 
(with the first being the most critical), but all three will be assumed as characteristics of 
every category discussed in this chapter. 
In categories in general, the classification of members as central and non-central, or 
as being in gradient distribution, reflects that some are better or more prototypical 
category members than others. For example, a robin is a more prototypical member of the 
category of birds than is a penguin; a car is a more prototypical vehicle than is an airboat. 
This aspect of graded structure is suggested by Wittgenstein (1953) and Austin (1961), 
and central and non-central members have been found in specific categories by Rosch 
(1973, 1975) and others. Mervis and Rosch point to a “now… growing amount of 
empirical evidence that all members are not equally representative of their category” 
(1981:95). In the context of the model proposed here, centrality reflects cognitive 
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availability: when one considers the base of a category, the most central members of that 
category are the ones that are most likely to come to mind in connection with the 
category base. Thus if one considers an item X, the most central members of X’s 
category provide the information that is most present via category membership, and the 
more peripheral members of X’s category provide the least information via category 
membership. 
Fuzzy boundaries represent the fact that there are “unclear cases, items whose 
category membership is uncertain” (Barsalou 1983:211). An early category found to have 
fuzzy boundaries was that of furniture – there is uncertainty as to whether smaller items 
such as a radio are members (Barsalou 1983). Lakoff (1987) offers a somewhat different 
type of example with the category of rich people – how rich must one be to count as a 
member? Zadeh (1965) formalizes the idea of fuzzy boundaries in what he calls “fuzzy 
set theory,” and McCawley (1981) discusses the application of this theory to language. 
McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) were among the earliest researchers to identify 
particular category elements with uncertain membership. Mervis and Rosch note that 
experimental evidence has been produced of two aspects of poorly-defined category 
boundaries: “between-subject disagreements concerning which categories certain (poor) 
exemplars belong to” and “within-subject disagreement… across testing sessions” on the 
same task (1981:101). The concepts of fuzzy boundaries and centrality of members are 
both thoroughly developed by Lakoff (1987).  
4.1.2 Individualization and common vs. ad hoc categories 
Each category represents the way knowledge about a topic may be structured in an 
individual’s mind. Because it is based on the modeled person’s knowledge and posits 
actual cognitive structures and processes, the model is specific to each individual. Minor 
differences in membership and centrality are likely to occur, but a large amount of 
consistency is expected from person to person, especially within a given culture or 
community; such consistency has been found in subjects’ ratings of a member’s 
representativeness of its category (Mervis and Rosch 1981). This consistency is important 
because, in deciding what to say to an addressee, a speaker must guess at how 
informative his or her utterance will be for the addressee. This means that a speaker must 
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be able to predict, with reasonable accuracy, some aspects of how the addressee’s 
relevant category (or categories) is arranged. However, an expectation of some variation 
is necessary for any account that seeks to incorporate the actual knowledge of language 
users and model what may be going on in the brain. All example categories given in this 
paper reflect the author’s knowledge and posited structures. 
Also, as mentioned above, each category is based on either a nominal or a quale. 
Because there is a theoretically infinite number of nominals, and a very large number of 
qualia, positing a pre-established and stored category based on each of these would be 
unreasonable. I therefore rely on Barsalou’s notion of ad hoc categories, which are 
“highly specialized” categories that are “created spontaneously for use in specialized 
contexts” (1983:211). These are distinguished from common categories, or those that are 
“well established in memory,” but both types of categories share the properties of graded 
structure (Barsalou 1983:224), so in the model presented here common and ad hoc 
categories are structured and function identically. 
I propose that each individual has common categories based on frequently 
encountered nominals and qualia. The membership of one person’s category based on a 
given item may differ from another’s category based on the same item, in terms of both 
members vs. non-members and centrality of members. In addition, each individual has 
the ability to create ad hoc categories based on infrequently encountered nominals and 
qualia as the need arises (i.e., as an infrequently encountered nominal or quale is 
encountered). Like common categories, ad hoc categories are likely to differ to some 
extent between individuals. Further, what common categories one has, and therefore what 
ad hoc categories one might need to create, also varies somewhat from person to person, 
since individuals’ differing experiences mean that which qualia and nominals are 
frequently encountered will differ to some degree. For example, all people can be 
expected to have a common category based on the nominal food, but the nominal 
aquarium cleaning supplies would likely require generation of an ad hoc category among 
non-aquarists. This can be viewed as analogous to the finding that which category level 
in a domain is basic, or the most fundamental, “can vary as a function of both the cultural 
significance of the domain and the level of expertise of the individual” (Mervis & Rosch 
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1981:93). Furthermore, definite nominals (discussed more in 2.2) almost always require 
ad hoc categories; even though the head noun and even a nominal of the same form may 
be frequently encountered, it is unlikely in most circumstances that the same form with 
the same referent is encountered frequently enough to form a common category based on 
it. 
4.2 Nominal-based categories 
4.2.1 The basic nominal-based category 
The first type of category I will discuss is that which is based on a nominal; in other 
words, a specific nominal, hereafter referred to as the “base nominal,” is the linguistic 
form around which the category is built, and members (and non-members) are 
determined according to their relationship to the concept denoted by that nominal. In this 
type of category, members are qualia distributed on a gradient according to the degree to 
which they apply to the nominal in question. These qualia and their placement within (or 
outside) the category can be thought of as representing an individual’s encyclopedic 
knowledge about the concept denoted by the base nominal, but should not be conceived 
of as representing the ‘meaning’ of the nominal per se, though meaning is certainly an 
important aspect in determining the members and non-members of a category. Central 
items are proposed to be those that are most cognitively available when a category is 
brought to mind.49 Recall that centrality equates to the degree to which a piece of 
information is considered “present” via category membership. It is important to note that 
the category members and non-members shown in this section are simply a representative 
sample of the full sets of category members and non-members, which in theory should 
comprise all qualia for which the author (or other modeled individual) has a mental 
representation. For the sake of simplicity, only telic qualia – those related to purpose and 
function – are considered and shown here, but it should be understood that the full set of 
category members also includes constitutive, formal, and agentive qualia. Because the 
union of the full sets of category members and non-members would contain all possible 
qualia of which the person whose categories are being modeled (in this case, me) is 
aware, it is infeasible to include them all in a graphical representation of this or any 
                                                
49 Central items may, but do not necessarily, correspond to definitional properties of the category base. 
 89 
modeled category. Thus, even among the telic qualia alone, only some illustrative 
examples are provided. 
Consider, for example, the nominal apple and the possible purposes and functions of 
the items to which this nominal can refer. A simplified version of apple’s category might 
look something like the illustration in figure (1). 
 
     PEEL 
              CHOP                 BAKE           READ 
 
CARVE             EAT 
 
     THROW  
      JUICE           DRIVE 
BROIL 
 
Figure 1: Category based on the nominal apple 
Here the dashed line represents the fuzzy boundary of the category. Qualia more towards 
the center of the category are samples of the most central or prototypical category 
members, or those that apply most clearly or strongly to the nominal – what one might 
most immediately think of as one of the primary purposes of or things done to the 
nominal under usual circumstances. For example, I (as the person whose category is 
shown here) think that EAT is one of the primary things that gets done to apples, and it is 
one of the first activities called to mind when I think of them. Most people would likely 
agree on this, meaning that they too would have EAT as one of the central members of 
their category based on the nominal apple. Qualia nearer to but still well within the 
boundaries are examples of those that apply less strongly; apples may get chopped or 
cooked, but this is not as primary as eating them. Those on the boundaries represent the 
“unclear cases” for which fuzzy boundaries are stipulated. They may or may not apply at 
all to the nominal: apples occasionally get thrown or carved, but I may or may not think 
of these as actions that can be or are done to an apple. Qualia shown completely outside 
the boundaries represent the group (much larger than what is shown here) that do not 
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apply; apples are neither read nor driven.50 Distance from the boundary represents the 
third category attribute noted in 1.1: non-members can vary in how far outside the 
category they are, based on the extent to which they are dissimilar to category members 
or fail to fulfill the requirements for category membership. Thus DRIVE is shown farther 
outside the category than READ, since I can imagine a situation in the actual world in 
which something could be written on an apple, and once could thus read an apple, but I 
cannot imagine a situation in the actual world in which one could drive an apple.51 
Apple is given here as an example of a maximally simple nominal in order to best 
illustrate how a nominal-based category works, but it is worth noting that categories 
based on similar nominals, such as a green apple or three Gala apples, would have very 
similar structures. That is, with the likely exception of some formal qualia – those that 
distinguish an item within a larger domain – these categories would have most of the 
same members with the same degrees of centrality as the category based on apple. These 
similar nominals, however, are more likely to be the basis of ad hoc categories, since they 
are less likely to be frequently encountered. Ad hoc categories such as these would likely 
be formed by modifying the common category based on apple, a process that is further 
discussed in 2.2.  
Food, being a hypernym of apple, has a similar qualia category, a simplified version 
of which might look something like this:  
        PEEL         CARVE  
      
  CHOP                                BAKE            READ 
          REFRIGERATE 
             EAT 
 
   COLOR                          THROW  
GROW              DRIVE 
        BROIL              JUICE 
                                                
50 ‘Drive’ is intended here in the sense that one drives a car (i.e., drives the instrument of driving), not in 
the sense that one drives a child to school (i.e., drives the contents of the instrument of driving). 
51 Note that I am confining myself to referents of apple that are actual apples, and excluding representations 
of apples. This is done for a reason similar to that which motivates confining my imagination to scenarios 
in the actual world. In both cases, excluding non-actual possibilities is important to the predictive power of 
the model, as first discussed in 2.3. In essence, I am stipulating that when one considers things that may be 
done to the referent(s) of a nominal, s/he considers one the most prototypical referents of that nominal and 
things that may be done in the actual world.  
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Figure 2: Category based on the nominal food 
Again, the dashed line represents the fuzzy boundary of the category. As in figure (1), 
more centrally placed qualia are those that apply most clearly or strongly to the nominal; 
in my mind and probably every individual’s, EAT is one of the primary things that gets 
done to food. Less central qualia apply less strongly; food may get chopped, but this is 
not as primary as eating it. In my perception, the majority of food is neither baked nor 
broiled, but baking is more commonly done than broiling, hence the former being a more 
central (or less peripheral) member of my food category. Unclear cases are shown on the 
boundaries; food occasionally gets thrown or colored, but I am less likely to think of 
these than to think of actions like eating or chopping. If this category reflected the 
knowledge of someone who had never heard of food coloring, COLOR would likely be 
farther outside the category, in the vicinity of READ and DRIVE. Those qualia well outside 
the boundaries represent the group  that do not apply; food is neither read nor driven. As 
mentioned above, food is a hypernym of apple, and as a result their categories share some 
similarities, but, as can be seen from comparing figures (1) and (2), they are not identical. 
4.2.2 Definite vs. indefinite nominals 
 The nominals discussed so far – apple, a green apple, three Gala apples, and food – 
are all indefinite. The members of their categories have been the qualia most related to 
the types of things typically denoted by the nominals, rather than to a specific thing 
denoted by the nominal. However, a category based on a definite nominal differs in a 
couple of ways. First, as long as the individual encountering the definite nominal knows 
what its referent is, the category members are the qualia most related to the particular 
thing(s) denoted by the nominal, rather than to the types of things typically denoted by it. 
Second, as mentioned in 1.3, most definite nominals will be the basis of ad hoc rather 
than common categories, because most definite nominals are not encountered frequently 
enough with the same referent for a common category to be formed.  
However, as mentioned above, the ability to create a category based on a specific 
referent is of course contingent on knowing what that referent is, as distinct from 
knowing the meaning of the nominal. That is, an individual could know the meaning of 
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the apple without knowing which apple it refers to. In this case, the category based on the 
nominal would be ad hoc only in the sense that it was used for the apple rather than for 
apple; the category itself would be identical to the one based on apple since the 
individual had no further information to use to create a category. Furthermore, it is 
conceivable that even an individual who knows the referent of a definite nominal may 
still lack any further information about it, and thus be in the same position as someone 
who does not know the referent when it comes to building a nominal-based category. In 
most cases, though, knowing the referent of a nominal involves knowing more about it 
than what is encoded in the nominal itself. For example, if the referent is visible to an 
individual, he or she is likely to have information gathered from its appearance; in the 
case of the apple, this could include information about size, color, variety, freshness, 
location, etc. Having further information does not mean that common categories become 
useless; in fact, as with apple and the apple above, they remain the foundation of ad hoc 
categories. As discussed in relation to apple, a green apple, and three Gala apples in 2.1, 
many (if not all) ad hoc categories can be created through the modification of one or 
more common categories.  
Consider again the definite nominal the apple; with knowledge of the particular apple 
to which it refers and further knowledge about that particular apple, an individual can 
form an ad hoc category by taking the common category based on apple and adding 
members, eliminating members, and changing the centrality of members as appropriate. 
For example, if the referent apple was known to be rather old, EAT might be made less 
central or even eliminated from membership and JUICE made more central, since an old 
apple often has an unpleasant texture but still produces palatable juice. Other adjustments 
might also be made, producing a category such as that in figure (3). 
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CHOP                                  PEEL 
                     READ 
 
                          CARVE                        JUICE          BAKE 
        
EAT                      THROW  
             DRIVE 
BROIL 
 
Figure 3: Category based on the nominal the apple with known referent 
Changes here from the category based on apple include that EAT and JUICE  have 
essentially been switched in terms of centrality. BAKE and THROW  have increased 
centrality, since these are more likely to be done to an apple that is unfit for eating raw. 
CARVE has moved slightly more towards being a non-member, since an old apple would 
likely be a more difficult carving medium. 
Note that these adjustments of the apple category would basically produce the same 
category as the nominal old apple, also likely an ad hoc category produced from the 
apple category. Any ad hoc category based on a definite nominal is likely to be similar or 
identical to an ad hoc category based on a more descriptive but often indefinite nominal: 
if the referent of the apple was known to be large, old, and green, the ad hoc category 
based on the apple would resemble that of a large, old, green apple; if it was known to be 
old and green and to belong to one’s mother, the category would resemble that of my 
mother’s old green apple. Thus it is not the case that each unique nominal has a unique 
category (and the same can be said for qualia). Nor is it true that ad hoc categories must 
be created from scratch; they can often be made by modifying and/or combining existing 
common categories. 
4.2.3 Assessment based on the model 
The nominal-based type of category (as in figures (1), (2), and (3)) allows some 
predictions to be made. For convenience in discussing predictions, I will use the term 
“quale action” to refer to the action denoted by the verb of a telic quale. The first 
prediction that can be made is shown in (1). 
 94 
(1) Given a nominal-based category and a member telic quale that is relatively 
central, a phrase that associates the absence (or undoing) of the quale action with 
the base nominal is more CM-informative than a phrase that associates the 
presence (or doing) of the quale action with the base nominal. 
Since a quale action (or its absence) is often associated with a base nominal through the 
use of a participial adjective derived from the quale verb, in effect (1) says that, for a 
central telic quale, a phrase associating the quale-derived adjective with the base nominal 
is more CM-informative if the quale-derived adjective is negated than if it is not negated. 
The reasoning behind this prediction is that, if the quale is one of the primary things 
that is done to the base nominal, in most circumstances it is not particularly informative 
to describe the nominal as having had that done to it. Rather, this is a property that an 
individual will in most cases expect of the nominal. In contrast, it is generally informative 
to describe the base nominal with the negated form of the quale-derived adjective for 
precisely the same reason: this attributes an unexpected property to the nominal. With 
respect to figure (1), this means that a phrase that associates food with an adjective 
derived from one of the more central qualia, such as eaten from EAT, is more CM-
informative when the adjective is negated than when it is non-negated, so a phrase such 
as uneaten food is more CM-informative than eaten food. Recall from chapter 3 the 
proposed relationship between CM-informativeness and relative frequency; more 
informative items are supposed to occur more frequently than their less-informative 
counterparts. In fact the former phrase does occur more often than the latter in COCA as 
well as a survey of broader usage (Google).52 As mentioned previously, all predictions 
apply in unmarked circumstances, and there are, of course, exceptions, such as in 
situations where expectations have been altered or there is a need to distinguish a specific 
item or collection within a group. 
                                                
52 For each Google search, the phrase in question was searched in quotes, with multiple searches for 
phrases with multiple possible determiners. I examined each result on the first 5-7 pages of results to 
determine the percentage that were valid, and then calculated that percentage of the total number of results 
(clicking through, when possible, to the point where the total number of results is reduced and a message is 
given that “In order to show you the most relevant results, we have omitted some entries very similar to the 
[#] already displayed”). 
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The prediction in (1) can also be generalized to apply to member qualia of other (non-
telic types. It will still be the case that, given a relatively central quale, a phrase that 
associates the nominal (or any linguistic item on which the category in question is based) 
with the absence of the property related to the quale is more CM-informative than one 
that associates the presence of the property. The main difference is that the quale is not as 
likely to indicate an action, or a property associated with an action having been done or 
not done. However, the generic term ‘property’ can still be used to denote whatever 
information the quale supplies, whether it is about an attribute, a part, the creation, or any 
other aspect of the entity denoted by the category base. 
 The second prediction that can be made with respect to nominal-based categories 
goes along with the previous one, and is shown in (2). 
(2)  Given a nominal-based category and a member quale that is relatively peripheral,  
a phrase that associates the presence (or doing) of the quale action with the base 
nominal is more CM-informative than a phrase that associates the absence (or 
undoing) of the quale action with the base nominal. 
Like the prediction in (1), this one can be stated in terms of quale-derived adjectives: for 
a peripheral telic quale, a phrase associating the quale-derived adjective with the base 
nominal is more CM-informative if the quale-derived adjective is not negated than if it is 
negated. 
The reasoning for this is analogous to that of the previous prediction: one generally 
expects the base nominal (or indeed any nominal) not to have atypical things done to it, 
so describing it as non-atypical is usually far less informative than describing it as 
atypical on the rare occasion that it actually does have such things done to it. For 
example, as reflected by the fact that THROW is a peripheral quale in figure (1) above, I 
generally expect food not to be thrown. Therefore, describing food as thrown attributes to 
it a more unexpected property, and is thus more CM-informative, than describing it as 
unthrown. Thus thrown food is more CM-informative than unthrown food. Again 
considering the connection between CM-informativeness and relative frequency, we can 
see that this assessment is shown to be accurate by usage, as the former phrase occurs 
more frequently than the latter (Google).  
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 As another example of the types of predictions that can be made from nominal-based 
categories, consider the category based on the nominal library book, shown in figure (4).  
 
          DESTROY 
                 EAT 
            
                  BORROW 
        REQUEST          READ 
        RETURN          SHELVE  
            GROW 
  
          SIT ON 
 
Figure 4: Category based on the nominal library book 
For most people, RETURN is likely to be among the more central qualia in this category, 
since returning is one of the primary things that gets done to library books. This predicts 
that a/the returned library book should occur less often than an/the unreturned library 
book; in online usage, this is in fact the case, with the former phrase occurring 52 times 
and the latter 2242 (Google). Unlike returning, destroying is something that is not 
typically done to library books, so DESTROY would be a peripheral category member and 
an opposite prediction is made: a/the destroyed library book should occur more often 
than an/the undestroyed library book; again this is borne out, with the former phrase 
appearing 7 times in contrast to the latter’s complete lack of occurrence (Google). 
4.3 Quale-based categories 
4.3.1 The basic quale-based category 
 The other type of category that the model uses is based on a quale (the “base quale”), 
with members (and non-members) determined by their relationship to that quale. For 
quale-based categories, members are nominals in gradient distribution according to the 
degree to which the base quale applies to them. Recall that a category member’s 
centrality is representative of its cognitive availability when the category base is called to 
mind; thus more central members are considered to be more available via category 
membership. As mentioned earlier, here I will discuss only categories based on telic 
qualia, with the understanding that categories based on other qualia would function in the 
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same way. For example, consider the telic quale EAT and the items to which this action is 
more or less likely to be done. The category based on the telic quale EAT might resemble 
the following: 
 
                      clay 
                   
                     flower 
            bread, apple, 
         lettuce, cheese, etc. 
                  car 
      
                   forgetfulness 
 
 
Figure 5: Category based on the quale EAT 
This illustration is set up like those in section 2; members (here nominals instead of 
qualia) closest to the center of the category are examples of those to which the base quale 
most closely applies. Peripheral members are those to which EAT applies less well, or the 
items which are not brought to mind as things eaten quite as easily as those in the center. 
On the category boundary are representatives of the items that may or may not be 
considered category members; they can be eaten, sometimes even without serious 
consequences, but are not usually eaten. Those farthest outside the category are 
representative of those to which it is least likely to apply (i.e., in this particular category, 
things that simply cannot be eaten). Note that forgiveness is shown farther from the 
category boundary than car; this represents the relative impossibility of eating a car – it is 
perhaps possible, though likely lethal, to eat at least small parts of one – versus that of 
eating forgiveness – completely impossible to even try due to its intangibility. As in 
section 2 the members and non-members shown are just a sample of larger sets that 
would in theory comprise all nominals, or at least all nominals for which the modeled 
individual has a mental representation.  
Here the individual nature of the categories can be seen perhaps more easily than with 
the examples given in section 2: as someone who has grown and eaten edible flowers, I 
have flower as a peripheral member rather than a non-member (though it is not very far 
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within the category since I know that flowers are relatively rarely eaten, and many are not 
eaten at all). Someone without this experience would likely be unaware that people 
sometimes eat flowers, and thus have flower firmly outside their EAT-based category. 
As another example, consider the category based on the quale READ, portrayed in 
figure (6).  
                       apple    water             
                 
         website 
article 
                  book   novel           sign   
     
          shirt 
           newspaper 
     license plate 
 
Figure 6: Category based on the quale READ 
As in previous figures, central items are those to which the quale most closely applies: in 
my conception, books are the most likely things to be read, followed closely by articles 
and novels. Other items that are frequently read make up the sample less-central members 
shown here, such as websites, and signs. The item apple is shown near the border of the 
category as an example of something that could perhaps, in some cases, be read, but that 
usually is not; as mentioned in 4.2.1, one could imagine a situation in which someone 
writes something on an apple and it can thus be read. Finally, water is given far outside 
of the category as a sample of the large group of items that I simply cannot imagine 
reading under any circumstances. 
4.3.2 Assessment based on the model 
Like the nominal-based categories, quale-based categories also allow some 
predictions to be made. Analogous to the use of “base nominal” previously, I use “base 
quale” here to refer to the quale on which a category is based. The first prediction is 
given in (3). 
(3)  Given a quale-based category and a member nominal that is relatively central,  
a phrase that associates the absence (or undoing) of the quale action with the 
nominal is more CM-informative than a phrase that associates the presence (or 
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doing) of the quale action with the nominal. 
Similar to (1), this prediction essentially says that for a central nominal, a phrase 
associating the quale-derived adjective with the nominal is more CM-informative if the 
quale-derived adjective is negated than if it is not negated. 
The reasoning for this can be connected to the previous category type: a nominal that 
is central in a quale’s category is one that has that quale as central in its category. And as 
seen above, when a nominal has a particular quale as a central member of its category, 
the phrase that associates the quale-derived adjective with the base nominal is more CM-
informative if that adjective is negated. Given the previously posited connection between 
CM-informativeness and relative frequency, with respect to figure (2) this predicts that 
central members such as bread should be described more often as uneaten than as eaten, 
so the uneaten bread should be more common than the eaten bread, and this is what is 
seen in online usage (Google). With the category in figure (2), another example similar to 
the one with bread above can be seen with lettuce, also a central member of the category. 
In both COCA and online, the negated phrase is more common than the non-negated one: 
the uneaten lettuce appears 28 times online and 26 times in COCA, while the eaten 
lettuce appears only 6 times online and 3 times in COCA. 
By reasoning analogous to that outlined above for (3), the quale-based category type 
allows the prediction shown in (4).  
(4)  Given a quale-based category and a member nominal that is relatively peripheral,  
a phrase that associates the presence (or doing) of the quale action with the 
nominal is more CM-informative than a phrase that associates the absence (or 
undoing) of the quale action with the nominal. 
Similar to (2), this prediction in effect states that for a peripheral nominal, a phrase 
associating the quale-derived adjective with the nominal is more CM-informative if the 
quale-derived adjective is not negated than if it is negated. This too is supported by the 
usage data: an/the eaten flower occurs 60 times in Google results, while an/the uneaten 
flower does not occur at all, suggesting, via the proposed relationship between CM-
informativeness and frequency, that the former phrase is in fact more CM-informative 
than the latter. 
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 What may at first appear to be a problem with the model’s predictions can be seen 
with the EAT-based category in figure (5). As shown above, apple is a central member of 
this category, so it is expected that an/the uneaten apple should be more CM-informative 
and therefore more common than an/the eaten apple. However, this is not the case; an/the 
eaten apple occurs almost twice as often in Google results as an/the uneaten apple. This 
example and others like it are important as a reminder that the model proposed here is 
intended only to assess one component that affects informativeness, namely the amount 
of information about an item that is present due to its category membership (what I have 
been calling CM-informativeness). The model does not assess other components of 
informativeness, and does not take other aspects of context into account. Therefore a 
distribution other than what would be expected due to the model’s predictions does not 
mean that it has not correctly assessed CM-informativeness; it does mean that there are 
other factors affecting the informativeness of a given item in a given context, and this is 
completely expected. In the case of the phrases mentioned above, one known mitigating 
factor is that a very common company’s logo is conventionally referred to as the eaten 
apple (though interestingly, the logo portrays an apple that has only been partially, not 
totally, eaten); the phrase may also be used, especially in titles of works of art, to evoke 
the legendary fruit from the tree of knowledge in the Garden of Eden. Despite patterns of 
use, the model still performs its function of determining one portion of what determines 
informativeness as a whole. 
 As another example of the types of predictions that can be made from quale-based 
categories, consider the category based on the quale ANSWER, shown below. 
                     book 
                     hair 
      prompt             insult 
     
              question 
          call 
    
          prayer     custom 
 
Figure 7: Category based on the quale ANSWER 
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A central member of this category for me, and likely for most people, is question. Thus a 
phrase that associates the adjective unanswered with question is more CM-informative 
than one that associates answered with question. As expected based on this, an/the 
unanswered question occurs more often (61 times in COCA) than an/the answered 
question (0 times). While prayers may be answered, they are perhaps not one of the most 
prototypical answerable things, so prayer may be considered a more peripheral member 
for many, meaning a phrase that associates answered with prayer is more CM-
informative than one that associates unanswered with prayer. As predicted by CM-
informativeness, the distribution of an/the unanswered prayer and an/the answered 
prayer is in contrast to that of the question phrases: the former occurs less often (4 times 
in COCA) than the latter (12 times). 
4.4 Category type relationships and the model as a whole 
4.4.1 Interactions between categories 
Categories can be said to “interact” in two ways: they can be combined to form new 
categories; and one category’s CM-informativeness assessments, and thus also relative 
frequency predictions, can be added to those of one or more other categories to yield an 
assessment and prediction for a more complex phrase. In determining how the CM-
informativeness and relative frequency predictions gleaned from categories can interact, 
it is important to consider the syntactic structures involved and how they affect 
interpretation; this in turn shows the need for combining categories. When a noun has 
more than one modifying adjective in attributive position, speakers tend to process the 
adjective closest to the noun as being the one that became applicable to the noun first, 
followed by the next closest adjective, and so on, working outwards (or leftwards).53 The 
basic syntactic structure with modifying attributive adjectives is as shown in (5).54 
(5) Basic structure of a phrase with more than one adjective modifying the same noun 
                                                
53 The information about speakers’ processing tendencies throughout this section was obtained through 
informal consultation with native speakers of American English. 
54 (5) shows a simple structure designed to illustrate the relationships between modifiers (specifically 
adjectives) and the noun they modify; I make no claims here about the presence, absence, or location of 
other projections. 
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X1 and X2 are used here to avoid making any unnecessary claims about the exact nature 
of the constituents formed, since what is important here is only their relationships to each 
other. A phrase with two attributive adjectives is shown, but the same pattern of structure 
is thought to apply regardless of the number of modifiers in attributive position. This 
structure serves to explain the way such a phrase is processed, as described above. 
Basically, a speaker processes X1 as existing first, then Adj2 as modifying X1 to produce 
X2, and so on; though I make no claim about the order in which processing takes place, a 
clear ordering of modification is formed.  
This ordering of modification becomes particularly relevant in the interaction of 
categories when one or more of the modifiers is a participial adjective, as are adjectives 
derived from quale verbs. In these cases it is assumed by hearers of this type of phrase 
that Adj1 came to apply to the noun first, then Adj2 came to apply to the phrase [Adj1 
N], continuing similarly for any additional adjectives. With past participial adjectives in 
both positions, this amounts to an interpretation that the action denoted by the verb 
associated with Adj1 was done to the N first, followed by the action denoted by the verb 
associated with Adj2, and so on; this interpretation tends to occur despite the general 
practice of saying things in the order in which they occur, in accordance with Grice’s 
(1975) maxim of manner. Thus the phrase [(Det) Adj2 Adj1 N] is generally not 
interpreted as equivalent to the phrase [(Det) Adj1 Adj2 N]. For example, when 
encountering the phrase a discarded eaten apple, hearers interpret this to mean that an 
apple was eaten, and then the remaining portion was discarded; an eaten discarded apple 
is, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, interpreted as an apple that was discarded and then 
retrieved and eaten, even though this seems much less likely to happen to an apple than it 
being eaten and then discarded. Likewise, a peeled baked apple is taken to indicate an 
apple that was baked then peeled, while a baked peeled apple indicates an apple that was 
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peeled before baking. A similar tendency is found when only one of the adjectives is 
participial: a brown chopped apple is more likely to be interpreted as an apple that was 
chopped and then turned brown, while a chopped brown apple is most often thought of as 
one that was brown before being chopped. However, interpretation according to syntactic 
structure is not always possible. Consider, for example, the phrase a baked eaten apple. 
Clearly an apple cannot be eaten and then baked, as a structurally-based interpretation 
would require. While the remains of a partially eaten apple could be baked, this 
interpretation also seems to be blocked, presumably by the extreme unlikelihood of one 
actually baking an apple core. In this type of case, hearers understand the intended 
meaning to be the reverse of what is structurally indicated (here, that the apple was baked 
and then eaten) and view the speaker as having made a mistake. Thus there is a very clear 
preference for interpreting the action associated with Adj1 as having happened first, 
followed by the action associated with Adj2, and continuing outwards through any 
remaining adjectives.  
This type of interpretation is relevant to the interaction of categories’ predictions 
because it affects exactly which categories are used. When Adj1 is applied to N, CM-
informativeness can be assessed by simply looking at one category, the one based on N, 
and assessing the centrality in that category of Adj1 or a related word, such as the verb 
from which it is derived.55 For example, PEEL is a somewhat peripheral member of 
apple’s category (as shown in figure (1)).  
The next step, however, is not simply to look at the categories based on N and Adj2. 
Instead, one must consider the (almost certainly ad hoc) category based on [Adj1 N] (in 
our example, peeled apple) and assess the centrality of Adj2 or a related word. This 
means that the hearer of the example phrase must now create an ad hoc category based on 
peeled apple and assess the centrality of BAKE in that category, with the likely result that 
BAKE is a bit more central in the category based on peeled apple than it is in the category 
based on just apple. The ability to combine categories into a new category is not 
unprecedented; Smith and Medin note that “conceptual combination” allows one to 
                                                
55 Throughout this section I will use “related word” to mean a word with similar meaning, related via 
derivation (i.e., eat and eaten, but not eat and uneaten). 
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enlarge his or her “taxonomy of things in the world…. by combining existent [categories] 
into novel ones” (1981:7). 
Note that, in the previous step, in theory one could consider the category based on 
Adj2 or a related word and introduce and assess the centrality of [Adj1 N]. I say 
“introduce” here because, just as it was noted in 4.1.2 to be unreasonable to expect an 
infinite number of nominal-based categories, it is likewise unreasonable to expect that 
each category with nominals as members has an infinite number of members. Thus one 
might allow for “ad hoc category members,” or potential members that are generally not 
considered in conjunction with a category, but may be assessed as to membership and 
centrality as needed. Into this group would fall the majority of multi-word nominals. 
However, this does not seem warranted for two reasons. First, it is unnecessary given the 
established existence of ad hoc categories. Second, the centrality of a category member is 
intended to indicate its cognitive availability, and if an item’s membership in a particular 
category is not considered unless necessary, this would seem to indicate very low 
cognitive availability of the item with respect to that category. However, as we can see 
with BAKE and peeled apple above, this would not always generate a correct assessment 
of CM-informativeness. Thus there seems to be no motivation for, or value to, creating ad 
hoc category members.  
To summarize, the categories for assessing the CM-informativeness of [Adj1 N] are 
simple, but any subsequent assessments become more complicated as more complex ad 
hoc categories are introduced. CM-informativeness of a full phrase with multiple 
adjectives can be thought of as the sum of the CM-informativeness of each smaller phrase 
contained within the full phrase, and as with all CM-informativeness measures, should be 
thought of comparatively. Thus a baked peeled apple has CM-informativeness in a 
somewhat medium range, since the relevant centralities are somewhat peripheral (for 
peeled + apple) and somewhat central (for baked + peeled apple). This phrase can be 
thought of as more CM-informative than, for example, a discarded eaten apple, since 
EAT is central in apple’s category and DISCARD is likely to be central in the ad hoc eaten 
apple category, yielding low CM-informativeness for each part of the phrase and in total. 
Similarly, a baked peeled apple can be thought of as less CM-informative than, for 
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example, a chopped thrown apple, since THROW is quite peripheral in apple’s category, 
and CHOP is likely to be quite peripheral in the ad hoc category based on thrown apple, 
yielding high CM-informativeness for each phrase part and in total. 
The above describes the process of assessing CM-informativeness of phrases with 
multiple adjectives when at least one adjective is participial. When no participial 
adjectives are involved, hearers may still tend to interpret phrases structurally in the 
absence of any cues to do otherwise, but this has little effect on the final understanding of 
a phrase, and is thus difficult to test. Non-participial attributive adjectives are subject to 
ordering restrictions that do not seem to apply to participial adjectives as much if at all; 
these restrictions have been explored by many56 but are not particularly relevant to the 
discussion here. Assuming that structural interpretation is the norm when only non-
participial adjectives are involved, the process of assessing CM-informativeness of a 
phrase with multiple adjectives would be essentially the same as described above. The 
only difference is that, since non-participial adjectives do not have associated verbs, other 
(non-telic) qualia would have to be used as category bases and/or members, as discussed 
previously. 
The basic process discussed here for assessing CM-informativeness also applies to 
other types of phrases. As further examples I will discuss phrases that have multiple 
participial adjectives in predicative position, and phrases that have one attributive and 
one predicative participial adjective. However, this is not meant to be an exhaustive 
account of the types of phrases in which categories interact, but rather sufficient 
illustration to generalize the mechanisms of interaction to other phrase types. 
With respect to this discussion, phrases with multiple predicative participial 
adjectives differ from their attributive counterparts primarily in their structure and 
resultant interpretation. Regardless of the exact structure one assumes for a phrase of the 
form [(Det) N copula Adj1 conjunction Adj2…], it is clear that both (or all) adjectives are 
relatively far from the noun, and none are given privileged position within the noun 
phrase. It should be unsurprising, then, that the syntactic structure here places no 
particular demands on the order of interpretation. Instead, hearers have a strong tendency 
                                                
56 See, e.g., Richards (1977), de Assis (1980), Scott (2002), and Wulff (2003). 
 106 
to interpret the adjectives in the order that makes the most sense given their knowledge of 
the world, and a weaker tendency to interpret them in the order in which they are given. 
These tendencies are usually not at odds with each other, since, as was mentioned earlier, 
speakers generally say things in the order in which they happened. Given the phrase the 
clothes were mended and ironed, most hearers are unsure of the order in which the 
mending and ironing happened, though some assume the mending was first. However, 
the clothes were washed and dried clearly indicates to hearers that the washing happened 
before the drying, while the clothes were dried and washed is generally viewed as a 
mistake by the speaker (since clothes are generally not dried and then washed). 
The result of these tendencies of interpretation is that predicative adjectives are 
generally assessed in the order given, with the same mechanisms discussed with respect 
to attributive adjectives. That is, the CM-informativeness of the pairing of Adj1 and N 
(for example, washed clothes) would be assessed first, followed by the CM-
informativeness assessed through the centrality of Adj2 (or a related word) in the ad hoc 
category based on [Adj1 N]. For example, the ad hoc category based on washed clothes 
would be created, and the centrality of DRY in that category assessed. Then, as before, the 
total CM-informativeness of the phrase as a whole is the sum of the informativeness of its 
parts, and is a comparative measure. In the case of the clothes were washed and dried this 
would be relatively low, since WASH is likely a fairly central member of the clothes-based 
category, and DRY is likely a very central member of the ad hoc category based on 
washed clothes. An example of a more CM-informative phrase of the same form would 
be the clothes were torn and sold, since TEAR would be a relatively peripheral member of 
the clothes-based category, and SELL would be a very peripheral member of the ad hoc 
category based on torn clothes.  
When a phrase has one attributive and one predicative participial adjective, i.e. [(Det) 
Adj1 N copula Adj2], the basic mechanisms of CM-informativeness assessment are again 
the same as discussed above. In this case, hearers tend to interpret the attributive 
adjective(s) as having applied first. Thus the washed apple was eaten is interpreted as 
meaning that the apple was washed and then eaten, and has its CM-informativeness 
assessed with the categories based on apple and washed apple. Though I have not tested 
 107 
larger phrases of this type, given this information and the ordering of phrase types 
discussed above, one could hypothesize about the interpretation of a more complex 
phrase such as [(Det) Adj1 Adj2 N copula Adj3 Adj4]. Attributive adjectives would be 
interpreted as applying first, starting with the one closest to the noun, then predicative 
adjectives in the order given; i.e. Adj2, Adj1, Adj3, Adj4. In this case, several ad hoc 
categories would be created, based on [Adj2 N], [Adj1 Adj2 N], and [Adj3 Adj1 Adj2 
N]. 
4.4.2 A generalized account of the model 
 The model, as shown above, assesses one factor of the degree to which specific 
phrases or co-occurrences of words are informative, and as such can to some extent 
predict relative distributions of phrases of some types as well. Use of the model is 
illustrated above mainly using one particular type of phrase, in which a determiner is 
followed by a participial adjective and then a nominal. As discussed in 3.2.8, adjective 
use in attributive position seems to be more sensitive to considerations of CM-
informativeness, and possibly informativeness in general, than adjective use in 
predicative position. This does not mean the model will not work as well for assessing the 
CM-informativeness of predicative expressions, but it does mean that situations such as 
the one discussed with an/the eaten/uneaten apple, where the actual relative frequency 
and model-based prediction do not appear to match, are more likely to be encountered 
with predicative expressions than with attributive ones. 
Though it is discussed primarily with respect to nominals with participial adjectives, 
the model presented in this chapter is useful for a wider variety of expressions than just 
nominals of this type, and may be generalized to a variety of linguistic forms. Essentially 
what it assesses is the degree to which specific co-occurrences of words are CM-
informative, or the degree to which the information that a phrase provides about an item 
is not provided simply by the recipient knowing the category of which the item is a 
member. For prediction of relative frequency, the model works best on expressions of 
types that are highly constrained by informativeness, and by CM-informativeness in 
particular, such as noun phrases with attributive adjectives; the model relies on the fact 
that there is a general preference, ceteris paribus, for more densely informative 
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expressions – i.e., given two equally informative expressions, the shorter one is 
preferable, and given two expressions of equal length, the more informative one is 
generally preferable. For simply assessing CM-informativeness, the model works on a 
wide variety of expressions: any construction that creates an association between almost 
any two linguistic items (e.g., nominal and adjective; verb and subject or object) is 
assessable. The model works by examining the relationship between a category base and 
some category member; the category member’s position in the base’s category 
determines whether the pairing of the base and member is more or less CM-informative. 
For some expressions, CM-informativeness is predictive of relative frequency, with more 
CM-informative expressions occurring more often than less informative ones. 
 A general account of the model’s assessment mechanism can be formulated as 
follows:  
(6)  Given an association of the base of a category (or its derivative) B with a category 
member or non-member, X: 
a. If X is a relatively central member of B’s category, the association is less CM-
informative than if X were more peripheral. 
b. If X is a peripheral member of B’s category, the association is more CM-
informative than if X were more central. 
c. If X is a non-member of B’s category, the association has the potential to be 
even more CM-informative than if X were peripheral. 
d. Negating either B or X reverses these relations. 
Shown in (6) are the core assessments of CM-informativeness that are the main purpose 
of the model and apply to any expression of the type stated. Note that CM-
informativeness measurements are given comparatively: a pairing of X and B is more 
CM-informative if X is peripheral than if X is central, and has the most potential for CM-
informativeness if X is a non-member of the category based on B. However, if either B or 
X (but not both) is negated, the CM-informativeness measures are reversed, so that, e.g., 
a pairing of unX and B is more CM-informative if X is a central member of B’s category 
than if it is a peripheral member. 
In (7) are the predictions regarding relative frequency that result from the assessments 
 109 
in (6); as noted previously, these predictions are sensitive to type of expression, and it is 
important to remember that not finding the expected distribution does not mean that any 
of the CM-informativeness assessments are inaccurate. Examples of nominals with 
attributive participial adjectives are shown here to illustrate the predictions, since this 
phrase type has been found to have relative frequency that is particularly sensitive to CM-
informativeness. 
(7)57  Given the base B of a category and some category member or non-member X: 
a. If X is a relatively central member of B’s category, the X B association usually 
occurs with either X or B negated. 
an/the unread novel   12485  
a/the read novel    329  
b. If X is a peripheral member of B’s category, the X B association usually occurs 
with neither X nor B negated. 
a/the thrown apple   5505  
an/the unthrown apple  0 
c. If X is not a member of B’s category, situations rarely if ever arise in which the 
X B association could be truthfully related to the actual world, so the association 
occurs rarely, if ever. 
  an/the employed peach   0 
  an/the unemployed peach  0 
The prediction in (7a) is related to the CM-informativeness assessment in (6a); negating 
either X or B increases the otherwise relatively low CM-informativeness of an 
association of B with a central X. Similarly, the prediction in (7b) arises from the 
assessment in (6b); the association referenced is more CM-informative when not negated, 
so it is most likely to be non-negated. Given these patterns, one might expect that an 
association of the type referenced in (6c) would almost certainly be non-negated, since it 
is potentially highly CM-informative in that form. However, the difference between a 
peripheral category member and a non-member (as in 6b and 6c) is qualitatively different 
than that between a central and a peripheral category member (as in 6a and 6b). That X is 
                                                
57 Frequencies given here are from Google searches as described in footnote 49. 
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a non-member of the category based on B means that X and B are rarely, if ever, 
associated with each other in the world. As such, the need to associate them with each 
other in language also arises rarely, if at all. When necessary, such a linguistic association 
can be made in a grammatically and pragmatically acceptable way, and is indeed highly 
informative, as noted in (6c); however, as indicated (and shown by example) in (7c), the 
association does not occur frequently in either negated or non-negated form. 
4.5 Informativeness in the model vs. in other theories 
 It should be evident from the discussion and illustrations up to this point that there are 
several differences between how my proposed model treats informativeness and how it is 
treated by most other theorists. In this section I will discuss in particular the differences 
between my view of informativeness, as implemented by the model, and the views 
discussed in chapter 2. 
 To begin, I repeat my characterization of informativeness: the extent to which a 
phrase or utterance increases the cognitive availability of information not fully present 
via category membership or context, and thereby reduces the number and/or likelihood of 
possibilities for the event, state, or entity to which it refers. In explicitly considering what 
information the recipient already has, my account is similar to those of relevance and 
information theories as well as some philosophical accounts, though Dretske (1981), for 
example, distinguishes between the information generated by an event and the 
information contained in a message about that event, rather than between the information 
contained in a message and the net information gain of the message’s recipient. Though 
Grice does not explicitly note that the recipient’s prior information should be taken into 
account, his injunction to be “as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange)” does not preclude that he may have considered “the current purposes of the 
exchange” to include not giving the recipient information he or she already has, as I 
assumed in my discussion of quantity implicatures (Grice 1975:45). Horn (1972; 1984) 
does not directly address the issue of a recipient’s prior information with reference to 
informativeness either, but his (1972) account of presupposition indicates at least an 
awareness of the importance of the recipient’s cognitive state. 
 Though my theory is similar to others in considering a recipient’s previous 
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knowledge, it is unique in explicitly taking into account information that can be said to 
come from the recipient’s cognitive context, but to be prompted by an utterance – that is, 
structured information that comes from category membership. To recap the explanation 
in 3.3.3, upon hearing (for example) a nominal, the recipient immediately has cognitively 
available the information associated with the qualia category based on that nominal, with 
more central members of that category being more cognitively available. Hence 
information provided by category membership can be thought of as a recipient’s previous 
knowledge, since it comprises only information that the recipient had prior to the 
utterance in question, but it can also be thought of as co-occurring with the utterance to 
some degree, since it is only “activated,” or made cognitively available, upon the 
recipient’s hearing (or reading, etc.) of the utterance.  
 Other theories vary in how explicit they are about where any ‘prior information’ that 
may be considered comes from. Relevance theory is most like my own in this respect, 
and it is this theory from which I have adapted my rather broad notion of context. Sperber 
and Wilson define context as “a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the world;” 
basically, anything the hearer believes may be used in interpreting an utterance 
(1995:15). This definition, while perhaps a bit vague, allows for some flexibility: it 
admits, I would argue, the possibilities of categories such as I have proposed being a part 
of context. The other theories discussed here are even vaguer, in that they do not 
explicitly address what sort of prior information a recipient might use, where that 
information might originate, or how it might be structured or accessed. 
 Another way to differentiate among theories is based on whether they portray 
information’s presence as binary – a given piece of information is either present or not 
present, available or not available – or as gradient. In my account, information is 
conceived of as primarily gradient, though there is still a binary aspect to the theory in the 
classification of items as members or non-members, a distinction that does affect 
distribution as described in section 4.4.2.  Of the other theories being discussed here, 
relevance theory is most like my own in this respect: it clearly allows for degrees of 
cognitive availability of information. Some philosophical views seem to sidestep this 
issue, as with Dretske’s (1981) distinction between information and knowledge, the latter 
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of which is a belief based on (true, informational) evidence. It is not clear whether 
Dretske allows for the possibility of knowledge being associated with different degrees of 
belief. Information theory allows for varying degrees of uncertainty; uncertainty is purely 
a function of the number of possibilities that exist, but it does take into account that one 
may know some possibilities to be more likely than others. When it comes to varying 
availability or certainty of information, Grice (1975) and Horn (1972) say nothing to 
indicate support for or rejection of either side; it is worth noting, however, that both 
discuss the cancellability of implicatures, and Horn additionally discusses the fact that 
they may be strengthened into assertions. This suggests that both Grice and Horn are 
amenable to a theory that places importance on the idea of levels of certainty or 
availability of knowledge. 
Finally, in differentiating between theories it is important to reiterate what I have 
strived to highlight throughout my discussion: the proposed model is intended to allow 
for the assessment of what information is present via category membership and how 
available it is. The model does not account for the other important information noted in 
my characterization of informativeness, namely everything that comes from any other 
aspect of context, hence my use of “CM-informativeness” to designate the measure 
provided by the model. This distinction is one major difference between my theory and 
the theories of others, who have largely treated informativeness as a monolithic whole 
rather than breaking down the assessment of already-present information by source. 
However, this focus has allowed me to be more explicit about the mechanisms behind 
and structure of this information source, while, as mentioned above, there has been a 
tendency towards vagueness among other theorists. In addition, I have been able to show 
that comparative levels of CM-informativeness play a role in the relative frequencies of 
some constructions; to my knowledge, no other informativeness assessment method has 
been used in this way. My account thus has a different focus than other linguistic or non-
linguistic accounts; it can be said to be superior to other accounts in its ability to assess a 
particular aspect of informativeness, its provision of a nuanced measure thereof, and its 
applicability to an area in which informativeness was previously not well developed. 
4.6 Conclusions 
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 In order to assess the information discussed in a formal and individualized way, in 
this chapter I introduced a model that uses the notion of qualia as well as gradient, fuzzy-
bounded categories. I discussed telic qualia-based categories with nominals as members, 
and nominal-based categories with qualia as members (and though I discussed only telic 
qualia members, it was noted that all qualia types exist as members). In addition, there 
are other categories based on other qualia types and linguistic items. The model is useful 
for assessing informativeness, and to the extent that it does that, can also be used to 
predict relative distribution in unmarked contexts. However, in its current form it is only 
intended to assess the aspect of informativeness related to information provided by 
category membership, or CM-informativeness, so in many cases numerous other factors 
relating to informativeness and distribution may be at work. This is not a failure of the 
model, but rather a necessary result of its somewhat narrow focus, which may be 
broadened in the future. 
 Following my explanation of the model, I discussed how my theory in general differs 
from others’ theories; the focus on CM-informativeness is the most obvious difference, 
and the way I structure the information provided by category membership – using 
categories and qualia – is unique. Another prominent divergence from all but relevance 
theory is my treatment of information as something that can have degrees of cognitive 
availability, rather than simply being present or absent. Finally, I have strived to be as 
explicit as possible in my characterization of informativeness and of how CM-
informativeness may be assessed; this has led me to also note that all of an utterance 
recipient’s prior knowledge (category membership-related and otherwise) should be 
considered in assessing informativeness as a whole. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
5.0 Introduction 
 This work represents an attempt to address the particular needs of a study and to 
enrich the linguistic conception and study of informativeness by developing a new 
characterization of informativeness and a model of how cognition may function to assess 
one aspect of informativeness so characterized. In motivating, developing, and explaining 
my account and model, I have accomplished a number of things. I have shed light on a 
relatively unexamined phenomenon of distribution – that of nominals with APPs in 
prenominal position. I have also highlighted some of the similarities and differences 
between various conceptions of informativeness, both within and beyond linguistics. In 
addition, I have provided a broad but explicit characterization that allows for a more 
nuanced view of informativeness than was present in previous theories and that helps to 
explain the distribution of APPs. Lastly, I have discussed cognitive aspects of the 
calculation and application of informativeness and created a model for how a previously 
under-studied portion of informativeness may be assessed. This allows for further insight 
into an important aspect of language and cognition that has not previously been studied in 
this way. 
I conclude here by first reviewing what I have proposed throughout this work. Then, 
in 5.2, I outline some limitations of the current research and suggest remedies for some of 
these along with other directions for future research. Finally, in 5.3 I provide some 
concluding remarks. 
5.1 Review of proposals 
 Following an examination in chapter 2 of informativeness in information theory, 
philosophy, and the work of Grice, Horn, Levinson, and Sperber & Wilson, I first 
provided further motivation for my proposals by recounting my 2010 study of phrases 
with prenominal adjectival past participles in chapter 3. This study showed that, in the 
phrase type studied, some APPs occur more frequently with the negating prefix un- than 
without it. Examination of factors related to semantic fields, situation aspect, incremental 
theme, and word origins revealed many possible but weak correlations to relative 
frequency, but no highly explanatory element. Informativeness, however, was found to be 
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much more explanatory than any of the previously examined factors; APPs that were 
most often informative in negated form were those that occurred most often in negated 
form, which conformed to the expectation that more informative forms are more likely to 
be used. 
 Given the discovery of informativeness as an important explanatory factor, a 
satisfactory characterization of it was needed. Definitions formulated previously by 
others were inadequate, so I developed my own account, by which informativeness is a 
measure of the extent to which an utterance increases the cognitive availability of 
information that is not already fully available. Information was said to be already 
available if it was present anywhere in the recipient’s cognitive context; this included 
information that came from knowledge about category membership, a unique attribute of 
my account of informativeness. I then focused on how to assess that specific aspect of 
informativeness, developing a structure based on qualia. Upon utilizing this more 
satisfactory account, and the new form of assessment, it was found that there were a 
number of mitigating factors that affected the relationship between CM-informativeness 
and relative frequency of APPs in the phrase type studied. I therefore discussed these 
factors and their effects before moving on to update and expand on my (2010) 
characterization of informativeness. 
 In again discussing my conception of informativeness, I revised it to apply to both 
propositional and non-propositional items and clarified what was meant by ‘cognitive 
availability.’ I discussed that category membership-related information could be 
considered to be already possessed by a recipient and simply activated by an utterance, 
hence it being characterized as information that was already present prior to the utterance. 
Finally, I noted that, as I use them, qualia can apply more or less well to a linguistic item, 
and an item can therefore have many qualia in gradient applicability. 
 In chapter 4 I proposed a model of how information may be arranged cognitively to 
allow for assessment of CM-informativeness. The model uses categories that have graded 
structure, are to some extent individualized, and can be common or ad hoc. Each category 
is based on a quale or a linguistic item. In a quale-based category, the members are 
linguistic items to which that quale applies, and the most central members are the ones to 
 116 
which the quale best (or most closely) applies. In a linguistic item-based category, the 
members are qualia that apply to the base item, again arranged with the most central 
having the closest relationship to the base. The categories I illustrated in chapter 4 used 
telic qualia and nominals, but all types of qualia and linguistic items can be used in the 
same manner. 
 Using these categories, one can comparatively assess the CM-informativeness of any 
construction that associates a base (or related word) with a category member (or related 
word). When a base and a relatively central member are associated, the result is less CM-
informative than the association of the base with a relatively peripheral member. 
Association between a base and a non-member is unlikely to occur, but when it does, is 
the most informative type of association. 
 Following my explanation of how the model and its assessment mechanism work, I 
discussed category relationships and interactions. I showed that, if a category based on a 
quale Q has a nominal or other linguistic item n as a central member, then the category 
based on n will have Q as a central member. Likewise, if Q has n as a peripheral member, 
n will have Q as a peripheral member, and if n is a non-member of Q, Q will be a non-
member of n. I then showed how multiple categories can be combined to form new 
categories, and how CM-informativeness assessments work when multiple categories are 
involved. I discussed that the order in which categories are used is important, and this 
order varies depending on the syntactic structure of the expression being assessed and on 
whether adjectives are participial or not. Prenominal adjectives are assessed starting with 
the one closest to the noun and working outward (right to left), while predicative 
adjectives are assessed from left to right. When both prenominal and predicative 
adjectives are present, the prenominal ones are assessed first. There is little evidence that 
this ordering matters much when adjectives are not participial, but when they are 
participial, recipients tend to view the ones assessed first as having come to apply to the 
noun first, meaning that the action denoted by the related verb happened before any other 
denoted actions. This yields differing interpretations of, for example, the phrases a peeled 
baked apple and a baked peeled apple. 
 I conclude chapter 4 by outlining how my conception of informativeness, and the 
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model that goes along with it, are different from those of the theories discussed in chapter 
2. The most obvious difference is the focus on CM-informativeness and the provision of 
a model for assessing that aspect of informativeness. I conform with information and 
relevance theories in explicitly considering a recipient’s prior information. In other 
details, my conception of informativeness is most similar to that of relevance theory: both 
define a relatively broad context from which previous information may come and allow 
for information to have degrees of availability rather than simply being present or absent. 
I have thus presented a theory of informativeness that is influenced by, and to some 
degree in concord with, other theories while also making use of the unique conception of 
CM-informativeness. 
5.2 Limitations and future research 
 The primary limitations of the research presented here involve its scope: there are a 
number of topics on which further inquiry is warranted. Several of these relate to the 
initial APP study, because it was the motivation for, rather than the focus of, my theory 
of informativeness. First, the study was limited in that 204 APPs were examined in one 
corpus (plus some Google results when the corpus was insufficient); increasing the 
number of APPs and/or corpora in a future study may provide more robust results. In 
addition, some of the factors investigated in the study may benefit from further research; 
in particular, situation aspect was difficult to assess, and a survey of native speakers’ 
intuitions on issues such as telicity and durativity is planned as part of future work. 
Another area related to the APP study in which there is clearly more research to be done 
is the distinction in CM-informativeness sensitivity between adjectival/attributive and 
verbal/predicative forms as discussed in 3.2.8. 
 Concerning the proposed model, an obvious limitation is the lack of testing it has 
undergone; aside from the varyingly robust connection between CM-informativeness and 
relative frequency, it has so far been unclear exactly how to test the functionality of what 
I have proposed. In future research I would like to figure out how to test category 
contents (i.e., which items are members, how central they are, and which items are non-
members), which would also allow me to test how an individual’s categories might 
change over time or in different contexts. In addition, it may be helpful to determine 
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whether, for a particular individual, a particular category is common or ad hoc; this 
should be relatively straightforward given previous work that has been done on the 
common / ad hoc distinction. I believe there is also the potential for further explication on 
category interactions and on the differences between categories based on definite and 
indefinite expressions. 
Finally, another limitation is the fact that, in its current form, the model only works 
with literal language. This is of particular concern to me because a great deal of language 
is non-literal, so the model is unequipped to deal with a significant portion of language as 
it is actually used. Thus I provide here a basic outline for how I propose to expand the 
model in future work. As in chapter 4, I confine my discussion to nominal- and telic 
quale-based categories, with the understanding that generalization to other category types 
would be relatively straightforward. 
For a nominal-based category, one must consider what other nominal the base can be 
metaphorically associated with. Then the qualia of that metaphorically associated 
nominal appear with the appropriate degree of centrality (based on robustness of 
metaphor and prototypicality aside from metaphor) in the base nominal’s category on a 
metaphorical plane. It may be useful to think of this in a 3-dimensional way, where a 
particular metaphorical extension is represented by a particular plane on which 
metaphorically associated qualia appear. Metaphorical associations only go one direction; 
for example, with the metaphor ‘life is a journey,’ the qualia associated with journey 
appear in life’s category, but the qualia associated with life do not appear in journey’s 
category. Predictions based on the category work basically the same as discussed with 
reference to non-metaphorical categories. 
For a quale-based category, the system is basically the same: nominals to which the 
base quale is metaphorically extended appear with the appropriate degree of centrality (as 
described above) in the base quale’s category on a metaphorical plane. As with nominal-
based categories, metaphorical associations are one-way; given the metaphor ‘seeing is 
touching,’ the nominals associated with the quale SEE appear in TOUCH’s category, but the 
nominals associated with TOUCH do not appear in SEE’s category. Thus both category 
types can be extended to work with metaphorical language use in addition to literal use. 
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5.3 Concluding remarks 
 In this work I provided motivation for a new conception of informativeness by 
outlining the previous ways it has been used and showing that it is an explanatory factor 
in the distribution of negated and non-negated adjectival past participles in attributive 
position. I defined informativeness as the extent to which an utterance increases the 
cognitive availability of information that was not already fully available to the recipient. I 
focused on the assessment of one part of the information already available to the 
recipient: the information that a recipient has when he or she knows the category 
membership of an item. Informativeness related to category membership, or CM-
informativeness, was shown to be correlated to APP frequency. I then proposed a model 
for assessing CM-informativeness. The model uses categories based on qualia and 
linguistic items; a phrase associating a category base and a central member is less CM-
informative than one associating a category base and a peripheral member. The account 
and model I proposed allow for the assessment of an aspect of informativeness that was 
previously largely ignored, and provide a glimpse into some of what may be going on 
cognitively when language users assess informativeness. They are intended to provide 
further elaboration on the concept of informativeness so that it may be useful in a wider 
variety of applications. 
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